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Introduction − Studying Negation and Polarity 
This volume contains the papers presented at the Workshop on Negation and 
Polarity, held in Tübingen, March 8 – 10, 2007. They focus on the syntax, 
semantics, and pragmatics of negation and polarity items. Both topics have been 
central to linguistic study in the last few decades. The reason for this is that these 
phenomena are to some extent universal: Every language has some mode to 
express negation and some set of lexical elements or (idiomatic) expressions that 
can only be felicitously uttered in negative contexts. However, languages exhibit 
strong differences with respect to the way this is executed.  
Hence, the study of negation and polarity phenomena requires on the one 
hand in-depth studies of the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics in particular 
languages, whereas on the other hand typological research of cross-linguistic 
differences is to be carried out. Especially the latter involves the application of 
linguistic database systems to collect and categorize data, observed in either the 
literature or during fieldwork. 
Combining in-depth syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic studies of particular 
language phenomena with typological research and the creation of linguistic 
databases is exactly the kind of work which has been carried out at the 
Collaborative Research Center (Sonderforschungsbereich, SFB) 441, named 
“Linguistic Datastructures”, in Tübingen.  
Within this research center, two projects are occupied with the study of 
negation and polarity. Project A5, “Distributional Idiosyncrasies in Logical 
Form”, studies to what extent lexical elements are restricted in their contexts in 
terms of their syntactic, semantic and selectional characteristics. Negative 
polarity items (NPIs), the subject of the current phase of this project, feature such 
distributional idiosyncrasies: NPIs must be licensed by certain elements within 
the logical form of the expression in which they occur. According to possible 
scope relations, these elements can be identified and classified. One of the main 
aims is to enlarge the database of polarity elements in German.  
Project B10, “Typology and Logical Form of Sentential Negation”, focuses 
on the different ways in which  sentential negation can be expressed. The aim is 
the development of a cross-linguistic theory of sentential negation that is both 
semantically and syntactically adequate. Special attention has been given to the 
phenomenon of Negative Concord (i.e. the multiple morpho-syntactic 
manifestation of a single semantic negation), the interpretation of negative 
indefinites and the relation between negation and speech act theory. All this has 
been investigated for different languages. 
Every scholar working on negation knows that (s)he cannot ignore polarity 
effects, and, conversely, understanding polarity requires a profound knowledge 
of the syntax and semantics of negation. Hence, the two projects have been 
cooperating to a large extend. This cooperation has also resulted in the 
organization of the Workshop on Negation and Polarity. For this workshop, 
papers have been solicited that concentrate on the syntax of negative markers, 
negative concord, the semantics of negative indefinites, the interaction between 
negation and other functional categories (such as tense and modality), the 
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interaction between negation and information structure, the licensing of negative 
and positive polarity items, and the distribution and classification of polarity 
items.  
We received forty submissions, 15 of which were selected for presentation at 
the workshop and one as an alternate. Theresa Biberauer, Cleo Condoravdi and 
Jack Hoeksema accepted our invitation as guest speakers. The present 
proceedings volume features the extended abstracts resulting from the successful 
submissions.  
These proceedings not only contain a rich collection of different 
investigations on the above-mentioned phenomena, but also represent what is 
currently going on in the process of obtaining a better understanding of negation 
and polarity and therefore provide a proper overview of the state of the art in this 
branch of linguistics and philosophy. 
Outline of Contents 
This volume contains 18 papers, of which the first two are the contributions by 
our invited speakers, Theresa Biberauer and Jack Hoeksema.1 The other 16 
papers have been selected through a peer reviewing process. They are arranged 
alphabetically according to the first author. 
Biberauer’s paper focuses on the much-noted, but for the most part not 
systematically discussed “double-nie”-containing negation structure in Afrikaans 
and considers how it may be understood from a comparative perspective. The 
paper investigates the nature and distribution of the isomorphic negation 
elements in sentential negation structures (nie1…nie2) and shows that nie1 is a 
“true” negation element, while nie2 serves as a polarity marker, i.e. Afrikaans is a 
Negative Concord (NC) language. 
In combinations with singular count nouns, the Dutch determiner enig shows 
a diachronic distributional shift from nonveridical environments to a subset of 
negative contexts. Similarities with Greek indefinites of the kanenas-series are 
explored by Hoeksema, and an argument is given that enig splits into two uses, 
one of which is on its way out. 
A study of Japanese adverbial Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) suggests that 
there are two types of NPIs: (i) NPIs that can precede an ellipsis site, and (ii) 
NPIs that cannot precede an ellipsis site. Buchanan claims that elements of the 
first type, but not the second type, are semantically negative and license ellipsis. 
Some sentences as All the students have not read the book, are ambiguous 
between a [∀ ¬] and a [¬ ∀] reading. Since the negation marker is syntactically 
lower than the universal quantifier in this sentence, the availability of the [¬ ∀] 
reading is difficult to explain. It will be shown by Cirillo that this reading is 
possible because the negation marker, which originates as a specifier in the 
negated quantifier phrase not all the students, can be stranded in the same way a 
quantifier can be stranded. 
                                                        
1 Unfortunately, Cleo Condoravdi’s paper couldn’t be included in the proceedings. 
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Erschler studies measure adverbials in Russian whose case marking is 
affected by the presence of negation. While in affirmative clauses they are 
obligatorily marked with the accusative, in the presence of negation the case 
marking can change to genitive. He describes semantic conditions that license 
such change and shows that these conditions are related to event structure and the 
scope of negation. 
Gajewski and Sharvit defend, and propose an amendment to, Chierchia's 
analysis of local implicatures in the scope of attitude verbs. The main 
observation is that while strict DE operators cancel local implicatures, Strawson 
DE operators do not, and that non-monotonic operators support local 
implicatures. 
A recent study by Hulsey et al. (2004) argued that scope resolution of 
negation in child language is largely determined by contextual factors. A 
different view was defended by Musolino and Lidz (2004), which reaffirmed the 
primary role of syntactic factors. Gualmini highlights several theoretical and 
empirical shortcomings of the critique offered by Musolino and Lidz (2004) and 
shows how the available data are accounted for by Hulsey et al.’s model. 
Gualmini and Schwarz study a semantic learnability problem, first 
identified by Crain et al. (1994), concerning the acquisition of ambiguous 
sentences where one reading truth-conditionally entails the other. They 
demonstrate that sentences containing downward entailing operators provide 
children with truth-conditional evidence that would allow them to solve the 
learnability problem discussed by Crain et al. (1994). 
In order to examine the controversially discussed meaning of negated polar 
questions, Hartung has conducted some experiments. The results indicate that 
one kind of negation in polar questions contributes a presupposition that the 
speaker believes in the truth of the positive proposition. Furthermore, a second 
kind of negation has the effect that the question is about a negated proposition. 
What is common to both kinds of negation is that they need a proper context in 
order to be felicitous. 
Herburger and Mauck argue that the internal semantics of NPIs does not 
fully explain Ladusaw’s puzzle, the question of why NPIs are licensed in 
downward entailing contexts. Instead, they propose that though it is no accident 
that NPIs have the semantics they have, ultimately, it is the presence of a 
syntactic feature that determines whether a semantically predisposed expression 
is an NPI or not. They spell out the implications of this analysis for the licensing 
of NPIs and their historical development. 
The interest of Hsiao’s paper is in questions of knowledge and negation. She 
discusses the different representations of epistemic implicatures/biases in polar 
(or yes-no) and bipolar (i.e., A-not-A) constructions. Her examples show that 
NPIs have negative-biased force, and PPIs possess positive-biased force.  
The typological distinction of different polarity types of indefinites leads to 
new insights in the history of negation beyond Jespersen's Cycle. It allows one to 
capture a whole range of changes in the marking of negation and polarity that 
have gone virtually unnoticed in classical philology. This is illustrated by Jäger 
in a cross-linguistic perspective with special emphasis on German. Furthermore, 
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it is shown that, while it is common for indefinites to become 'more negative', the 
opposite change is also attested. 
Kim and Sells show that Korean NPIs are universal-like in nature, scoping 
over negation. Specifically, a Korean NPI takes negation in its immediate scope, 
respecting a generalized form of the Immediate Scope Constraint of Linebarger. 
Levinson discusses a particular class of Negative Polarity Items in English: 
Negative Polarity Particles (NPPs). He observes that these items are only 
licensed by a subset of downward entailing (DE) environments. To distinguish 
the DE environments that can license NPPs he proposes an additional condition 
of assertivity and shows that only environments that are both DE and assertive 
can license NPPs. The combination ‘DE and assertive’ is then shown to be 
helpful in explaining other semantic and pragmatic phenomena. 
Østbø presents data from two Norwegian dialects which each have two 
different negative markers with different distribution. In these dialects of 
Setesdal, as in the dialect of Älvdalen, the verb can move across a short form of 
negation but not the full form in non-asserted embedded clauses. In the dialects 
of Trøndelag the short negation may among others induce a peculiarity in 
imperatives. She discusses the possible explanation that these facts are related to 
the different syntactic status of the short negations, one being both a head and a 
specifier, the other being a specifier marked as a clitic. 
Sailer argues that the class of interveners for NPI-Licensing matches exactly 
with the class of operators that are treated as establishing a dynamic relation 
between two Discourse Representation Structures within Discourse Represent-
ation Theory. 
Data from the FRED and the BNC-SpS corpora show that most varieties of 
non-standard British English allow n-words to co-exist with polarity items (PIs) 
in NC constructions. Two separate licensing mechanisms operate in such cases. 
Tubau argues that never bears [iNeg] features in some occasions, and [uNeg] 
features in some others. By means of real data, the assumption that, unlike 
Standard English, Non-Standard English has n-words instead of negative 
quantifiers is strengthened.  
Finally, Yamashita claims that the Shika-NPI construction in Tokyo 
Japanese, like Wh-questions, exhibits not only the prosodic, but also the 
interpretive property which is closely related to the former. This result provides 
further support for the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to the theory of 
grammar, which seriously takes prosody into consideration of syntactic analysis. 
 
We are very grateful to Stefan Müller and Frank Richter for their technical 
assistance in creating the workshop proceedings and to Doris Penka for helpful 
comments. 
 
Amsterdam and Tübingen, February 2007  
 
Hedde Zeijlstra and Jan-Philipp Soehn 
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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the much-noted, but for the most 
part not systematically discussed “double-nie”-
containing negation structure in Afrikaans and considers 
how it may be understood from a comparative 
perspective. The paper investigates the nature and 
distribution of the isomorphic negation elements in 
sentential negation structures (nie1 …nie2) and shows 
that nie1 is a “true” negation element, while nie2 serves 
as a polarity marker, i.e. Afrikaans is a Negative 
Concord (NC) language. Nie2, however, has the peculiar 
feature that it is obligatorily absent in certain negation 
contexts, raising questions as to whether Afrikaans 
is/isn’t a strict NC language. It is shown that it is, and 
also that an analysis of nie2 as a polarity item can 
account for a range of phenomena including the 
occurrence of nie2 in non-negative contexts, and formal 
parallels between Afrikaans negation structures and 
negation and polarity-marking structures found in a 
range of related and unrelated languages. 
1 Introduction†
An often noted fact about Afrikaans is that it is a Negative Concord (NC) 
language which employs two superficially identical negators wherever negation 
does not involve specially designated n-words – cf. (1): 
(1) Ek verstaan     nie1  sy  redenasie nie2 
 I    understand not   his reasoning not  
 “I don’t understand his reasoning” 
Two further notable, but not often noted facts about Afrikaans are, firstly, that 
there are range of circumstances in which nie-doubling produces an 
ungrammatical structure – cf. (2) – and, secondly, that it is possible for a single 
nie to surface in non-negative contexts in spoken Afrikaans – cf. (3): 
(2) Ek verstaan (*nie) hom  nie  
 I    understand not  him  NEG  
 “I don’t understand him” 
(3) Ek kan my nouliks/skaars inhou   nie 
 I    can me barely              in-hold not 
 “I can barely contain myself”, i.e. “I’m very excited“ 
                                                        
† For helpfully confirming the crucial data, I thank André Pretorius, and for their 
thought-provoking comments and suggestions, the following also deserve thanks: the 
audiences at the Doubling in European Dialects conference held in Amsterdam in 
March 2006 and at the CGSW21 meeting held in Santa Cruz later that month, 
particularly Sjef Barbiers, Hans Bennis, Helmut Weiss and Hedde Zeijlstra. 
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The present paper investigates these and related empirical facts in order to 
determine how the structure of Afrikaans negation is to be understood. Section 2 
considers the nature of the two nies and establishes Afrikaans as a strict NC 
language in the sense of Giannakidou (2005), despite the existence of structures 
like (2-3). Section 3 considers the merits of the proposed analysis viewed from 
both a language-internal and a comparative perspective, and concludes. 
2 Negation and Negative Polarity in Afrikaans 
Investigation of the behaviour of the two nies in structures like (1) clearly shows 
that nie1 is the “true” negator, while nie2 represents an element that lacks the 
interface properties typically associated with lexical items, i.e. nie2 is some form 
of functional head (cf. Roberts & Roussou’s  2003 Interface Defectivity 
Hypothesis). The difference between the two nies is summarised in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Comparison of the properties of nie1 and nie2 in Afrikaans 
Property nie1 nie2
1. Omission → meaning change (polarity reversal) YES NO 
2. Modifiability YES NO 
3. Co-ordinateability YES NO 
4. Substitution by emphatic negator YES NO 
5. Stressability YES NO 
 
The properties listed above evidently correspond to what one would expect of an 
NC language, which raises the question whether Afrikaans is a strict NC 
language or not. Structures like (2) would initially suggest not, but it can be 
shown that the non-occurrence of nie2 in structures of this kind is systematically 
regulated by an OCP-style deletion operation that takes place at PF. Section 2.1 
presents the clausal structure of Afrikaans negative sentences and section 2.2, the 
haplological mechanism that regulates the occurrence of nie2. 
2.1 The clause-structure of Afrikaans negative sentences 
Distributional facts clearly show that nie1 is merged at the lower edge of vP (i.e. 
immediately adjacent to v) and that there is no need to postulate a higher NegP to 
which negative elements obligatorily move. The examples in (4-5) illustrate: 
(4)a. … dat ek nie1 altyd/   maklik/gou      verstaan      nie2 
    that  I   not  always/easily/quickly understand NEG 
 “… that I don’t (always/easily) understand (quickly)” 
     b. ... dat ek altyd /   maklik/gou  nie1 verstaan nie2
     that I always/easily/quickly not understand NEG  
 “... that I (always/easily/quickly) don’t understand”  
(5)a. Jy   weet   dat  hy (met  Jan) tevrede (?met Jan) is (met  Jan) 
 you know that he  with John satisfied with John is  with John 
 “You know that he is  satisfied with John” 
BIBERAUER: Afrikaans Negation and Polarity: a comparative investigation... 3
   b. Jy weet dat hy (met niemand) tevrede (?met niemand) is (met niemand) 
 nie2  
 you know that he with no-one satisfied with no-one is with no-one NEG 
 “You know that he is satisfied with no-one” 
The examples in (4) show that nie1 and VP-adverbs can be interchangeably 
merged, with concomitant scope-effects, as one would expect if nie1 belongs to 
this class of adverbs. The examples in (5), in turn, indicate that the same 
distributional possibilities are available to both positive and negative objects, 
something we would not expect if negative objects are required to raise to a 
position designated exclusively for negative elements (cf. i.a. Haegeman, 1995 
and Zanuttini, 1998). The Afrikaans data therefore point to the correctness of the 
view that Germanic negators are vP-adverbs (cf. i.a. Zeijlstra, 2004).   
Nie2 in its turn is rather clearly a C-related polarity element of the kind discussed 
in i.a. Laka (1994): its origins appear to lie in a discourse-functional “resumptive 
negator” (cf. Roberge, 2004) which was grammaticalised as a polarity- rather 
than a scope-marker. Evidence that nie2 should be viewed as such comes from 
the fact that it is possible in non-veridical contexts like (3) which lack a “scope-
initiating” negator and also from data clearly showing that “scope-marking” is 
not exclusively the province of nie2 (as one might expect, given that this is, with 
only the rarest of spoken-language exceptions, a necessarily clause-final 
element).  
Given these facts and adapting the analysis in Oosthuizen (1998), I propose the 
following clause structure for Afrikaans negative clauses: 
(6)   PolP 
      
  Pol’ 
      CP          
       Pol    CP 
       nie2         
                  [Pol:u]     Spec   C’ 
          ek         
            C  TP 
                   verstaan         
         Spec              T’ 
                   
       T              vP 
                             
      nie1  v’ 
              [Pol:neg]       
             v           VP 
         
           sy redenasie 
As illustrated above, the assumption is that nie2 is merged higher than nie1 and 
that its clause-final occurrence is the consequence of CP-movement (“clausal 
piedpiping”) to Spec-PolP. This movement is assumed to be the consequence of 
an EPP-feature (move diacritic) associated with the unvalued polarity feature 
([Pol:u]) on Pol which probes the corresponding valued feature on nie1/an n-
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word/a non-veridical element in its c-command domain. This analysis therefore 
crucially assumes that the “real” negators in Afrikaans bear valued/interpretable 
features (contra Zeijlstra), a claim that correctly predicts that these elements can 
surface independently of nie2 (as often happens in the spoken language) without 
their negative meaning being compromised (cf. property 1 of Table 1). Consider 
(7) which illustrates the relevant optionally available omission of nie2: 
(7) A: Wie’s daar? B:  Niemand (nie2) 
  who’s there  no-one (neg) 
If this is the case, however, is there any reason for maintaining the assumption 
that Afrikaans is a strict NC language?   
2.2 Haplology in Afrikaans negative structures 
Consider (6) again: this structure represents a sentence in which two nies are 
realised. Investigation of structures which systematically (as opposed to just 
sporadically as in spoken-language structures like (7)) bar nie2 reveals that these 
are all structures in which the contents of VP have been evacuated: V2 structures 
lacking objects or VP-adverbs, V2 structures featuring scrambled objects and 
pronominal objects (which undergo obligatory scrambling; cf. (2)), V2 structures 
in which VP-adverbs outscope nie1 (as in (4b)), and V1 structures lacking VP-
contained material are therefore all incompatible with nie2, while structures in 
which VP is filled – all embedded clauses, for example – obligatorily require two 
nies. The examples in (8) illustrate: 
(8)a. Hy kom    nie1 (*nie2) 
 he  comes not   NEG  
 “He isn’t coming” 
     b. Hy kom waarskynlik/moontlik nie1 (*nie2) 
 he comes probably/possibly    not      NEG 
 “He is probably/possibly not coming” 
     c. Hy verstaan     daardie redenasie/dit nie1 (*nie2) 
 he  understand that        reasoning/it   not    NEG 
 “He doesn’t understand that reasoning/it”   
     d. Kom    hy nie1 (nie2)? 
 comes he not    NEG 
 “Isn’t he coming?” 
    e. Wat   verstaan      jy   nie1 (nie2)?  
 What understand you not    NEG 
 “What don’t you understand?” 
I take the distributional fact outlined above to signal the operation of an OCP-
like mechanism which operates as given in (9): 
(9) Afrikaans Syntactic Haplology mechanism  
  Nie2 is subject to PF deletion whenever it is sent to Spellout in a position 
 where it will (a) end up (following copy deletion) being the 
 element which is spelled out immediately adjacent to nie1 and (b) in 
 the same prosodic phrase (φ) as nie1. 
 i.e. [φ… nie1 nie2] → nie1 nie2  
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Employed in conjunction with a syntax-PF mapping algorithm of the kind 
proposed in Selkirk (1995) and Truckenbrodt (1995), (9) correctly predicts the 
(non-) occurrence of nie2, also in more complex structures involving multiple 
negation. Furthermore, it also has the virtue of being a “natural” PF-mechanism 
whose operation is appropriately constrained so as not to rule out well-formed 
structures in which identical elements do surface adjacent to one another (e.g. 
I’m keen to stay on on the West Coast in English). This is particularly important 
since adjacent nies are not categorically ruled out in Afrikaans – cf. (10): 
 
(10) Hy verstaan     NIE1 nie1 die redenasie nie2 
 he understands not   not  the reasoning NEG 
 “He doesn’t NOT understand the reasoning” (i.e. he does understand it) 
 
Given (9), it therefore seems reasonable to conclude that Afrikaans is indeed a 
strict NC language in which nie1 bears LF-interpretable negation features and 
nie2 functions as a polarity head. The following section will consider the extent 
to which an analysis of this kind seems natural when viewed in comparative 
perspective. 
3 Afrikaans negation in crosslinguistic perspective 
To conclude, I will focus on three aspects of the proposed analysis: (a) “clausal 
piedpiping”, (b) the occurrence of a polarity head in the C-domain of a Germanic 
language and (c) the feasibility of postulating OCP-style deletion in negation 
contexts generally. Clausal piedpiping appears to be quite widely attested in the 
world’s languages, particularly in contexts involving operators (cf. wh-
piedpiping as discussed i.a. in Simpson, 2000 and neg-piedpiping as discussed in 
i.a. Hagstrom, 2000). If van Craenenbroeck (2004) is correct in identifying 
elements like ja(wel) as C-related affirmation (polarity) markers which feature in 
clausal piedpiping structures, Afrikaans need not even be unique in the Germanic 
context in exhibiting either clausal piedpiping or a C-related polarity marker; and 
polarity-biasing interrogatives containing elements like huh and right (You’re 
going home, huh/right?) in English and oder in German (Du kommst mit, oder?) 
may represent further instances of C-related polarity heads attested in Germanic. 
Finally, (c) seems to be attested in a range of West African languages (cf. Bell 
2004, Dryer 2006), all of which are NC languages and all of which feature 
identical negators whose presence/absence appears to be regulated in exactly the 
same way as in Afrikaans.  
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Abstract
This paper offers a systematic approach to NPI licensing in temporal
clauses based on a uniform analysis of temporal connectives as relations be-
tween times and relying on appropriate type shifting for compositional build-
up. The quantificational force commonly associated with temporal connec-
tives is attributed to the operators earliest and max operating on the temporal
clause and effecting the necessary type-lowering for a connective to compose
with a clause. An implication about the truth of a temporal clause with any
kind of temporal connective is a semantic presupposition due to a definedness
condition associated with earliest and max. Based on Beaver & Condoravdi
(2003, in progress), I show that veridical and non-veridical before induces a
reversal in specificity ordering when combined with a temporal clause, and
so does after when construed with max. I then show that the exceptional NPI
licensing in until and since clauses is due to a reversal in specificity ordering
induced after the composition of these clauses with main clauses of a particu-
lar kind. Crucial throughout is the more restricted, presupposition-dependent
notion of entailment, Strawson-entailment, proposed by von Fintel (1999).
1 Introduction
Before licenses negative polarity items, while after generally does not. Therefore,
according to Ladusaw (1979), the strengthening inference in (1) ought to be valid.
However, (1) appears no more valid intuitively than the strengthening inference
in (2).
(1) He left before we were in the room.
? ∴ He left before we were in the room standing by the window.
(2) He left after we were in the room.
6∴ He left after we were in the room standing by the window.
The invalidity of the inference in (1) is in a sense only apparent. It comes
about because before and after sentences give rise to two kinds of implications:
an implication that the temporal clause is true (TC) and an implication about the
relative ordering between the events or states of affairs described by the main and
by the temporal clause (O). The conclusions of (1) and (2) share the same TC—
they both imply that we stood by the window at some point while in the room. The
corresponding premises do not guarantee the truth of that implication. However, if
we take TC to hold, (1) and (2) differ with respect to the other implication of the
conclusion: O necessarily follows from the premise in the case of (1) but not in the
case of (2).
†Thanks to the audiences at MIT, where an earlier version of this work was presented in April
2006, and at NegPol, where this paper was presented in March 2007.
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A popular view of the semantics of before and after treats TC as a truth-con-
ditional entailment of after sentences but not of before sentences. As shown in
(3), this view takes before to universally quantify over the times in the denotation
of the temporal clause and after to existentially quantify over them (Heina¨ma¨ki,
1972; Landman, 1991; Ogihara, 1995).
(3) A Before B iff (∃t ∈ A)(∀t′ ∈ B) t < t′
A After B iff (∃t ∈ A)(∃t′ ∈ B) t > t′
The semantics in (3) was primarily motivated by the asymmetries in before and
after’s inferential properties pointed out by Anscombe (1964)1 but has also been
used to account for their asymmetry in licensing NPIs.
With respect to the temporal clause, (3) makes before non-veridical and down-
ward entailing (DE) and after veridical and non-DE. (3) thus makes (1) valid and
(2) invalid. Landman (1991:143) defends this view about the validity of inferences
like (1) explicitly: “The fact that the inference is weird doesn’t mean that it is in-
valid. This issue clearly has to do with the question whether p before q entails that
q took place or presupposes or implicates that q took place. Entailments cannot
be canceled, implicatures can.” Endorsing the universal semantics, Zwarts (1995)
argues that it is nonveridicality that “plays a role in the temporal system of many
languages, particularly in connection with connectives like before” (p. 286) and
that the universal semantics “makes before a nonveridical connective whose char-
acteristic feature is that pBq doesn’t necessarily imply q.” (p. 299)
This is a simple and elegant account of NPI licensing in before-clauses. But
it is not an adequate analysis of before and after, unless supplied with pragmatic
principles to explain, first, why the TC implication of a before sentence, when
present, is no more cancelable than the same implication of an after sentence, and,
secondly, the modal implications that accompany non-veridical readings of before.
The need for the latter is seen in (4) and (5). In (4) the implication that the temporal
clause is false is accompanied by a counterfactual implication. In (5) the implica-
tion of speaker uncertainty as to the truth of the temporal clause is accompanied by
a likelihood implication.
(4) The mice died before they showed an/any immune response.
No immune response.
The mice might have shown an immune response had they lived longer.
(5) We left the demonstration before there was (any) trouble.
Trouble looked likely before we left and may have come about.
In order to address precisely these implications, Heina¨ma¨ki (1972) and Ogihara
(1995) associate a presupposition with before.2 Some additional assumptions are
1(3) is a reconstruction of Anscombe (1964), who considers and rejects the quantificational anal-
ysis. For a more faithful reconstruction of Anscombe’s own proposal see del Prete (2005).
2Their proposals differ in several significant respects, including the presupposition they assign to
before. Heina¨ma¨ki makes TC a semantic presupposition of veridical before, while Ogihara makes
the likelihood of TC a uniform pragmatic presupposition of before.
10
then needed to resolve the question of the role of presuppositions in strengthening
inferences. Under what conditions, for instance, can (4) be said to be semantically
stronger than (6a), or (5) stronger than (6b)?
(6) a. The mice died before they showed a strong immune response.
b. We left the demonstration before there was (any) serious trouble.
Ogihara (1995:282) offers the necessary qualification: for premise and conclusion
“to be comparable, the same presupposition must be shared by them.”3 This means,
for instance, that the relative semantic strength of (4) and (6a) can only be assessed
in contexts where the two temporal clauses are equivalent, i.e. where a likely im-
mune response would also be a strong immune response.
More recently, von Fintel (1999) has motivated the kind of qualification Ogi-
hara employed on more general grounds and formulated it in somewhat different
terms. He proposed a more restricted notion of entailment, Strawson-entailment,
as coming into play when checking strengthening inferences. The main idea is that
the strengthening inferences relevant for NPI licensing do not require that the truth
of the proposition pG based on the more general expression guarantee the defined-
ness of the proposition pS based on the more specific expression. The requirement
is rather that pG restricted to those worlds in which pS is defined entail pS .
This relativized notion of entailment comes into play in all cases of NPI licens-
ing in temporal clauses, observed not just with before but under certain circum-
stances also with after (Linebarger, 1987, 1991), since (Zwarts, 1995; von Fintel,
1999), and until. This means that the TC implication of after, since and until
clauses is not simply truth-conditional.
The rest of the paper outlines how Strawson-entailment coupled with a se-
mantics of temporal connectives as relations between times and composing with
temporal clauses via the mediation of certain operators gives a uniform analysis of
NPI licensing in temporal clauses. With this perspective, seemingly exceptional or
pragmatically-based NPI licensing can be brought under the fold of semantically
based accounts of NPI licensing. The proposed analysis integrates NPI licensing
with the veridical and modal implications of temporal clauses and accounts for the
so far unobserved synonymy of positive after clauses with an NPI and the corre-
sponding negative after clauses.
2 NPI licensing by before
Beaver & Condoravdi (2003, in progress) argue that before and after differ neither
in quantificational force nor in presuppositionality. Lexically before and after are
3Since on Ogihara’s analysis the truth-conditional content of before sentences, determined by (3),
does not depend on their presuppositional content, one could follow Ladusaw (1979) and assume
that the entailment in strengthening inferences is solely based on truth-conditional content and that,
therefore, we should abstract away from presupposition satisfaction when judging the validity of
strengthening inferences. This is not an option afforded to the analysis presented below since there
the truth-conditional content crucially depends on operators like earliest being defined.
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relations between times and cannot directly compose with a clause. In order for
the connectives to apply to a set of times, an operator has to apply first, selecting
a particular time from that set. B&C (2003) show that earliest gets the desired
asymmetry in inferential properties between before and after. For left-bounded
instantiated sets of times T , earliest.T is that t ∈ T such that t = glb(T ). In order
for earliest to be defined, the temporal clause has to be instantiated.
2.1 Veridical before
Let us take sentence radicals to denote temporal properties (mappings from worlds
to sets of times) and assume that there is only one semantic tense taking scope over
both main and temporal clause. Before denotes the relation of temporal precedence
<, and after its converse >. They combine with a sentence radical via the prior
application of earliest, as seen in (7b,c). Temporal and main clauses combine con-
junctively as in (7d,e) and the subsequent application of tense yields a proposition
by instantiating the resulting temporal property.
(7) a. earliestw.B = earliest.λt at(w, t, B) defined if ∃t at(w, t, B)
b. [[before B]]w = λt t < earliestw.B if defined
c. [[after B]]w = λt t > earliestw.B if defined
d. [[A before B]]w = λt at(w, t, A) ∧ t < earliestw.B if defined
e. [[A after B]]w = λt at(w, t, A) ∧ t > earliestw.B if defined
Supposing Y is a temporal property at least as specific asX , then for any world
w for which earliestw is defined for both Y and X:
(8) a. earliestw.X ≤ earliestw.Y
b. [[before X]]w ⊆ [[before Y]]w
λt t < earliestwX ⊆ λt t < earliestwY
c. [[after Y]]w ⊆ [[after X]]w
λt t > earliestwY ⊆ λt t > earliestwX
(8b) shows the reversal induced by before based on the temporal ordering, shown
in (8a), between the earliest time at which X is instantiated and the earliest time
at which Y is instantiated. The proposition λw∃t at(w, t, A) ∧ t < earliestw.X is
then at least as strong as the proposition λw∃t at(w, t, A)∧t < earliestw.Y . Before
sentences, therefore, satisfy strengthening inferences provided earliest is defined.
On this view, an exclusively veridical before would still be an NPI licenser. By
contrast, after preserves the original specificity ordering, as shown in (8c), and,
therefore, after sentences cannot satisfy strengthening inferences.
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2.2 Non-Veridical before
Beaver & Condoravdi (2003) attribute the modal dimension of before to the fact
that when earliest is undefined in the world of evaluation it is relativized to a set of
alternatives to the world of evaluation in which the temporal property the operator
applies to is instantiated. If that set is empty, earliest will remain undefined and
the before sentence will lack a truth value. The alternatives are specified as the
reasonably probable amongst a world’s historical alternatives at a given time and
thus depend on a contextual parameter.4
With earliest relativized to a set of worldsW defined as in (9a), we can specify
the meaning of before clauses as in (9b), with altc(w, t,X) defined as in (10).
(9) a. earliestW .X = earliest.λt(∃w ∈W ) at(w, t,X) defined if
∃w ∈W ∃t at(w, t,X)
b. [[before X]]cw = λt t < earliestaltc(w,t,X).X if defined
(10) altc(w, t,X) =
{w} if ∃t′ at(w, t′, X)
{w′ ∈ rphc(w, t) | ∃t′ at(w′, t′, X)} otherwise
Supposing Y is a temporal property at least as specific asX , then for any context c,
any world w and time t for which earliestaltc(w,t,X) is defined and altc(w, t,X) 6=
{w}:
(11) a. altc(w, t, Y ) ⊆ altc(w, t,X)
b. earliestaltc(w,t,X).X ≤ earliestaltc(w,t,Y ).Y if earliestaltc(w,t,Y ) defined
c. [[before X]]cw ⊆ [[before Y]]cw if [[before Y]]cw is defined
Y may be instantiated only in a subset of the worlds in which X is instantiated,
but still the earliest time at which Y is instantiated in some world will be no earlier
than the earliest time at which X is instantiated in any world. If earliestaltc(w,t,X)
is defined, then earliestaltc(w,t,Y ) will be defined just as long as Y ’s instantiation is
consistent with altc(w, t,X). Therefore, the relative semantic strength of (4) and
(6a) can be assessed in any context in which a strong immune response is consis-
tent with the possibility of an immune response, that is in any context implying
that if the mice had shown an immune response that response might have been a
strong one. This weaker requirement of consistency allows for a stronger notion of
entailment than Ogihara’s requirement of equivalence.
2.3 Alternatives and Strawson entailment
We can combine Krifka’s (1995) analysis of NPIs as introducing alternatives with
von Fintel’s Strawson-entailment by considering only those alternatives that yield
4Since the worlds in the expanded domain are selected from a particular forward branching struc-
ture of possible worlds, after is only trivially modal but before can be essentially modal.
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a semantic value. In these terms, the reversal induced by before would be with
respect to the temporal property derived on the basis of the ordinary content of an
NPI in a temporal clause and alternative temporal properties derived on the basis
of the alternatives associated with the NPI, as shown schematically in (12) (more
concrete examples are found in the following sections).
(12) [[ before Z ]] ⊆ [[ before ZA ]] if defined
In general, it can be shown that the familiar strength-based inferences are valid—
for instance, (12) is guaranteed to be satisfied—for exhaustive NPIs.5 Krifka
(1995) characterizes weak NPIs as exhaustive NPIs. Extra considerations need
to be brought to bear for non-exhaustive NPIs, which Krifka takes to characterize
strong NPIs, and I will not discuss them here.
3 NPI licensing by after
Linebarger (1987, 1991) showed that after may license NPIs when combined with
an appropriate measure phrase (long after, (for) years after, but not seconds after).
(13) a. She persisted for years after she had any hope at all of succeeding. [ML]
She first had hope of succeeding and then she ran out of hope.
She persisted for years after she had run out of hope.
b. Over months however the reality of the situation emerged, tho long
after anyone still cared.[Google]
People first cared and then stopped caring.
The reality of the situation emerged after people had stopped caring.
c. # Dogs were domesticated after there were any humans on the planet.
Humans stopped existing.
Linebarger used examples like (13a) to argue against semantic accounts of NPI
licensing. She claimed that NPIs can be licensed in the presence of a Negative
Implicature (NI) and that with the right measure phrase after tends to “close down”
the situation described in the temporal clause, resulting in the relevant NI. (13a)’s
NI, for instance, is that she persisted when there was no hope anymore.
According to Linebarger (1991:176), “on the NI account, the acceptability of
NPIs in sentences of the form P (long) after Q depends upon whether or not they
are paraphraseable as P when not Q” The presence of a NI, however, is not suf-
ficient for NPI licensing. Until sentences systematically give rise to a negative
implication, e.g. in (14) that he was in the room while she was not, but NPIs are
generally not licensed in until clauses.
(14) He was at the office until she/*anyone else got in.
5An NPI is exhaustive iff the union of the semantic values of the alternatives is identical to the
ordinary semantic value of the NPI.
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Linebarger (1991) imposes certain conditions on the negative implication associ-
ated with NPI licensing but it does not seem that until’s NI satisfies them any less
than after’s NI.
The generalization to draw from examples like (13) is that an NPI in an after-
clause is associated with the implication that the situation described by that clause
ended at some point and that the situation described by the main clause is asserted
to hold after that point. Now, with this ordering, strengthening inferences are valid,
suggesting that the semantic account of NPI licensing, based on Strawson down-
ward entailment, is applicable here as well. It is interesting to observe that the
kind of reading forced by an NPI in an after clause arises independently of the
presence of an NPI. (15a) has two incompatible readings and (15b) is synonymous
with (15c). Moreover, NPI licensing is not dependent on there being a measure
phrase, as seen in (15d).
(15) a. It also included cleaning the viewing room after you had a cat or bunny
in there. [Google]
Cleaning during vs. after cat’s or bunny’s presence
b. Once the white blood cells are there, they continue to fight long after
there is an enemy to conquer. [Google]
c. Once the white blood cells are there, they continue to fight long after
there is no enemy to conquer anymore.
d. Some say the cuts were made after there was any real use for them.
[Google]
In Beaver & Condoravdi (in progress) we propose that in addition to earli-
est, the operator max can be applied to a sentence radical to yield a unique time.
Like earliest, max is defined only if the sentence radical to which it applies is
instantiated. earliest and max give different interpretations for after but identi-
cal ones for before. The semantics does not constrain which operator is applied
but in the case of after the choice of operator will determine the implications of
the sentence (coming about/into existence vs. ceasing to hold/be) as well as the
validity of strengthening inferences. For bounded, instantiated sets of times T ,
max.T is defined only if T is cumulative (closed under summation); when defined
max.T =
⊕
T ∪ {glb(T ), lub(T )}. For instantiated, bounded, homogeneous (di-
visive and cumulative) clauses, such as the stative clauses comprising the great
majority of after clauses with NPIs, max cannot fail to be defined.6
On this view, the endpoint readings observed in (13) and (15) are semantic,
not due to pragmatic strengthening, and it is precisely in the construal with max
that after is predicted to license NPIs. After in construal with earliest, as we have
seen, does not induce the necessary specificity ordering reversal for strengthening
6The unacceptability of Linebarger’s *He kept writing novels long after he retired to any
Caribbean island can be attributed to the non-cumulativity of the achievement predicate retire to
any Caribbean island.
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inferences to be valid. If there is an NPI in an after clause, max will have to apply
to the temporal clause. Linebarger’s NI is the result of max’s requirement for a
right-bounded set and after’s truth-conditional content. The synonymy of positive
and negative after-clauses, seen with (15b,c) above and (16) below, is due to the
option for both earliest and max.
(16) a. Small mammals were abundant (long) after there were no dinosaurs
anywhere on the planet.
b. Small mammals were abundant (long) after there were any dinosaurs
anywhere on the planet.
Let us see more concretely how the analysis works for (16), ignoring the NPI
anywhere in (16a), as it is licensed by overt negation in the temporal clause. The
sentence radicals corresponding to the main and temporal clauses are as in (17).
The NPIs are indefinites and are associated with alternatives with more specific
descriptive content. As seen in (18), the operator earliest is associated with the
temporal clause in (16a) and the operator max with the temporal clause in (16b).
(17) a. X = “Small mammals be abundant”
b. Y = “There be no dinosaurs anywhere on the planet”
c. Z = “There be any dinosaurs anywhere on the planet”
d. [[X]]w = λt at(w, t, abundant(smam))
e. [[Y]]w = λt at(w, t,¬∃x∃ydino(x) ∧ pop(y) ∧ loc(x, y))
f. [[Z]]w = λt at(w, t, ∃x∃ydino(x) ∧ pop(y) ∧ loc(x, y))
g. [[ZA]]w = λt at(w, t, ∃x∃ydinoA(x) ∧ popA(y) ∧ loc(x, y))
(18) a. [[after Y]]w = λt t > earliestw.λt′ at(w, t′,¬∃x∃ydino(x) ∧ pop(y) ∧
loc(x, y))
b. [[after Z]]w = λt t > max.λt′ at(w, t′,∃x∃ydino(x)∧pop(y)∧loc(x, y))
c. [[after ZA]]w = λt t > max.λt′ at(w, t′,∃x∃ydinoA(x) ∧ popA(y) ∧
loc(x, y))
Ywill denote a left-bounded set of times, as required by the definedness conditions
of earliest, and Z or ZA a right-bounded set of times, as required by the definedness
conditions of max, only relative to worlds in which dinosaurs (or in the case of ZA
more specific kinds of dinosaurs) become extinct. For any such world w, (19a,b)
hold. (19b) is an instance of the specificity reversal induced by after.
(19) a. [[after Y]]w = [[after Z]]w
b. [[after Z]]w ⊆ [[after ZA]]w
Finally, the effect of measure modifiers on NPI licensing is a direct conse-
quence of their semantics. Long after, years after preserve the specificity ordering
in (19b), whereas shortly after, seconds after in general do not.
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4 NPI licensing by since and until
NPIs are generally unacceptable in since clauses or until clauses:
(20) a. *I’ve been sitting over here since anyone paid any attention to me.
b. *I stayed in the room until anyone noticed me.
Zwarts (1995), citing Bolinger (1977), notes that it’s two weeks since, it’s a long
time since, it’s been a while since license any. von Fintel (1999) makes a similar
observation, citing examples like (21), and uses this case as another (suggestive)
instance of licensing of NPIs based on Strawson-entailment.
(21) It’s been five years since I saw any bird of prey in this area. [vF]
Observing that while the inference in (22) is invalid, the adjusted inference in (23)
is valid von Fintel concludes the following regarding (21): “This construction is not
downward entailing as the problematic inference in (22) shows. Nevertheless, (21)
shows that NPIs are licensed by this construction. We observe that it’s been five
years since p asserts that p hasn’t been true since five years ago and presupposes
that p was indeed true five years ago. The Strawson-DE experiment in (23) works
fine.” (p. 107)
(22) It’s been five years since I saw a bird of prey in this area.
6⇒ It’s been five years since I saw an eagle in this area. [vF]
(23) It’s been five years since I saw a bird of prey in this area.
Five years ago I saw an eagle in this area.
∴ It’s been five years since I saw an eagle in this area. [vF]
The fact that the last time I saw a bird of prey in this area was (at least) five years
ago seems part of the informative content of (21) rather than presupposed. It would,
moreover, be desirable to derive the implications of (21) without appeal to any
construction-specific presuppositions. In addition to being theoretically preferable,
it would be empirically more adequate since for two hours/for a long time until
similarly license NPIs:
(24) The package was in the office for a week until anyone noticed it.
(heard on NPR, March 2006)
Noone noticed the package for a week.
Someone (eventually) noticed the package.
(25) a. However, it was a long time until anyone knew who’d really fathered
Amy. [Google]
For a long time noone really knew.
Someone (eventually) got to know.
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b. She sat at the Fandangle for a long time until anyone acknowledged her
presence. [Google]
For a long time noone noticed her.
Someone (eventually) noticed her.
What are (24) or (25) supposed to pressupose? How do the negative and positive
implications of (24) and (25) and their implied ordering come about? We can use
the general apparatus developed so far, associating definedness conditions with
the operators earliest and max instead of the connectives themselves or particular
constructions in which the connectives appear, to account for the meaning of (21),
(24), (25), as well as the exceptional NPI licensing in since and until clauses.
4.1 Until
Until is lexically a relation between a time and intervals extending up to that time:
λt1λt2 t2 < t1 ∧ convex(t1 ⊕ t2). In the relevant NPI licensing cases until is con-
strued with earliest. As before, main and temporal clauses compose intersectively.
(26) gives the analysis of (24).
(26) a. X = “The package be in the office”
b. Z = “Anyone notice it”
c. [[Z]]w = λt at(w, t, ∃x(person(x) ∧ notice(x, p)))
d. [[ZA]]w = λt at(w, t, ∃x(personA(x) ∧ notice(x, p)))
e. [[X]]w = λt at(w, t, in-office(p)) ∧ 1 week ≤| t |
f. utw = earliest.λt at(w, t, ∃x(person(x) ∧ notice(x, p))
g. utAw = earliest.λt at(w, t, ∃x(personA(x) ∧ notice(x, p))
h. [[until Z]]w = λt t < utw ∧ convex(utw ⊕ t)
i. [[until ZA]]w = λt t < utAw ∧ convex(utAw ⊕ t)
j. [[X until Z]]w = λt t < utw ∧ convex(utw ⊕ t)∧ at(w, t, in-office(p))∧
1 week ≤| t |
k. [[X until ZA]]w = λt t < utAw∧convex(utAw⊕t)∧at(w, t, in-office(p))∧
1 week ≤| t |
For any w, utw ≤ utAw. Therefore, for any defined ZA, [[ until Z ]] is either
equal to or disjoint from [[ until ZA ]]. So, in general, there is no NPI licensing in
until clauses. But in composition with main clauses like X we get the necessary
specificity reversal: [[ X until Z ]] ⊆ [[ X until ZA ]], for any defined ZA.
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4.2 Since
Iatridou (2003) looks more closely at it’s been 5 years/a long time since construc-
tions, what she calls temporal existentials. She argues that in temporal existentials
there is a uniqueness presupposition in addition to an existential presupposition
associated with the since clause. On her approach, the inference in (23) would be
reformulated as in (27).
(27) It’s been five years since I saw a bird of prey in this area.
The only time I saw a bird of prey in this area I saw an eagle.
∴ It’s been five years since I saw an eagle in this area.
However, (28) and (29) clearly show that there is no uniqueness presupposition
necessarily associated with the since clause. Note that the negative and positive
implications of (28a) or (28b) parallel those of the corresponding until cases in
(24) and (25) but the implied ordering is reversed from that of the until cases.
(28) a. It’s been a long time since anyone’s died. [Google]
For a while people were dying.
Noone has died in a long time.
b. It has been over five years since there was any film in our office. That
was truly the biggest hurdle for me, shooting with the F6. [Google]
There used to be film in the office.
There has been no film in the office for over five years.
(29) a. But it’s been a long time since anyone even seriously mentioned any of
them as possible conference champions. [Google]
b. It’s been a long time since anyone attempted a new side-scrolling beat-
em-up, and a much longer time since anyone did it right. [Google]
Since is lexically a relation between a time and intervals extending from that
time onwards: λt1λt2 t1 < t2∧convex(t1⊕t2). In the relevant NPI licensing cases
since is construed with max. Main and temporal clauses compose intersectively.
As in Iatridou (2003), we can take the perfect to scope over the result of main and
temporal clause composition. (30) gives the analysis of (22).
(30) a. X = “It be 5 years”
b. Z = “I see any bird of prey”
c. [[Z]]w = λt at(w, t, ∃x(bird(x) ∧ see(I, x))
d. [[ZA]]w = λt at(w, t, ∃x(birdA(x) ∧ see(I, x))
e. [[X]]w = λt 5 years ≤| t |
f. stw = max.λt at(w, t, ∃x(bird(x) ∧ see(I, x))
g. stAw = max.λt at(w, t, ∃x(birdA(x) ∧ see(I, x))
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h. [[since Z]]w = λt stw < t ∧ convex(stw ⊕ t)
i. [[since ZA]]w = λt stAw < t ∧ convex(stAw ⊕ t)
j. [[X since Z]]w = λt 5 years ≤| t | ∧stw < t ∧ convex(stw ⊕ t)
k. [[X since ZA]]w = λt 5 years ≤| t | ∧stAw < t ∧ convex(stw ⊕ t)
l. [[PERF]]w = λPλt ∃t′ at(w, (t′, t], P )
m. [[PRES]] = λPλw at(w, now, P )
n. [[PRES(PERF(X since Z))]] = λw∃t′ 5 years ≤|(t′, now] | ∧
stw < (t′, now] ∧ convex(stw ⊕ (t′, now])
o. [[PRES(PERF(X since ZA))]] = λw∃t′ 5 years ≤|(t′, now] | ∧
stAw < (t
′, now] ∧ convex(stAw ⊕ (t′, now])
For any w, stAw is a subinterval of stw Therefore, for any defined Z
A, [[since Z]]
is either equal to or disjoint from [[since ZA]]. So, in general, there is no NPI li-
censing in since clauses. But in composition with main clauses like X we get the
necessary specificity reversal: [[ X since Z ]] ⊆ [[ X since ZA ]], for any defined ZA.
The inference in (23) can now be reformulated as in (31).
(31) It’s been five years since I saw a bird of prey in this area.
I have seen a bird of prey in this area.
At some point I stopped seeing birds of prey in this area.
I have seen an eagle in this area.
At some point I stopped seeing eagles in this area.
The last time I saw an eagle in this area was no later than the last time I saw
a bird of prey in this area.
∴ It’s been (at least) five years since I saw an eagle in this area.
The view of since clauses presented here is broadly compatible with Iatridou’s
(2003) observations and conclusions, with the following two differences. First,
the requirement for uniqueness will only be present for non-cumulative temporal
clauses. Secondly, the requirement is not tied to since but ought to be present for
any connective construed with max.
5 Conclusion
Instead of piecemeal analyses we can have a uniform analysis of NPI licensing in
temporal clauses. The operators earliest and max, rather than the temporal con-
nectives, are responsible for quantification over temporal clauses. An implication
about the truth of a temporal clause with any kind of temporal connective is a se-
mantic presupposition due to the definedness condition associated with earliest and
max. This allows us to properly factor out presuppositional content in strengthen-
ing inferences and apply von Fintel’s (1999) presupposition-dependent notion of
Strawson-entailment.
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Abstract 
In combinations with singular count nouns, the Dutch 
determiner enig shows a diachronic distributional shift 
from nonveridical environments to a subset of negative 
contexts. Similarities with Greek indefinites of the 
kanenas-series are explored, and an argument is given 
that enig split into two uses, one of which is on its way 
out. 
1 Introduction 
The Westgermanic languages all have determiners derived from the numeral one 
by means of the affix -ig (which developed into -y in English), compare German 
einig, Dutch enig, and English any (Old English ænig). While these determiners 
share a common origin, it is clear that they have developed in different 
directions. English any is now the best-known example of a negative polarity 
item, German einig is not a polarity item, and Dutch enig takes a middle position: 
it is a polarity item when combined with a singular count noun, and not polarity-
sensitive with mass or plural nouns (cf. Hoeksema and Klein 1995). 
In English, any is a classical polarity item, and shows up in the 
following collection of environments (cf. Klima 1964, Ladusaw 1979, 
Linebarger 1980, Landman and Kadmon 1993, and much other literature):  
 
• negative sentences 
• questions 
• protasis of conditionals 
• complements of negative ("adversative") predicates 
• clausal complements of too 
• complements of without 
• the scope of  quasi-negative quantifiers such as little, few, seldom, etc. 
• relative clauses modifying universal or superlative noun phrases 
• comparative clauses (both of equality and of inequality) 
 
This set of environments is also characteristic of the distributional properties of 
modern Dutch enig and of English ever, provided we ignore for the moment 
those uses of ever where it signifies ‘always’: He was ever the same. Ever since 
the accident, he was a changed man  (cf. Israel 1998 for discussion). It is the 
classical set of downward-entailing or monotone-decreasing contexts (cf. 
Ladusaw 1979, Zwarts 1981, Van der Wouden 1997). Illustrations of enig in the 
various attested environments are given in (2) below: 
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(2) a. Geen van hen heeft enig dier geslacht. 
  none  of  them has   any  animal slaughtered 
  “None of them has slaughtered any animal” 
 b. Heeft u     ooit enig voorstel verworpen? 
  Have you ever any  proposal rejected 
  “Have you ever rejected any proposal?” 
 c. Als ik enig voorstel verwerp, wordt     hij boos. 
  When I any proposal reject,   becomes he mad 
  “When I reject any proposal, he gets mad” 
 d. Hij ontkende enig dier     geslacht      te hebben. 
  he  denied      any animal slaughtered to have 
  “He denied having slaughtered any animal” 
 e. Het was te koud om enig kledingstuk         uit te doen 
  It    was too cold for any  piece of clothing off to do 
  “It was too cold to take off any piece of clothing” 
 f. Hij vertrok zonder enig voorstel verworpen te hebben. 
  he  left   without    any   proposal rejected    to have 
  “He left without having rejected any proposal” 
 g. Weinig mensen hebben enig voorstel ingediend. 
  Few      people   have     any  proposal submitted 
  “Few people have submitted any proposal”  
 h. Iedereen   die  enig voorstel gedaan heeft, krijgt antwoord. 
  everybody who any proposal done  has,   receives answer 
  “Everybody who has made a proposal, will receive an answer” 
 i. Hij was langer dan / zo lang als enige andere speler. 
  He was taller than  / as  tall   as  any    other    player 
  “He was taller than/as tall as any other player” 
 
Unlike any, however, enig does not have a use as a free-choice item: 
 
(3) a. *Neem een appel, enige appel. 
  Take     an   apple, any    apple  
  ‘Take an apple, any apple.’ 
b. *Jan kan enig probleem oplossen. 
Jan   can  any answer     solve 
‘Jan can solve any problem’ 
c. *Enig probleem zal opgelost worden. 
Any   problem   will solved    become 
‘Any problem will be solved.’ 
 
To the extent that the above examples are acceptable at all, they receive an 
existential, nonspecific reading. E.g. (3b) would read as ‘Jan can solve some 
unspecified problem.’  The universal reading of free-choice items is completely 
absent. For accounts of English any that postulate two separate uses, free-choice 
and NPI any, this state of affairs is not a problem: Dutch simply lacks one of the 
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two uses. For unified accounts of any, the Dutch situation is more surprising, and 
does not receive an easy solution.  
2 Historical developments 
Based on a corpus of over 2700 occurrences of enig with singular count nouns 
(ambiguous cases of nouns that could be either count or mass were kept out of 
the database), a number of generalizations can be made regarding the diachrony 
of enig. 
2.1 Contexts in early modern texts 
When we look at older texts, even going back 100 years will suffice to show that 
the distribution of enig has not always been what it is now. The following types 
of environment are all attested: 
 
(4) Modal contexts 
a. Men moest toch wel enige aanwijzing hebben  
“ One would have to have some clue”  
b. Ziedaar een paar vragen, waarop ik gaarne eenig antwoord zou 
willen ontvangen. 
“These are some questions for which I would like to receive an 
answer.” 
Imperative 
c. Kom daar maar eens om in enig ander land. 
  “Try to find/get that in any other country!”  
Subjunctive 
d.   En wie geen steenen kan aandragen storte [..] eenige gift in de 
offerbus 
“And who cannot carry bricks, should donate some gift in the 
offertory-box”  
Disjunction 
e. [..] terwijl mijne oudste Zuster tusschen beide in den Bijbel of 
eenig stichtelijk boek las 
“ (..) while in between my oldest sister was reading in the Bible 
or some devotional book”  
Habitual 
f. Vrienden en bekenden hadden de gewoonte om eenig deel van 
een nieuw gebouw te versieren met een glas 
“Friends and acquaintances had the habit to decorate some part 
of a new building with a glass”  
Sporadic occurrences of  “some or other” readings  (10% of about 300 
“positive” occurrences): 
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g.  Hy zondt enige Benden zyner Lyfwachten naar enig Binnen-
landts Dorp, dat wat verre van de handt ligt. 
“He sent some groups of his body-guards to some interior 
village, that is lying a bit  out of the way. 
h. Die de minste kennis van de manieren van Den Haag hebben, 
weeten, dat het een gerecipieerd gebruik is, dat Jonge 
Juffrouwen nooit alleen in een Gezelschap komen, maar altyd 
verzeld van hunne Moeders, of eenige andere getrouwde Vrouw 
“Those who have the least knowledge of the manners of The 
Hague, know, that it is a received custom, that young Ladies 
never appear alone in society, but always accompanied by their 
Mothers, of some other married Woman” 
 
The examples in this list mostly fall within the category of nonveridical contexts 
(Zwarts 1995, Giannakidou 1997).  Besides occurrences in nonveridical contexts, 
but less commonly, also nonspecific uses in veridical contexts can be found, even 
today. Here, the meaning seems to be indifference: some X or other, as in 
examples g-h above. (Cf. also Haspelmath 1997 and Vlachou 2007 on non-
specific and specific/unknown uses of indefinite pronouns.) 
 In Table 1 below, diachronic distributional developments are sketched. 
Note especially the yellow and blue rows, representing categories that become 
more and less important, respectively, over time.   
I take the driving force behind the developments in this table to be the 
gradual disappearance of nonveridical occurrences. As a result, other categories 
that were important already, such as negation, complements of zonder ‘without’ 
and comparatives, became relatively more important. I assume that the gradual 
reduction of occurrences in conditional clauses is due to the general reduction of 
nonveridical environments, although conditional clauses are also among the 
standard examples of negative contexts (cf. e.g. Landman and Kadmon 1993). 
Note that in English, a conditional clause is a good host both for any and some in 
its ‘some or other’ sense: 
 
(5) a.  If you meet any stray dog, shoot it. 
 b. If you meet some stray dog, shoot it.  It has rabies. 
 
It is clear that the two sentences do not have the same meaning. While (5a) has 
universal force (“shoot every stray dog on sight”), (5b) does not. Moreover, (5a) 
is emphatic (Landman and Kadmon’s strengthening) but (5b) is not. Occurrences 
of enig in the protasis of a conditional are, in the absence of emphasis marking, 
ambiguous between the emphatic any-type use and the nonemphatic some or 
other nonspecific use of English some. Given the large drop in conditional 
environments in Table 1, it is likely that the nonstrengthening, nonspecific uses 
represent the majority of occurrences in the early modern period. 
Also worth pointing out in the table is the jump in negative occurrences 
for enig between the 16th and 17th centuries: I assume this is due to the 
disappearance of negative concord, which in the 16th century was still an 
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important competitor of negation + enig, much like Middle English preferred 
Nobody did nothing etc. to Nobody did anything.   
Also note the temporary drop in frequency of enig in comparatives of 
inequality, which seems due to the competition, at least in the written language, 
of comparatives of equality. After all, if one wanted to state that some woman is 
very beautiful, one could write that she is schoner dan enige vrouw ‘more 
beautiful than any woman’ or zo schoon als enige vrouw ‘as beautiful as any 
woman.’ Comparatives of inequality and comparatives of equality, although they 
differ somewhat in meaning, nonetheless should be viewed as semantic 
competitors from the point of view of the writer. Unlike English any or ever, in 
Dutch the use of enig in comparatives in equality disappeared from the written 
language, mirroring similar developments in the distribution of the negative 
polarity item ooit ‘ever’. Other types of Dutch polarity-sensitive indefinites still 
appear in comparatives of equality, however, e.g. wie dan ook ‘who then also = 
whoever, anyone’: 
 
(6) a.   Jan is groter dan wie dan ook 
  Jan is larger than wie then also 
  ‘Jan is larger than anyone’ 
b. Jan is net zo slim als wie dan ook 
Jan is just as smart as who then also 
 ‘Jan is just as clever as anyone’ 
 
TABLE 1: ENIG - distribution of singular count occurrences  
[minus those of the collocation op enig moment] 
Context before 
1600 
N=109 
1600-
1700 
N=224
1700-
1800 
N=375
1800-
1900 
N=656
1900-
1950 
N=451
1950-
2000 
N=524 
2000-
2007 
N=248 
Negation 17 29 34 33 33 38 37 
Before 1 2 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.4 
Conditional 20 16 9 6 5 3 3 
Comparative 12 5 6 10 16 20 19 
Comp of Eq. - 5 5 1 0.5 0.4 0 
Few/little - 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Hardly - 0.5 1 1 0 0.8 0.8 
Neg. pred. 5 3 6 6 8 5 7 
Question 10 5 7 8 8 7 5 
Seldom 1 - 0.3 1 - 0.2 0.4 
Superlative 2 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.4 
Too - - 0.5 1 1 0.6 0.4 
Universal 3 4 3 2 1 0.2 1 
Without 16 13 14 14 19 19 22 
Positive 13 17 13 15 8 3 2 
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2.2 Discussion 
 
Its gradual disappearance from positive, mainly nonveridical, uses has turned 
enig, at least in combinations with singular count nouns, into a negative polarity 
item. This chance is interesting for several reasons. First, it shows that 
nonveridicality is not an exotic property of some Greek pronouns: Germanic 
languages, which so far had seemed rather different from Greek in not appearing 
to have pronouns sensitive to nonveridicality, also show sensitivity to this 
property. Sensitivity to non-veridicality is of course a sign that a pronoun or 
determiner is used in a non-referring way. Obligatory nonreferentiality may lead 
to a pronoun being used only in nonveridical, including negative, contexts.  In 
negative contexts, emphatic use of items may develop into a special use with 
different distributional properties than nonemphatic, nonstressed occurrences. 
For Greek kanenas, it was shown by Veloudis (1982) and Giannakidou (1997) 
that stressed occurrences have a far more limited distribution, being acceptable 
only in negative sentences, the scope of xoris ‘without’, and prin ‘before.’  For 
English any, the role of stress and focus was emphasized by Sahlin (1979) and 
Krifka (1995). Finally, Hoeksema (1999) argued that Dutch ooit ‘ever’ has 
developed two prosodically-distinct uses, one allowing for comma intonation, the 
other for emphatic lengthening of the vowel. The latter is a negative polarity 
item, the former is not. Let us therefore assume that in certain environments, 
such as negation, the possibility of stress changed enig from an expression 
primary used to express nonreferentiality, to an expression of emphasis, much 
like Greek stressed kanenas, and with an almost identical distribution 
(comparatives being the main difference).  The main difference with the Greek 
situation is that the two types of kanenas remained equally grammatical, whereas 
the nonreferential, nonemphatic form of enig has all but disappeared.   
3 Conclusion 
On the basis of diachronic data, I have argued that Dutch enig changed from a 
non-referential indefinite found primarily in nonveridical contexts into a regular 
negative-polarity item restricted to negative contexts. The role of stress was 
hypothesized to have played a role in this process. The distribution of polarity 
items tends to be fairly unstable, prone to developing sometimes idiosyncratic 
collocation restrictions (van der Wouden 1997, Sailer and Richter 2002) and 
therefore, at any given moment in time, rather messy. Detailed historical and 
synchronic corpus study of usage patterns will be needed to further expose the 
general forces behind the chaos.  
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Abstract†
A study of Japanese adverbial Negative Polarity Items 
(NPIs) suggests that there are two types of NPIs: (i) 
NPIs that can precede an ellipsis site, and (ii) NPIs that 
cannot precede an ellipsis site.  I claim that the first 
type, but not the second type, are semantically negative, 
and license ellipsis. 
1 Introduction 
In this study, I analyze the Japanese phenomenon where some adverbial 
Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) can precede an ellipsis site, but some cannot.  By 
NPIs, I mean items that always appear with negation.  I argue that these different 
distributions of NPIs are attributed to their semantic property, specifically the 
negation feature.  I claim that the NPIs of the first type, but not the second type, 
can license ellipsis because they are semantically negative.  It has been generally 
assumed that Japanese does not have VP-ellipsis (VPE) parallel to English VPE.  
However, my analysis suggests that like English not, which can also license VPE 
(Lobeck 1995; Potsdam 1997), NPIs with the negation feature in Japanese can 
license VPE.  This study, therefore, also contributes to the study of VPE. 
2 VPE in Japanese 
Japanese lacks do-support, and its tense, negation, and auxiliary morphemes are 
bound to verbs.  Japanese VPE parallel to the English VPE in (1), therefore, is 
ungrammatical as shown in (2). 
(1) a John eats sushi. b I do [e] too. 
(2) a John-wa sushi-o tabe.ru. ‘John eats sushi’ 
 -TOP sushi-ACC eat.PRESENT 
 b * Watasi-mo [e]-ru ‘[intended reading] I do too.’ 
 I-also -PRESENT 
In English, not can precede an ellipsis site as in (3b).  However, the Japanese 
counterpart to (3b) is ungrammatical, as seen in (4b). 
(3) a John eats sushi. 
 b I do not [e]. 
(4) a John-wa sushi-o tabe.ru. ‘John eats sushi.’ 
 -TOP sushi-ACC eat.PESENT 
 b * Watasi-wa [e]-nai. ‘[intended reading] I do not.' 
 I-TOP -NEG.PRESENT 
                                                 
† I am grateful for the help and encouragement from Jeanette Gundel, Hooi Ling Soh, 
Amy Sheldon, and Nancy Stenson.  I thank anonymous reviewers for their comments 
on my abstract. 
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As shown in (5), however, there is a VPE-like phenomenon in Japanese 
(referred to as “stripping” in Fukaya and Hoji 1999), where the ellipsis site is 
preceded by a focus particle mo ‘also’ and followed by the copula da. 
(5) a John-wa sushi-o tabe.ru. ‘John eats sushi’ 
 b Watasi-mo [e] da. ‘I do too.’ 
 I-also COP 
This type of ellipsis requires a linguistic antecedent, as seen in (6).  In (6), the 
ellipsis site lacks a linguistic antecedent, therefore, the ellipsis followed by the 
copula is not acceptable. 
(6) [Situation: Seeing a friend eating sushi...] 
 # Watasi-mo [e] da. ‘[intended reading] I’ll eat sushi too.’ 
3 Puzzle: adverbial NPIs and ellipsis 
Some Japanese adverbial expressions that denote quantity/frequency (e.g., zenzen 
‘at all’, mattaku ‘at all’, sappari ‘at all’, kessite ‘at all’, amari ‘much’, and 
sukosi-mo ‘even a bit’) are NPIs in that they must occur with the negation marker 
–nai, as in (7). 
(7) John-wa {zenzen/mattaku/sappari/kessite/amari/sukosi-mo} sake-o 
 -TOP at all / at all / at all / at all / much / a bit-FOC sake-ACC 
 {noma-nai / *nomu}. 
 drink-NEG / *drink 
 ‘John doesn’t drink sake {at all/much/even a bit}.’ 
These NPIs, however, behave differently in relation to ellipsis.  Some NPIs 
(e.g., zenzen ‘at all’, mattaku ‘at all’, sappari ‘at all’) can precede an ellipsis site 
followed by da as in (8b-i), while others (e.g., amari ‘much’, sukosi-mo ‘even a 
bit’, kessite ‘at all’) cannot, as in (8b-ii). 
(8) a John-wa sake-o noma-nai. 
 -TOP sake-ACC drink-NEG 
 ‘John does not drink sake.’ 
 b-i Mary-mo {zenzen/mattaku/sappari} [e] da. 
 -also at all / at all / at all COP 
 ‘Mary (doesn’t drink sake) at all either.’ 
 b-ii * Mary-mo {amari/sukosi-mo/kessite} [e] da. 
 -also much / a bit-FOC/at all COP 
 ‘[intended reading]Mary (doesn’t drink sake) {much/even a bit/at all} either.’ 
 
These different distributions are observed not only when the preceding clause is 
negative, as in (8), but also when the preceding clause is positive, as in (9).  For 
both cases, the recovered meaning of the ellipsis is negative as in (8b-i) - (9b-i). 
(9) a John-wa sake-o nomu. 
 -TOP sake-ACC drink 
 ‘John drinks sake’ 
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 b-i Mary-wa {zenzen/mattaku/sappari} [e] da. 
 -TOP at all / at all / at all COP 
 ‘Mary (doesn’t drink sake) at all.’ 
 b-ii *Mary-wa {amari/sukosi-mo/kessite} [e] da. 
 -TOP much / a bit-FOC/at all COP 
 ‘[intended reading] Mary (doesn’t drink sake) {much/even a bit/at all}.’ 
This paper will address two questions.  First, why can the NPIs in (8b-i) and 
(9b-i), but not the NPIs in (8b-ii) and (9b-ii), precede an ellipsis site followed by 
the copula da?  Assuming that ellipsis can occur under syntactic and/or semantic 
identity with its antecedent, (8b-i) satisfies the identity condition, and so does 
(8b-ii).  However, only the NPIs in (8b-i) can precede an ellipsis site.  Second, 
what allows negative interpretation for the ellipsis site in (9b-i), given that the 
ellipsis site and an antecedent are not identical?  As shown in (6), ellipsis that 
involves the copula da requires a linguistic antecedent.  How does the negation 
occur in the process of recovering the meaning? 
Although ellipsis preceded by the NPIs in (8b-i) and (9b-i) allows the negative 
interpretation without the negation marker –nai, these NPIs are not n-words in 
negative concord.  In negative concord languages, n-words can appear with and 
without other negative markers as in the Spanish examples in (10) and (11) 
(taken from Herburger 2001:289).  In (11), where the predicate appears without 
the negative marker, an n-word nadie ‘nobody’ can be responsible for the 
negative interpretation.  That is not the case for the NPIs in (8b-i) and (9b-i).  As 
shown in (7), these NPIs cannot appear without the negative marker –nai. 
(10) No vino nadie. ‘Nobody came.’ 
 not came n-body 
(11) Nadie vino. ‘Nobody came.’ 
 n-body came 
3 Proposal 
I propose that phenomena like (8b-i) and (9b-i) are VPE, and that the NPIs in 
(12-i), but not the NPIs in (12-ii), can license ellipsis, because they are 
semantically negative.  Their negation feature contributes to their emphatic 
nature.  On the other hand, it also causes semantic redundancy of negation in a 
negative sentence where the negative marker –nai appears. 
(12) i. NPIs that can precede ellipsis: 
 e.g., zenzen ‘at all’, mattaku ‘at all’, sappari ‘at all’ 
 ii NPIs that cannot precede ellipsis: 
  e.g., amari ‘much’, sukosi-mo ‘even a bit’, kessite ‘at all’ 
In this study, I follow the common assumption of ellipsis as “a device expressing 
redundancy” (Rooth 1992:4).  Assuming NPIs are licensed at a syntactic level, 
(Chomsky and Lasnik (1993); Fox (2000); Merchant (2001); among others), in 
this study ellipsis is considered to be a result of PF-deletion. 
In a sentence where a semantically negative NPI (e.g., zenzen) appears, the 
negation marker -nai is always a candidate for deletion because of the semantic 
BUCHANAN: Two Types of Negative Polarity Items 33
redundancy.  However, since –nai is bound to the verb in Japanese, it cannot be 
elided leaving VP as shown in (13).  The VP sake-o noma ‘drink sake’ cannot be 
elided, on the other hand, because there is no linguistic antecedent for the VP. 
(13) * Mary-wa zenzen sake-o noma-[e]. (e = nai) 
Thus, as shown in (14), for ellipsis like (9b-i) to occur, two conditions have to be 
satisfied: there is a linguistic antecedent; the NPI is semantically negative. 
(14)a John-wa sake-o nomu. 
 -TOP sake-ACC drink Identical VP 
 ‘John drinks sake’ 
 b Mary-wa zenzen [NEG [VP sake-o noma]-nai]] da. 
 
 Semantic redundancy of negation 
Recovery of the meaning of the elided VP in (14b) works as follows.  Ellipsis 
followed by da indicates that there are syntactic and/or semantic redundancies.  
The VP sake-o nomu ‘drink sake’ is available from the preceding clause in (14a), 
and zenzen adds the negative meaning to the VP. 
In contrast, for sentences with NPIs that are not semantically negative (e.g., 
amari), there is no semantic redundancy for –nai; thus –nai cannot be elided, 
even if the VP is identical with the one in the preceding clause.  This is shown in 
(15). 
(15)a John-wa sake-o nomu. 
 -TOP sake-ACC drink Identical VP 
 ‘John drinks sake’ 
 b * Mary-wa amari [NEG [VP sake-o noma]-nai]] da. 
 
 No semantic redundancy of negation 
It appears that the semantic property of each NPI in (12-ii) varies.  Amari ‘much’, 
which is an attenuating NPI in Israel’s (2001) term, makes the negative statement 
weaker, thus, we can assume that it is not semantically negative.  Sukosi-mo 
‘even a bit’ is a minimizer that denotes a minimal quantity, with which it is 
inferred that Mary does not drink sake at all.  Kessite means ‘at all’, but unlike 
the NPIs in (12-i), it expresses the person’s strong will. 
As to VPE, Fukaya and Hoji (1999) refer to ellipsis followed by the copula da 
as in (5) as “stripping.”  However, this type of ellipsis allows backward anaphora 
as in (16), which is allowed for VPE, but not for “stripping”, as pointed out by 
Lobeck (1995).  Therefore, I claim that this type of ellipsis is VPE, rather than 
“stripping.” 
(16) Mary-wa zenzen [e] da ga, John-wa sake-o nomu. 
 -TOP at all COP but -TOP sake-ACC drink 
 ‘Mary doesn’t at all, but John drinks sake.’ 
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4 Further evidence of negation feature 
It has been reported that zenzen is used not only with negation, but also with 
affirmation (e.g., Noda 2000).  The use of zenzen with affirmation is observed 
especially among the young generation, and it occurs with adjectives or adverbs 
to emphasize degree, as in (17). 
(17) Kono keeki-wa zenzen {oisii/oisiku-nai} 
 this cake-TOP very/at all tasty/tasty-NEG 
 ‘This cake {is very tasty/is not tasty at all} 
Zenzen with adjectives or adverbs, like zenzen with verbs, can license ellipsis 
when the following items are negative, as in (18).  However, zenzen cannot 
license ellipsis when the following items are positive, as in (19) and (20). 
(18)a Ano keeki-wa oisii. 
 ‘That cake is tasty.’ 
 b Kono keeki-wa zenzen [e] da. (e = oisiku-nai) 
 ‘This cake is (not tasty) at all.’ tasty-NEG 
(19)a Ano keeki-wa oisii. 
 ‘That cake is tasty.’ 
 b # Kono keeki-mo zenzen [e] da. (e = oisii) 
 ‘[intended reading] This cake is very (tasty) too.’ tasty 
(20)a Ano keeki-wa oisiku-nai. 
 ‘That cake is not tasty.’ 
 b # Kono keeki-wa zenzen [e] da. (e = oisii) 
 ‘[intended reading] This cake is very (tasty).’ tasty 
This data further supports my proposal that zenzen is semantically negative and 
license ellipsis. 
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           Abstract 
The sentence All the students have not read the book, 
like its equivalents in the other Germanic languages, is 
ambiguous for a [∀ > Negation] and a [Negation > ∀] 
reading.  Since the negation marker is lower than the 
universal quantifier in this sentence, the availability of 
the  [Negation > ∀] reading is difficult to explain.  It 
will be shown that this reading is possible because the 
negation marker, which originates as a specifier in the 
negated quantifier phrase not all the students, can be 
stranded in the same way a quantifier can be stranded. 
1 Introduction 
It has been argued in Sportiche (1988), Giusti (1990), Shlonsky (1991), Cirillo 
(2005) and elsewhere that universal quantifiers head a Quantifier Phrase (QP) 
and can be stranded inside it, as is shown in these English and German examples: 
 
(1) The students have all read the book. 
 
(2) Die Studenten haben alle das Buch gelesen. 
        the   students  have  all   the book   read 
 
As argued in Cirillo (2005) and (2007a), negated quantifiers can also be stranded 
inside QP, as illustrated in the following English and German examples: 
 
(3) The students have not all read the book. 
 
(4) Die Studenten haben nicht alle das Buch gelesen. 
the   students    have   not   all   the book   read 
 
The structure posited for negated QPs in Cirillo (2007a) is as follows: 
 
(5)        QP 
                    2 
                not         QP 
                                2 
                      SPEC              Q’ 
                   2 
       Q              DP 
                                         all           6 
                                                        the students 
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The subject of this paper is the hypothesis that not only a quantifier or negated 
quantifier but also a negation marker embedded in a QP such as the one in (5) 
can be stranded.  The idea that a negation marker can be stranded, which I refer 
to as the Neg Stranding Hypothesis, arises from the fact that the following 
English sentence, like its equivalents in all the Germanic languages, is 
ambiguous, allowing both a [∀ > Neg] and a [Neg > ∀] reading: 
 
(6) All the students have not read the book. 
 
The derivation of the [∀ > Neg] reading is straightforward if we follow Zeijlstra 
(2004) and assume that in the Germanic languages both subjects and negation 
markers are base-generated in a [SPEC, vP] position and that it is possible for the 
subject to occupy the higher SPEC position, thereby taking scope over the 
negation marker: 
  
(7)                    vP 
                            2 
                  Subject          vP 
                                        2 
                          Negation             v’ 
 
While the [∀ > Neg] reading of (6) is straightforward, the [Neg > ∀] reading is 
difficult to explain, given the position of the negation marker with respect to the 
quantifier.  It is this [Neg > ∀] reading of (6) that is the main topic of this paper.   
 
2 How Neg Stranding Works 
Sentences (8) and (9) have the same meaning and contain the same elements as 
(6).  It would thus seem logical to derive all three sentences from one source: 
 
(8) Not all the students have read the book. 
(9) The students have not all read the book. 
 
To derive (6), (8) and (9), I assume that the subject of all three sentences is the 
QP not all the students in (5), which is base-generated in [SPEC, vP], as follows: 
 
(10)                                 vP 
                         2  
                                            QP             v’ 
 
In order to derive (8), we simply move the entire QP in (5) to subject position, 
with no stranding.  To derive (9), we move the DP the students out of the QP, 
leaving behind the negation marker and the universal quantifier.  For the 
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derivation of (6), the lower QP node moves to subject position, leaving behind 
the negation marker.   
 
The question will arise as to how the negation marker in the [Neg > ∀] reading of 
(6) can retain scope over the quantifier if the quantifier has moved above the 
negation marker, particularly in view of my claim, defended in Section 3 below, 
that negation must be interpreted in situ.  In (6), the negation marker immediately 
precedes the main verb and follows the universal quantifier. An in situ 
interpretation would therefore seem to require that the negation marker take 
scope over vP or v’but not over the quantifier, resulting in a [∀ > Neg] reading. 
There are two factors that cause the stranded negation marker in (6) to take scope 
over the quantifier.  First of all, the negation marker does not c-command vP or 
v’ and thus cannot take scope over them.  Secondly, it is embedded in QP and 
can take scope only over the traces remaining in that QP. In other words, the 
negation marker is interpreted in situ, inside QP, with no c-command relationship 
with vP or v’.  Consequently, even after the stranding of the negation marker, 
the only possible interpretation of (6) is [Neg > ∀]. 
 
The Neg Stranding Hypothesis has the theoretical advantage of being able to 
derive three surface structures that have the same meaning from one single base 
structure.  Nonetheless, because the Neg Stranding Hypothesis is unorthodox, 
alternative hypotheses should be considered.  I am unaware of any attempts in 
the literature to account for the [Neg > ∀] reading of sentences like (6) 
syntactically, and have therefore proposed four alternatives of my own. Under 
the first alternative hypothesis, the [Neg > ∀] reading of (6) would be obtained 
by covertly moving the negation marker and adjoining it to the universal 
quantifier at LF.  Under the second alternative hypothesis, the scope of the 
negation marker would be handled not by moving it but by merging it at the 
proper time in the derivation. Under the third alternative hypothesis, the negation 
marker would undergo a type of raising similar to what is seen in a sentence such 
as I do not believe that John loves Mary, derived from I believe that John does 
not love Mary.  The fourth and final alternative would involve the copy theory of 
movement combined with the concept of partial deletion found in Nunes (2004) 
and elsewhere.  Under this approach, in the sentence in (6), there would be two 
copies of the subject not all the students.  In the lower copy, everything would be 
deleted except the negation marker.  In the higher copy, only the negation marker 
would be deleted.  This would generate the word order in (6).  I argue in Cirillo 
(2007a) that none of these four alternative hypotheses works as well as the Neg 
Stranding Hypothesis. However, because of space limitations, only the first of 
the four alternatives, that of covert movement of the negation marker, will be 
evaluated here.  
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3 Alternative to Neg Stranding:  Covert Movement    
Under this alternative hypothesis, in order to obtain the [Neg > ∀] reading of 
sentence (6), the negation marker would simply be moved and adjoined to the 
quantifier all at LF. This approach presupposes that the negation marker is not 
base-generated in QP but rather as an adjunct to vP, in the position that it 
occupies in the case of sentential negation.  Using examples from Italian, I will 
argue that this alternative hypothesis is untenable because negation must be 
interpreted in situ and cannot be moved covertly. I assume here, in accordance 
with Zeijlstra (2004) and Cirillo (2007a), that in the Romance languages the 
negation marker is not base-generated in a SPEC position of vP or QP but that it 
is the head of NegP, which dominates vP as shown in the following structure:  
 
(11)                NegP 
                            2 
                   SPEC            Neg’ 
                                        2 
                          Negation             vP 
 
With that background, consider now the following Italian sentences: 
 
(12) ?Tutti gli studenti  non l’hanno letto. 
           all   the students  not it  have  read 
 
(13)   Non l’hanno letto tutti gli studenti. 
                  not it  have  read  all  the students 
 
(14)   Non tutti gli studenti  l’hanno letto. 
           not  all   the students it have  read 
Unlike its equivalent in the Germanic languages, such as (6), sentence (12) has 
only a [∀ > Neg] interpretation. (Remember that the negation marker in (12) is 
not base-generated inside QP and is therefore not limited to taking scope over the 
quantifier.) Sentence (13) seems to be exactly the same as (12), except that the 
subject QP has not moved to a higher subject position. One would therefore 
expect (12) and (13) to have the same meaning. However, sentence (13) has only 
a [Neg > ∀] reading, the same as (14). Sentences (12) to (14) tell us two things 
about negation.  First of all, covert movement of negation is not possible. If it 
were, it would be possible to covertly move the negation marker in (12) to the 
position it occupies in (14) and obtain the reading of (13) and (14), but this 
reading is simply not available in (12). Secondly, in all three of theses sentences, 
negation is interpreted in situ.  That is, its position with respect to the quantifier 
determines its scope.  Related to the idea of covert movement is the concept of 
reconstruction.  That is, one could argue that in (6) the scope of the stranded 
negation marker is disambiguated by returning the QP all the students to its base-
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position below the quantifier at LF. The problem with this solution is that too 
much evidence has been presented in the literature that there is no reconstruction 
after A-movement.  
Given the indications that negation is interpreted in situ and does not move 
covertly, I conclude that this alternative hypothesis, in which negation is moved 
at LF, is untenable, and that the Neg Stranding Hypothesis is preferable.  
 
To briefly summarize, if covert movement of negation and reconstruction are 
unacceptable ways of explaining the [Neg > ∀] reading of (6), and if negation 
must be interpreted in situ, then the Neg Stranding Hypothesis based on the 
structure in (5) is the desirable analysis. Neg Stranding does not require covert 
movement of the negation marker or reconstruction after A-movement, and it 
allows in situ interpretation of the negation marker.  The in situ interpretation of 
the negation marker in (6) is due to the fact that it is embedded in QP and does 
not c-command vP or v’.  It can therefore only take scope over the traces in QP, 
and this means that the [Neg > ∀] reading is the only available one.   
4 Neg Stranding is not QP-Specific 
One is tempted to say that the hypothesis that a negation marker can be stranded 
in QP is independently motivated because quantifiers and negated quantifiers can 
also be stranded in QP.  However, there is reason to believe that Neg Stranding is 
not limited to QP.  For example, topicalized DPs, PPs and VPs can strand a 
negation marker in German. The following pairs of sentences are cases of 
negated constituents (DP, PP and VP) rather than cases of v’ (sentential) 
negation.  This is clear from the fact that in the (a) sentences the entire negated 
constituent is topicalized and contrasted with a non-negated constituent of the 
same type.  The (b) sentences have the same meaning as the (a) sentences, that is, 
an interpretation of a negated constituent. The difference is that in the (b) 
sentences, the topicalized negated constituent has stranded the negation marker: 
 
(15)   a. Nicht den Hund hat er gefüttert, sondern die Katze.                 not    the   dog  has he    fed         but      the   cat 
 
                 b. Den Hund hat er nicht gefüttert (sondern die Katze). 
                      the   dog  has he  not      fed          but      the   cat 
 
(16)   a. Nicht auf dem Sofa hat er geschlafen, sondern in dem Bett. 
               not    on  the  sofa has he   slept            but     in  the  bed 
 
                  b.  Auf dem Sofa hat er nicht geschlafen, (sondern in dem Bett). 
                       on   the  sofa has he  not     slept              but     in  the bed 
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(17)   a. Nicht gefüttert hat er den Hund, sondern getreten. 
               not       fed      has he the  dog       but      kicked 
 
                b.  Gefüttert hat er den Hund nicht (sondern getreten). 
                          fed     has he  the  dog    not     but      kicked 
 
The conclusion is that Neg Stranding is not a QP-specific phenomenon.     
5 Conclusion 
The Neg Stranding Hypothesis can account for the [Neg > ∀] reading of 
ambiguous Germanic sentences like All the students have not read the book.  Neg 
Stranding is not a QP-specific phenomenon, given that DP, PP and VP can also 
strand a negation marker.  Given its descriptive and explanatory abilities and the 
fact that it is less problematic than alternative hypotheses, the Neg Stranding 
Hypothesis deserves serious consideration.  
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 Abstract 
I study measure adverbials in Russian whose case 
marking is affected by the presence of negation. While 
in affirmative clauses they are obligatorily marked with 
the accusative, in the presence of negation the case 
marking can change to genitive. I describe semantic 
conditions  that license such change. I show that these 
conditions are related to the event structure and the 
scope of negation.  
1 Introduction†
A well-known feature of the Russian grammar is that NP’s with the semantic 
role of undergoer may be marked with genitive in negative clauses, a 
phenomenon that is known under the name of genitive of negation: 
 
(1) a. Ivan pisa-l   stat’-ju. 
 I.  write-PST1 article-ACC 
 ‘Ivan was writing an article.’ 
 b. Ivan ne pisal  stat’-ji/ stat’-ju 
  I. NEG write-PST article-GEN/-ACC 
 ‘Ivan was not writing an article.’ 
 This phenomenon was extensively studied from both syntactic and semantic 
perspective.  
 However the accusative/genitive alternation under negation is not  restricted 
to such NP’s. Certain adverbials that are marked with accusative in affirmative 
clauses, can be assigned genitive under negation. 
 
(2) a. Tom  Soyer  ži-l   na ostrov-e  nedel-ju. 
 Tom Sawyer live-PST on island-PREP week-ACC. 
 ‘Tom Sawyer stayed on the island for a week.’ 
 b. Tom Soyer  ne proži-l  na 
 Tom Sawyer NEG live-PST on 
  ostrov-e  i nedel-i.  
  island-PREP and week-GEN 
                                                        
† The research was carried out in the framework of the research seminar “The Object 
Genitive of Negation in Russian” at the Russian State University of Humanities. I 
thank all participants of the seminar and especially E.V. Rakhilina, the organizer of 
the seminar, for fruitful discussions.  
1 I use the following glosses: ACC = accusative case, GEN = genitive case, INSTR = 
instrumental case, PREP = prepositional case, INF = infinitive, PRS = present tense, PST 
= past tense, IMP = imperative, F = feminine, M =masculine,  NEG = negative particle, 
DISC = discoursive particle, MOD = modal particle. 
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‘Tom Sawyer did not stay on the island even for a week.’ (i.e. he left earlier.) 
 c. Tom i Gek podozhda-l-i  minut-u/ *minut-y. 
  Tom and Huck wait-PST-PL minute-ACC/*-GEN. 
 ‘Tom and Huck waited for a minute.’ 
 d. Tom i  Gek ne  zhda-l-i  ni  minut-y/*minut-u 
  Tom and Huck NEG wait-PST-PL NEG minute-GEN/*-ACC 
‘Tom and Huck did not wait even for a minute.’ (i.e. they did not wait at all.) 
 
Sometimes genitive-marked adverbials are bona fide NPI’s, that is, the 
corresponding accusative-marked NP is at least unfelicitous without negation: 
 
(3) a. Ne  dozhi-l-a   dv-ux   dn’-ej   do 
 neg live.until-PST-F two-GEN.PL day-GEN.PL until 
 pensi-i.  
 retirement-GEN 
‘She did not live (the last) two days before the retirement. (i.e. she died two 
days before the retirement.)’ 
 b. Dozhi-l-a   (#dv-a  dn’-a)   do  pens’ii 
  live.until-PST-F (two-ACC.M day-GEN.PL) until retirement-GEN. 
 ‘She survived (#two days) until the retirement.’ 
 c. Petrovič ne  doshe-l   dv-ux  
 P.   NEG walk.until-PST two-GEN  
 shag-ov  do  dom-a.  
 step-GEN.PL until house-GEN 
 ‘Petrovich did not walk (the last) two steps towards the house.’ 
 d. Petrovič doshe-l  (#dva  shaga)  do  dom-a. 
 P.  walk.until-PST two-ACC.M step-GEN until house-GEN 
 ‘Petrovich walked (#two steps) to the house.’ 
 
These adverbials do not get their semantic roles from the verb, and both the 
accusative marking and the case alternation under negation present a problem to 
theories of case. This phenomenon has not passed unnoticed by syntacticians, the 
mechanism of case alternation for such adverbials was analyzed in Pesetsky 
(1983); Franks and Dziwirek (1993); Borovikoff (1997); Pereltsvaig (1998, 
2000a, 2000b).  
However, to the best of my knowledge, no-one has ever systematically 
studied the semantics of such genitive-marked adverbials, nor their corpus 
studies were carried out. For instance, (Mustajoki and Heino, 1991), the most 
extensive corpus study of Russian genitive of negation to be ever undertaken, 
explicitly exclude such expressions from the scope of their study. Timberlake 
(1975) observes that such instances  of case alternation exist and remarks that in 
these circumstances,  accusative marking is preferred to the genitive one. 
This paper is based on a corpus study of  this phenomenon. For the study, I 
mostly used the materials of the National Corpus of Russian (NRC), 
http://www.ruscorpora.ru. 
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2 A description of case-changing adverbials 
The semantics of accusative-marked adverbial NP’s is described in Krys’ko 
(2006). They fall into the following categories: 
Temporal adverbials: 
• Temporal localization (few strongly lexicalized expressions2) 
(4) Zakr-oy   dver’ si-yu   sekund-u. 
 close-IMP.SG door this-ACC.F second-ACC 
 ‘Close the door immediately (lit. this second).’ 
 
• Temporal frequency (every Friday etc) 
(5) Ven’a ezd-it   v Petushki kazhd-uyu pyatnic-u. 
 V.  go-PRS.3SG to P.   every-ACC.F Friday-ACC 
 ‘Venya goes to Petushki every Friday.’ 
 
•  Number of times 
(6) Mitrich  by-l  v Kreml’-e   tr-i    raz-a. 
 M.  was-PST in Kremlin-PREP three-ACC  time-GEN.PL 
‘Mitrich has been to Kremlin three times.’ 
 
• Temporal stage (for the third week etc) 
(7) Tret’-yu  nedel-yu  p’yo-m   za  zdorov’e Vash-ego 
 third-ACC.F week-ACC drink-PRS.1PL for  health  your-GEN 
 Velichestv-a. 
 majesty-GEN 
‘We are drinking to the health of Your Majesty for the third week.’ 
 
• Temporal extent, see examples 2a, 2c. 
 
Spatial adverbials: 
• Spatial extent 
(8) The Pravda (01/15/1985), quoted from Krys’ko (2006). 
 Do Moskv-y   des’at’  tys’ach   verst    zaprosto 
 to Moscow-GEN ten.ACC thousand.GEN.PL versta.GEN.PL with.ease 
 leta-esh’,  a  vot  dobezha-t’ sotn-yu  kilometr-ov   
 fly-PRS.2SG but  DISC run.until-INF hundred-ACC kilometer-GEN.PL 
 na elektrichk-e    do   men’a — dux-om  slab.  
 on electric.train-PREP until I.GEN  spirit-INSTR weak 
‘You don’t hesitate to fly ten thousand versts to Moscow, but you don’t have 
spirit to go a hundred kilometers by train to visit me.’ 
 
However, it is only temporal extent, spatial extent and number of times 
adverbials that admit the case change under negation. Moreover, the case change 
                                                        
2 In some non-standard varieties of Russian, the accusative of temporal localization is 
productive.  
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can occur only in a limited number of constructions. They can be classified as 
follows. 
 
 Construction Restrictions 
on V 
Restrictions 
on NP 
Case 
change 
Example 
1. ne    pref-V 
NP 
NEG pref-V 
NP 
The prefix3 
should be  
pro-, ot-, do-, 
or vy- 
 optional 3a 
2. ne    V  i4  
NP 
NEG V and 
NP 
 
Strong 
preference for 
prefixed 
verbs, 
prefixes like 
in 1 
 obligatory 2b 
3. ne   V daže 
NP 
NEG V even 
NP 
Any non-
punctual 
imperfective 
verb or 
prefixed 
perfective 
verb, prefixes 
like in 1. 
 optional, 
genitive 
more 
common 
 
4. ne      V ni  
NP 
NEG V NEG 
NP 
as in 3. no modifiers 
except odin 
‘one’ and 
ediny ‘single’ 
obligatory 3d 
                                                        
3 These prefixes carry certain lexical meanings, but simultaneously they serve as 
valency change markers. In particular, they introduce temporal and spatial 
participants. 
4 Etymologically, this negative particle is just the conjunction ‘and’. It is perhaps not 
quite accurate to claim that it coincides with the conjunction synchronically. 
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In the first three cases the interpretation is always: “The situation took place, 
but during the period of time less than denoted by the NP.”. The fourth 
construction means that the event has not occurred at all. However, we consider 
it a pragmatic inference, as it is often the case with expressions that refer to 
minimal entities, see Krifka (1995).  
The reading “The situation did not take place during the period of time 
denoted by the NP” is sometimes possible, if the NP is marked with the 
accusative, but absolutely impossible, if it is marked with genitive. 
3 Conditions licensing the case change 
Trivially, the corresponding NP must be c-commanded by NegP. However, 
additional  conditions must be fulfilled: 
1. In order for the change of case marking to be possible, the event has to be 
bounded. For a discussion of this notion see, among others, Kiparsky (1998); 
Pereletsvaig (2000a, 2000b, Thompson (2006). 
2. Genitive adverbials mark the fact that the event has terminated before 
reaching some expected end-point.  
3. In particular, semantically the verb is beyond the scope of negation, and it 
is only the duration adverbial that is negated. 
4 Genitive of negation with adverbials and case 
theories 
Under negation, a genitive-marked adverbial can co-occur  with genitive-
marked direct  object, although this is rather unusual and subject to some 
restrictions, which are not very well understood.5 That led Franks and Dziwirek 
(1993) to a conjecture that the case is assigned to such adverbials through a 
mechanism different from the usual genitive of negation.6 NRC has some natural 
examples of this phenomenon: 
(9) ona by  i  dnya  ne  terpe-l-a   vozle sebya 
 she MOD and day-GEN NEG suffer-PST-F  near self-GEN 
 et-oy    zdorovenn-oy babishch-i. 
 this-GEN.F huge-GEN.F female-GEN 
‘She would not suffer this huge female near her even for a day.’ 
 
However, as the structural necessary conditions for the case change with 
adverbials are exactly the same as with direct objects, the proposal of Franks and 
                                                        
5 Contrary to the claim in Pereltsvaig (2000a, 2000b) that such co-occurence is 
impossible in Russian. 
6 It should be noted that most of their Russian examples were judged  ungrammatical 
by all native speakers I have consulted. 
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Dziwirek (1993) does not seem satisfactory. However, if we adhere to the 
modern Minimalist theory of case assignment via feature checking,  the feature 
on NegP that is responsible for the genitive of negation seems to be checked 
twice, which is problematic to the theory. 
5 Conclusion 
I have shown that the case change for adverbials is governed by semantic, and 
not purely structural, conditions. I dealt only with semantic issues, but the 
possibility for two genitive-marked NP’s to co-occur within the same clause 
suggests that there remain purely syntactic problems to be solved. 
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Abstract 
We defend, and propose an amendment to, Chierchia's 
analysis of local implicatures in the scope of attitude 
verbs. The main observation is that while strict DE 
operators cancel local implicatures, Strawson DE 
operators do not, and that non-monotonic operators 
support local implicatures. 
1 The problem 
1.1 The facts to be explained 
Observation 1: Some propositional attitude verbs exhibit, what seem to be, 
“local” implicatures (Chierchia 2004). 
 
(1) John is certain that the boss or his assistant have disappeared. 
       John is certain that the boss or his assistant, but not both, have disappeared. 
 
These implicatures can be cancelled explicitly. 
 
(2) John is certain that the boss or his assistant, or both, have disappeared. 
 
Question A: How does the local implicature arise? 
 
Observation 2: Negation cancels local implicatures (Chierchia 2004) 
 
(3) John is not certain that the boss or his assistant have disappeared. 
       John is not certain that the boss or his assistant, but not both, have 
disappeared. 
(4) #John isn’t certain that the boss or his assistant, or both, have disappeared. 
 
Question B: Why does the local implicature disappear under not? 
 
Observation 3: Under “negative” verbs such as sorry, the implicature survives in 
the presupposition part but disappears in the assertion part (cf. Simons). 
 
(5) John is sorry that the boss or his assistant have disappeared. 
      John believes that the boss or his assistant, but not both, have disappeared. 
       John is sorry that the boss or his assistant, but not both, have disappeared. 
(6) #John is sorry that the boss or his assistant, or both, have disappeared. 
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Question C: If what causes the cancellation in (3) is the “negativity” of not, why 
doesn’t sorry give rise to exactly the same cancellation effects as not? 
 
Observation 4: Non-monotonic operators do not cancel local implicatures. 
 
(7) Exactly two men are certain that the boss or his assistant have disappeared. 
      Speaker/context variation: 
  Exactly two men are certain that the boss or his assistant, but not both, 
have disappeared. 
  Exactly two men are certain that the boss or his assistant have 
disappeared, and these men are certain that only one of them did. 
(8) Exactly two men are certain that the boss or her assistant, or both, have 
disappeared. 
(9) Exactly two men are certain that the boss or her assistant have disappeared, 
and they are certain it’s possible that they both disappeared. 
 
Question D: If what causes the cancellation in (3) is the lack of “positivity” of 
not, why doesn’t the non-monotonic exactly two give rise to the same 
cancellation effects as not? 
1.2  Why are questions A-D interesting? 
Until recently, (scalar) implicatures were thought to be the result of purely 
Gricean (i.e., “conversational”) principles. This approach leads to the expectation 
that all implicatures are global, but Chierchia’s work has brought to our attention 
the possible existence of “local” implicatures. Notice that a globalist approach in 
the spirit of Grice (such as Sauerland 2004) does not account for the local 
implicature of (1), only for its weaker, global, implicature. This weaker 
implicature is obtained by assuming that the stronger alternatives are false. 
 
(10)  John is certain that the boss or his assistant have disappeared. 
        Alternatives: 
{John is certain that the boss or his assistant have disappeared, John is 
certain that the boss and his assistant have disappeared} 
Assuming that “John is certain that the boss and his assistant have 
disappeared” is false leads to the following implicature: 
It is possible, for all John knows, that the boss or his assistant have both 
disappeared.  
 
Chierchia also observes that local implicatures, like global ones, disappear under 
negation. Global implicatures are predicted to disappear under negation by the 
Gricean theory. 
 
(11)  a. The boss or her assistant have disappeared. 
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Alternatives: {the boss or her assistant have disappeared, the boss and 
her assistant have disappeared} 
Assuming the stronger alternative to the assertion is false leads to: 
Only one of them disappeared. 
        b.  It isn’t true that the boss or her assistant disappeared. 
Alternatives: {it isn’t true that the boss or her assistant have disappeared, 
it isn’t true that the boss and her assistant have disappeared} Since there 
is no stronger alternative to the assertion, then = It isn’t true that only 
one of them disappeared. 
 
Chierchia’s “localist” system generates implicatures alongside standard 
meanings, yielding pairs of meanings. The strongest member of the pair is 
always preferred over the weaker one. 
 
(12)  a. The boss or her assistant have disappeared. 
 b.  <the boss or her assistant have disappeared; the boss or her assistant, but 
not both, have disappeared> 
(13)  a. It isn’t true that the boss or her assistant have disappeared. 
         b.  <it isn’t true that the boss or her assistant have disappeared; it isn’t true 
that the boss or her assistant, but not both, have disappeared> 
(14)  a. John is certain that the boss or her assistant have disappeared. 
         b.  <John is certain that the boss or her assistant have disappeared; 
John is certain that the boss or her assistant, but not both, have 
disappeared> 
(15)  a. John isn’t certain that the boss or her assistant have disappeared. 
         b.  <John isn’t certain that the boss or her assistant have disappeared; 
John isn’t certain that the boss or her assistant, but not both, have 
disappeared> 
(i) If negation is responsible for cancellation, why doesn’t the 
“negative” sorry pattern with not? 
(ii)  If relative strength is what generates implicatures, why does the 
non-monotonic exactly two pattern with the “positive” certain? 
It should be noted that: 
(i) The globalist approach predicts global, but not local, implicatures to 
disappear under not. 
 (ii)   Both the globalist approach and Chierchia’s approach predict no 
local implicatures with exactly two. 
2 Is there an alternative to Chierchia’s account? 
Sauerland (2004) presents an alternative account of some of the data that 
motivate Chierchia’s local, grammatical calculation of implicatures. In particular, 
Sauerland gives a global solution to certain problems relating to the implicatures 
of scalar items occurring in the scope of other operators – for example,  some in 
the scope of disjunction: 
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(16)  Kai ate the broccoli or some of the peas. 
 
However, being global, Sauerland’s approach cannot produce implicatures in 
which an alternative scalar term is negated within the scope of another operator.  
So, Sauerland’s theory cannot directly derive (17a) as an implicature of (17), but 
only the weaker (17b).  
 
(17)  Bill said that Mary or Sue has disappeared. 
 a. Bill said that Mary and Sue did not both disappear. 
 b. Bill did not say that Mary and Sue both disappeared. 
 
Sauerland (2004) suggests that in many cases such stronger implicatures may 
result from reasoning about the attitude under discussion. For example, one 
typical reason for asserting (17) is that Bill made an utterance equivalent to (18).  
 
(18)  Mary or Sue has disappeared. 
 
If we assume that he was following Gricean maxims when he made this 
utterance, we may then infer that he is certain not both disappeared.  How such 
second-order reasoning could be made a part of Sauerland’s formal theory is 
unclear. Also unclear is whether such reasoning can plausibly be extended to 
cases of sentence-embedding predicates that describe mental attitudes as opposed 
to speech acts.  
3 Extending/amending Chierchia’s theory to the case of 
sorry and exactly two 
3.1 A bit more on the data and Chierchia’s predictions 
(18)  Mary is certain that some students passed. 
          Mary is certain that not all students passed. 
(19)  Mary discovered that some students passed. 
          Mary discovered that not all students passed. 
Simons (2006) and Russell (2006) note with respect to (19) that the local 
implicature may be cancelled while the common ground one (that not all students 
passed) remains. This is a puzzle for Chierchia. 
Another potential problem (discussed by Simons): Chierchia points to a 
connection between cancellation of local implicatures and NPI licensing: 
operators that cancel local implicatures (e.g., negation) license (weak) NPIs. 
 
(20)  *John is certain that he ever proposed to Mary. 
(21)  John is not certain that he ever proposed to Mary. 
(22)  #John doubts that the boss or his assistant, or both, have disappeared. 
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(23)  John doubts that he ever proposed to Mary. 
 
In view of this, the behavior of predicates such as sorry is especially interesting, 
because they do license NPIs, despite the fact that the implicatures it generates 
are not exactly the same as the ones generated by not and doubt. 
 
(24)  John is sorry that he ever proposed to Mary. 
 
Simons takes these predicates to be counter-examples to Chierchia’s theory. Our 
position is different: we subscribe to the view (Kadmon and Landman 1993, von 
Fintel 1999) that sorry is a Strawson DE predicate, with the meaning in (25). 
 
(25)  [[sorry]] = [λp∈D<s,t> . λx∈De . λw∈W : (i) p(w)=True, and (ii) DOXw(x) ⊆ 
{w’∈W:p(w’)=True} . DESw(x) ⊆ {w’∈W:p(w’)=False}] 
(26)  f Strawson-entails g iff for every X s.t g(X) is defined, f(X) ==> g(X) 
(‘==>’ stands for cross-categorial entailment; see von Fintel 1999) 
(27)  John is sorry that Mary hates professors. 
        John is sorry that Mary hates linguistics professors. 
 
Given this assumption, the pair of meanings associated with John is sorry that 
the boss or his assistant have disappeared is the one give in (28). 
 
(28)  a. <[λw∈W: (i) the bossw or his assistantw disappearedw and (ii) 
DOXw(John) ⊆ {w’∈W: the bossw’ or his assistantw’ disappearedw’} . 
DESw(John) ⊆ {w’∈W: the bossw’ or his assistantw’ have not 
disappearedw’}], [λw∈W: (i) the bossw or his assistantw disappearedw 
and the bossw and his assistantw have not disappearedw and (ii) 
DOXw(John) ⊆ {w’∈W: the bossw’ or his assistantw’ disappearedw’, and 
the bossw’ and his assistantw’ have not both disappearedw’}. DESw(John) 
⊆ {w’∈W: it isn’t the case that the bossw’ or his assistantw’ have 
disappearedw’, and the bossw’ and his assistantw’ have not 
disappearedw’}]> 
       b.  <‘John is sorry that the boss or his assistant disappeared’, ‘John is sorry 
that the boss or his assistant, but not both, have disappeared’> 
 
Neither member of the pair is stronger than the other. So while it is true that 
Chierchia’s theory makes no predictions regarding sorry, it isn’t true that it 
makes wrong predictions. The same state of affairs holds for the non-monotonic 
exactly two. The pair of meanings associated with Exactly two men are certain 
that the boss or his assistant have disappeared is the one given in (29). 
 
(29) <‘exactly two men are certain that the boss or his assistant have 
disappeared’, ‘exactly two men are certain that the boss or his assistant, 
but not both, have disappeared’> 
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3.2 The proposal 
(A) “Strengthened” meanings are generated as suggested in Gajewski 2001. 
 
Gajewski suggests that the strong meaning of a sentence S is equivalent to the 
plain meaning of S conjoined with a set of propositions U, where U contains 
alternatives to S in which exactly one of the scalar terms in S has been locally 
strengthened.   
 
(B) A pair of meanings is generated separately for presuppositions and 
assertions. In each case, the stronger member is selected. 
 
(30) John is sorry that the boss or his assistant have disappeared. 
 Presupposition pair: <John knows that the boss or his assistant have 
disappeared, John knows that the boss or his assistant, but not both, have 
disappeared> 
 Assertion pair: <John wishes [NOT the boss or his assistant have 
disappeared]; John wishes [NOT the boss or his assistant but not both 
have disappeared]> 
(31) Mary discovered that some students passed. 
 Common ground pair: <Some students passed; some, but not all, 
students passed>  
Presupposition pair: <Mary used to not know that some students passed; 
Mary used to not know that some, but not all, students passed> 
  Assertion pair: <Mary now knows that some students passed; Mary now 
knows that some though not all students passed> 
 
Chierchia’s account of the local implicatures of certain, and his account of the 
cancellation of these implicatures by not are unaffected by our proposed 
qualification. This is because “classical” entailment implies Strawson-entailment.  
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Abstract 
A recent study by Hulsey et al. (2004) argued that scope 
resolution is largely determined by contextual factors. A 
different view was defended by Musolino and Lidz 
(2004), which reaffirmed the primary role of syntactic 
factors. We highlight several theoretical and empirical 
shortcomings of the critique offered by Musolino and 
Lidz (2004) and we show how the available data are 
accounted for by Hulsey et al.’s model. 
1 Scope in Child Language: The Observation of 
Isomorphism† 
Much recent work on children’s interpretation of sentences containing negation 
draws upon work of Musolino (1998). That study investigated English-speaking 
children’s interpretation of several constructions. The sentences which yielded the 
clearest difference in behavior between children and adults are reported below. 
 
(1) Every horse didn’t jump over the fence. 
(2) The detective didn’t find some guys. 
(3) The detective didn’t find two guys. 
 
The research question that Musolino (1998) and others have addressed is whether 
young children are capable of accessing both the surface scope (isomorphic) and the 
inverse scope (non-isomorphic) interpretation of sentences like the ones above. 
The experimental evidence collected by Musolino (1998) suggests that for the 
sentences in  (1)- (3), 4- and 5-year old children consistently resort to their surface 
scope interpretations. Crucially, across all of the experiments conducted by Musolino, 
children’s behavior runs counter to a strategy that is accepted by most 
psycholinguistic researchers: namely, the bias to access an interpretation that makes 
the sentence true. We will adopt the term Principle of Charity for such a bias (see 
Grice, 1975). The hypothesis offered by Musolino (1998) is that children access the 
surface scope interpretation for all of the sentences that adults interpret on their 
inverse scope interpretation. This is the Observation of Isomorphism.  
                                                 
† I thank Luisa Meroni and Bernhard Schwarz for discussion and Jennifer Morehouse for 
valuable editorial work. This work was supported in part by a McGill VP-Research 
internal grant.  
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2 Scope in Child Language: The Role of Context 
The first piece of evidence against the view of Isomorphism proposed by Musolino 
(1998) comes from Gualmini (2004a,b). Gualmini drew upon the observation that 
sentences containing negation ordinarily are used to point out a discrepancy between 
an expected outcome and the actual outcome (see Horn, 1989; Wason, 1965, 1972). 
In order to evaluate the role of expectations, Gualmini presented children with stories 
in which a character had a task to carry out. In one of the trials, children were told a 
story about a troll, who is supposed to deliver four pizzas to Grover. Unfortunately, 
on the way to Grover’s house two pizzas fall off the delivery truck, and the troll only 
manages to deliver two pizzas. Children were then asked to evaluate  (4) or  (5). 
 
(4) The troll didn’t deliver some pizzas. 
(5) The troll didn’t lose some pizzas. 
 
Notice that both  (4) -  (5) are true in the context under consideration on the inverse 
scope interpretation. The two sentences differ in appropriateness, however. Whereas 
 (4) points out that the troll failed in carrying out his task, upon hearing  (5) the hearer 
has the impression that the speaker is not addressing what’s at stake. Gualmini 
(2004a,b) suggested that this difference has an effect on children’s responses. Thirty 
4- and 5-year-olds participated in the experiment. Children accepted sentences like 
 (4) in 54 out of 60 trials (90%) but they accepted sentences like  (5) only in 30 out of 
60 trials (50%). More recently, Gualmini, Hacquard, Hulsey and Fox (2005) have 
shown that the very same contextual maneuver discovered by Gualmini (2004a,b) 
also leads children to access the inverse scope interpretation of sentences equivalent 
to  (1) and  (3).  
3 The Question-Answer Requirement 
A recent proposal by Musolino and Lidz (in press) and attempts to analyze the data 
as resulting from two factors: a preference for surface scope interpretations and a 
preference for true interpretations. Specifically, the former factor is supposed to take 
precedence over the latter. On this view, the cases in which children indeed manage 
to access true inverse scope interpretations represent the exception. In these cases, 
the context provides children with an extra-cue which allows them to override their 
default preference for surface scope interpretations. 
In an attempt to study the role of context, Hulsey et al. (2004) designed an 
experiment to assess the relative ranking of the factors that influence children’s 
interpretation. Their study provides us with a significant contribution to the current 
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debate. First, Hulsey et al. (2004) demonstrate that, in certain contexts, English-
speaking children access the inverse scope interpretation to a larger extent than adults.  
Most importantly, the study reported in Hulsey et al. (2004) developed a new 
model of scope resolution which makes reference to independently motivated 
principles of communication. According to this model, which Hulsey et al. (2004) 
call the Question-Answer requirement (hereafter QAR), children select the scope 
assignment which allows them to address the Question under Discussion (QUD). 
Focusing on ‘yes/no’ questions, the case which is most relevant for studies 
employing the Truth Value Judgment task, an interpretation addresses a question, if 
that interpretation entails the proposition that is being questioned or the negation of 
that proposition. According to this model, what is relevant in the pizza story used by 
Gualmini is the troll’s task. At the end of the story, one wants to know whether the 
troll has carried out his task or not. This is equivalent to asking the ‘yes/no’ question 
“Did the troll deliver all the pizzas?” Notice that either scope assignment of  (4) 
entails an answer to that question. Since the Question-Answer requirement is 
satisfied by either scope assignment, children can make use of the Principle of 
Charity and select the interpretation that makes the target sentence true, namely the 
inverse scope interpretation. By contrast, consider  (5). In this case, only the surface 
scope interpretation addresses the contextually relevant question, and that 
interpretation is selected, even though it leads to a violation of the Principle of 
Charity.  
A prediction of the QAR model is that, for any given context and for any given 
predicate, children will prefer the same interpretation, regardless of whether it 
amounts to surface scope or inverse scope. Hulsey et al. corroborated this prediction 
in an experiment testing children’s interpretation of  (6) and  (7), in the same contexts 
investigated by Gualmini (2004a,b). 
 
(6) Some pizzas were not delivered. 
(7) Some pizzas were not lost.  
 
The results show that all English speaking children accepted  (6), but half of them 
rejected  (7). In particular, half of the subjects interviewed by Hulsey et al. (2004) 
rejected  (7) on the grounds that some pizzas were indeed lost, thereby accessing the 
inverse scope interpretation of  (7) (i.e., it is not the case that some pizzas were lost). 
As predicted by the QAR, the rate of rejection for  (7) closely mirrors the rate of 
rejection for  (5) documented by Gualmini (2004a,b). 
4 A Challenge to the Question-Answer Requirement 
The most recent contribution to the debate is due to Musolino and Lidz (2004), who 
take issue with the QAR model. The first criticism offered by Musolino and Lidz 
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(2004) is that the Question-Answer requirement does not make the right predictions 
for quantifiers other than some. While it is true that not all of the predictions of QAR 
had been investigated by Hulsey et al. (2004), we should not take the absence of data 
as disconfirming data. In fact, a further study by Gualmini et al. (2005) showed that, 
just like in the case of  (4), a context which makes prominent the relevant question 
will lead children to access the inverse scope interpretation of sentences equivalent to 
 (1) and  (3).  
A second criticism offered by Musolino and Lidz (2004) is that the QAR does 
not account for some of the data described by Musolino (1998). In particular, they 
consider Musolino’s experiment on children’s interpretation of  (1). Musolino and 
Lidz (2004) set out to offer a charitable rendering of how previous data could be 
explained by the QAR, by considering whether any question would account for the 
data, according to the QAR model. In particular, they consider to which extent the 
two interpretations of  (1), address the question in  (8): 
 
(8) Will any of the horses jump over the fence? 
 
This is what Musolino and Lidz (2004, p.8) write: 
 
“Suppose now that (12b) [ (8)] is the QUD. In this case, (…) (13a) [i.e., the 
inverse scope interpretation of  (1)] entails the Yes answer to (12b)  (8)], and 
(13b) [i.e., the surface scope interpretation of  (1)] entails the No answer.” 
 
This claim is incorrect unless we are ready to abandon the distinction between 
entailment and implicature. The inverse scope interpretation of  (1) may implicate a 
‘yes’ answer to  (8), but there is no entailment. Crucially, however, Hulsey et al. 
(2004) explicitly define good answers in terms of entailment and in fact argue that 
children could not make use of implicatures to address the QUD.  
The third criticism offered by Musolino and Lidz (2004) that we would like to 
mention here relates to how one determines the relevant Question under Discussion. 
Musolino and Lidz (2004, p. 7) claim: 
 
 “The fact that any set of events is compatible with a range of descriptions, 
and hence a range of possible questions about those events, illustrates a 
fundamental problem for QAR: how does one determine what the QUD 
should be?”  
 
This criticism raises an interesting point: there is no good theory of what makes a 
question salient in a given context. Nevertheless, Hulsey et al. (2004) offer one 
proposal and argue that the Condition of Plausible Dissent proposed by Crain, 
Thornton, Boster, Conway, Lillo-Martin, and Woodams (1996) plays a role in 
shaping the possible answers, and consequently, the possible Question under 
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Discussion. Musolino and Lidz (2004) do not offer any evidence to disconfirm this 
hypothesis. Furthermore, one should not see Hulsey et al.’s failure to understand 
what questions are made salient in any given context as a failure of the theories that 
explain how those questions could guide ambiguity resolution. By those standards, 
one would need to reconsider all of the phenomena for which context has been 
shown to matter.  
A final criticism for the QAR is presented in Lidz and Musolino (in press). 
These authors draw upon findings documenting children’s ability to access the 
inverse scope interpretation of  (1) in a context in which all horses jumped over the 
log before two of them jump over the fence as well. This is what Lidz and Musolino 
(in press, p. 38-39) write: 
 
“…, the fact that inverse scope can be primed, leading to improved access to 
nonisomorphic readings in the absence of contextual support (Viau, Lidz and 
Musolino 2005), suggests that it is not discourse properties alone that are 
responsible for children’s isomorphic behavior with indefinites or more 
generally.” 
 
We should accept this conclusion with caution. In essence, Lidz and Musolino (in 
press) are attempting to adjudicate between different theories of scope resolution, 
something we don’t fully understand, by means of a phenomenon we understand 
even less. The results documented by Viau et al. (2005) demonstrate that inverse 
scope interpretations can be primed. The question is what primes inverse scope 
interpretations in the study by Viau, Lidz, and Musolino (2005). The answer is quite 
simple: we don’t know. We do know that syntactic scope is not at a possible 
candidate, since children only hear both scope bearing elements in the target sentence. 
Furthermore, in absence of an explicit theory of priming, we can’t exclude the 
possibility that the context primes the relevant question. 
5 Conclusion 
To sum up, the objections raised by Musolino and Lidz (2004) miss the mark. A 
convincing critique of the QAR would be most welcome in the present stage. The 
same goes for new experiments testing the predictions of QAR. To date, however, 
the model proposed by Hulsey et al. (2004) remains valid.  
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Abstract 
In this paper we study a semantic learnability problem, 
first identified by Crain et al. (1994), concerning the 
acquisition of ambiguous sentences where one reading 
truth-conditionally entails the other. We demonstrate 
that sentences containing downward entailing operators 
provide children with truth-conditional evidence that 
would allow them to solve the learnability problem 
discussed by Crain et al. (1994). 
1 A learnability problem in the acquisition of semantics† 
This paper is concerned with a semantic learnability problem. The problem, 
originally identified in Crain et al. (1994), concerns the acquisition of so-called 
privative ambiguities, that is, ambiguous sentences where one reading truth-
conditionally entails the other. Suppose that at a certain stage of language acquisition 
a child has learned the strong, entailing interpretation of such a sentence, but has not 
acquired the weak, entailed interpretation. Plausibly, the child could acquire the weak 
reading when exposed to an utterance of the sentence in a situation where only the 
weak reading is true, provided the child considers the speaker truthful and reliable. 
But a child who at some stage has learned only the weak interpretation of a sentence 
would not be able to access analogous, purely truth-conditional evidence for the 
strong reading Since the strong reading entails the weak reading, there are no 
situations in which only the strong reading is true. So in such a case, it would be 
unclear how the child’s linguistic experience might ever provide evidence for the 
availability of the strong reading. We will refer to this learnability problem as the 
entailment problem.  
We agree that the entailment problem is indeed a potential problem facing the 
child in the course of language acquisition. However, Crain et al. (1994) and Crain 
and Thornton (1998) argue that this problem would be unsolvable if language 
learners ever had to face it and they accordingly suggest that the Language 
Acquisition Device is designed to ensure that the problem in question never arises in 
the first place. More precisely, according to Crain et al. (1994), the Language 
Acquisition Device prevents children from positing only a weak reading of a 
                                                 
† We thank Stephen Crain, Marc Garellek, Luisa Meroni, Jennifer Morehouse and 
Michelle St-Amour, as well as the participants of our Fall 2006 seminar on the 
acquisition of semantics. Part of the research reported in this paper was supported by a 
grant from the Arts Undergraduate Society of McGill University. Both authors 
contributed equally to the present paper and their names appear in alphabetical order.  
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potential privative ambiguity, ensuring that the strong reading is always learned first. 
Crain et al. (1994) refer to this constraint as the Semantic Subset Principle.  
2 Solving the learnability problem  
We would like to argue that the introduction of the Semantic Subset Principle is 
insufficiently motivated. We believe that the claim that the entailment problem is 
unsolvable ignores conceivable solutions that may well be open to the child. Below 
we will first describe a solution that applies in certain special cases. We will then 
present a more general solution that applies in all cases, a solution that exploits 
children’s knowledge of the semantics of downward entailing expressions. 
We start by discussing a specific case of privative ambiguity which has been 
used to motivate the Semantic Subset Principle in the literature. We will argue that a 
particular feature of the ambiguity in question could allow the child to solve the 
instance of the entailment problem at hand, and hence that this particular type of 
ambiguity, at least, does not establish the need for the Semantic Subset Principle. 
Sentence  (1) below, discussed in Musolino (1998) and Musolino, Crain and 
Thornton (2000), permits two readings that differ as to the relative scope of the two 
operators in the sentence.  
 
(1) Every horse didn’t jump over the fence 
(2) a. Every horse is such that it did not jump over the fence 
b. Not every horse jumped over the fence 
 
For English-speaking adults the sentence in  (1) is ambiguous between the 
(dispreferred) surface scope interpretation in  (2)a and the (preferred) inverse scope 
interpretation in  (2)b. The ambiguity is privative, with  (2)a entailing  (2)b. Musolino 
et al. (2000) accordingly argue that children would not be able to acquire it if their 
initial hypothesis only included the weak reading in  (2)b.  
We are not convinced by Musolino et al.’s argument. We think children might 
plausibly avail themselves of pragmatically-inferred information content to switch 
from a grammar that only has the reading in  (2)b to a grammar that has both 
readings. As extensively discussed in the literature (e.g. Horn, 1989), negated 
universal statements typically carry a so-called scalar implicature, a kind of 
generalized conversational implicature in the sense of Grice (1989). Specifically, the 
reading in  (2)b implicates that some horses did indeed jump over the fence. 
Therefore, a child who has a complete grasp of the meaning and use of sentence  (1) 
in reading  (2)b could after all find evidence for the existence of the additional 
reading  (2)a when hearing  (1) in a context in which no horse jumped over the fence.  
One comment on the proposal above is in order. Children’s computation of 
scalar implicatures is the subject of a rapidly growing body of research (for a recent 
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review see Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini and Meroni, 2005). A 
frequent finding is that children do not compute implicatures to the same extent as 
adults. As a consequence, if a child were to initially acquire only the weak reading, 
he might not be able to access the solution described above until relatively late. 
However, this should not be taken as evidence against our proposal. At most, they 
could be taken as evidence against the claim that children go through the relevant 
acquisition scenario in the early stages of language development. This is not our 
claim, however. Our claim is simply that children could acquire the strong reading of 
a privative ambiguity after learning the weak reading. It might take them a long time, 
but the possibility cannot be excluded on logical grounds. 
Thus far we have illustrated how children could use pragmatic knowledge to 
solve a particular instance of the entailment problem. A question that remains is 
whether one can find a conceivable solution to the entailment problem that could 
apply to all instances of the entailment problem and that makes use of purely 
semantic truth-conditional evidence. We propose that such a solution indeed exists: 
sentences containing a downward entailing operator could provide children with 
indirect truth-conditional evidence allowing them to solve the entailment problem.  
We illustrate the proposal with an ambiguity attested in sentences containing the 
focus sensitive operator only. Crain et al. (1994) point out that the two readings of  (3) 
give rise to a privative ambiguity, as  (4)a entails  (4)b.  
 
(3) The dinosaur is only painting a house 
(4) a.  painting a house is the only thing that the dinosaur is doing  
b.  a house is the only thing that the dinosaur is painting 
 
According to Crain et al. (1994), a child who has only learned the strong, wide-focus 
reading  (4)a could find direct truth-conditional evidence for the weak, narrow-focus 
reading  (4)b through exposure to (3) describing a scenario where the dinosaur is both 
painting a house and, say, eating a sandwich. But the reverse order of acquisition 
would run into the entailment problem, that is, no direct truth conditional evidence 
for the existence of the strong reading  (4)a can possibly be available to a child who 
has only acquired the weak reading  (4)b.  
Our proposal draws upon the well-known observation that the vocabularies of 
natural languages contain so-called downward entailing (DE) operators, operators 
that reverse entailment relations among their arguments. It is conceivable that 
sentences containing such DE operators provide children with indirect truth-
conditional evidence allowing them to acquire a strong reading after having first 
learned the weak one. To illustrate, consider  (5), the negated version of  (3).  
 
(5) The dinosaur is not only painting a house 
(6) a.  painting a house is not the only thing the dinosaur is doing 
b. a house is not the only thing the dinosaur is painting  
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Negation being a DE operator, it reverses the direction of entailment between the 
narrow and wide focus readings. While the wide focus reading in  (4)a entails the 
narrow focus reading in  (4)b, the wide focus reading in  (6)a is entailed by the narrow 
focus reading in  (6)b. Therefore, a child might use purely truth-conditional evidence 
to acquire the wide focus reading of  (5) after first having learned the narrow focus 
reading. All the child would need to hear is  (5) in a context in which the dinosaur is 
both painting a house and, say, eating a sandwich, the very same type of context that, 
according to Crain et al. (1994), a child would need to learn that  (3) is ambiguous. 
Suppose now a child has learned only the weak, narrow focus, reading of  (3). 
Assuming the child has mastered the DE semantics of negation, he will thereby also 
have acquired the strong, narrow focus, reading of  (5). As demonstrated above, 
purely truth-conditional evidence could then permit the child to add the weak, wide 
focus, reading of  (5). Under the plausible assumption that an ambiguity that exists in 
the presence of a higher DE operator is also available in the absence of that operator, 
the child will then have acquired the strong, narrow focus, reading of  (3). In other 
words, the child will have solved an instance of the entailment problem. 
The mechanism described above is completely general. In particular, it applies to 
scope ambiguities of the sort illustrated by sentence  (1) above. The only remaining 
question is then whether sentences with DE operators that would point a child in the 
right direction indeed occur in the child’s input. A quantitative analysis of the input 
available to children is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we have reasons 
to believe that the relevant data do in fact exist. We are led to this belief by a 
proposal which is also due to Crain et al. (1994). As we saw, these authors argued 
that learnability demands force children to start off from the strong reading of 
potential privative ambiguities. A second point offered by Crain et al. (1994) 
concerns adults. Crain et al. (1994) argue that the resolution of privative ambiguities 
in adults is governed by a principle that leads them to prefer weak readings. They call 
this the Principle of Parsimony. The fact that adults prefer to use the relevant 
sentences on exactly those readings that children need to acquire ensures that 
children will receive robust evidence for such weak readings. Note now that the 
Principle of Parsimony can play exactly the same role in the alternative acquisition 
scenario that we have envisioned. We have argued that children could use indirect 
truth-conditional evidence to add the strong reading to the weak reading of a 
potentially ambiguous sentence. In particular, children would need to hear a sentence 
in which the relevant construction is in the scope of a DE operator and the intended 
reading is generated by the same mechanism that would generate the strong reading 
of the original construction. Crucially, however, this amounts to the weak reading of 
the construction containing the DE operator. Unless we have reasons to believe that 
adults’ preference for weak readings doesn’t carry over to sentences containing an 
additional downward entailing operator, we must conclude that the required evidence 
would indeed be available. 
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Furthermore, we are encouraged by the results of an informal internet search for 
scopally ambiguous sentences of the type exemplified by sentence  (1) above. The 
search returned many such sentences. Two relevant examples are presented in  (7).  
 
(7) a. "There is absolutely no question in my mind that this is the proper 
way to handle bone growth in young horses," said Fisher. "It's not a 
guarantee that every horse won't buck his shins because there's an 
exception to every medical rule. 
www.ctba.com/00magazine/oct00/news2.htm 
b. No big deal, because it's not as though every person didn't get it, but 
I hope people figure this out. 
theconstructivecurmudgeon.blogspot.com/2006/04/gospel-of-
brutus-evolutionary.html 
 
In both cases, the surface scope reading is clearly intended by the writer, as the 
reading where every takes inverse scope under negation is too strong to be 
pragmatically consistent with the context provided. Thus, the inverse scope reading 
of  (7)a would convey that every horse might buck his shin, and the inverse scope 
reading of  (7)b, that every person got the point. Cases of this sort, then, could in 
principle help children solve the particular instantiation of the entailment problem 
posed by sentences like  (1), that is, they could allow children to acquire the surface 
scope reading in  (2)a after initially having learned the inverse scope reading in  (2)b. 
Let us summarize the proposed mechanism. Given a sentence S and two 
logically possible readings SA and SB, where SA entails SB, we have argued that 
children could acquire both readings on the basis of truth-conditional evidence, 
regardless of which reading was posited first. If the child’s first hypothesis is that 
only SA is available, then all the child needs to experience is an utterance of S in a 
context in which reading SA is false, but SB is true. By contrast, if the child’s first 
hypothesis is that only SB is available, then evidence for the existence of SA might 
come from an utterance of the form OPDES. In this case the mechanisms that generate 
SA and SB would generate OPDESA and OPDESB respectively, where OPDESB entails 
OPDESA. In this case, the child could receive truth-conditional evidence in favor of 
OPDESA. Then, the child would need to infer that the mechanism that generates 
OPDESA would also be available for the original sentence S, thereby acquiring SA.  
We note again that the two paths to the acquisition of privative ambiguity are on 
equal footing in that by the Principle of Parsimony, the weak reading that the child is 
assumed to add later (SB or OPDESA) is predicted to be adults’ preferred reading of 
the relevant sentence (S or OPDES), which in both cases increases the likelihood of 
the relevant data being in the child’s input. Finally, we note that, if S can have the 
strong reading SA but, at the same time, reading OPDESA was unavailable for any 
sentence OPDES, the mechanism we have proposed would fail. However, we are not 
at present aware of any case of this sort. 
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3 Conclusion 
We have argued that DE operators provide a solution to the putative learnability 
problem that the Semantic Subset Principle is expected to prevent. The availability of 
sentences containing DE operators coupled with children’s knowledge of downward 
entailment (see Gualmini, 2003; Gualmini and Crain, 2005) ensures that children 
could arrive at the conclusion that any given sentence is ambiguous, regardless of 
what the initial assumption might be. In particular, even when the two readings are 
related by entailment, either reading could constitute the child’s first hypothesis.  
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Abstract 
In order to examine the controversially discussed 
(Romero and Han, 2004; Büring and Gunlogson, 2000; 
van Rooy and Safarova, 2003) meaning of negated 
polar questions, we have conducted experiments. The 
results indicate that one kind of negation in polar 
questions contributes a presupposition that the speaker 
believes in the truth of the positive proposition. 
Furthermore, a second kind of negation has the effect 
that the question is about a negated proposition. What is 
common to both kinds of negation is that they need a 
proper context in order to be felicitous. 
 
1 Introduction†
There is a general agreement that a semantic theory of questions needs to account 
for the diversity, which exists between the different subtypes of polar questions. 
It is obviously not sufficient to assume the same meaning for both positive and 
negative polar questions. The semantic theory of questions (Groenendijk & 
Stokhof, 1984; Hamblin, 1973), however, predicts all yes/no-questions to denote 
the set of possible answers {that p, that not-p}. This is demonstrated by the 
examples in 1) and 2) and their denotation in 3).  
  
1) Is Jane coming?  
2) Is Jane not coming?  
3) Denotation for 1) and 2): {that Jane is coming, that Jane is not coming}  
  
On the other hand, the typology of negated polar questions and what they convey 
has been controversially discussed in the literature. Ladd (1981) suggests that 
these questions are ambiguous between an inner (INPQ) and outer (ONPQ) 
negation reading. A y/n-question with an inner negation questions the negative 
proposition while a y/n-question with an outer negation questions the positive 
proposition. Buering and Gunlogson (2000) (B&G) take up this suggestion and 
introduce a typology of polar questions, which comprises positive and negative 
ones with the negative polar questions being subdivided into INPQs and ONPQs. 
B&G assume all negative questions to convey the implication1 that the speaker 
believes in the truth of the positive proposition. Further on, Romero and Han 
(2004) (R&H) expanded the typology and restricted the ambiguity to preposed 
negation questions (4 and 5). That is, preposed negation questions are ambiguous 
                                                        
 
1 However, the implication of ONPQs is suggested to be stonger than the implication 
of INPQs 
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in that they either question the positive proposition or the negative proposition. 
The reading of a preposed negation question can be disambiguated by the use of 
either and too. 
  
4) Isn't Jane coming too?  
5) Isn't Jane coming either?  
6) Is Jane not coming?  
  
Their typology of negated questions includes NI-questions (≈Ladd’s INPQs – 
5)), PI-questions (≈Ladd’s ONPQs – 4)) and non-preposed negation questions 
(6). Moreover, they assume NI-questions and PI-questions to contribute an 
implicature, which says that the speaker has the positive belief that e.g. for 4) and 
5), Jane is coming. It is argued that non-preposed negation questions do not 
convey a speaker’s belief. Finally, van Rooy and Safarova (2003) (vR&S) argue 
that the assumption of an ambiguity pertaining to polar questions should be 
abolished.  
The diverging opinions on the typology and meanings of negated polar questions 
call for empirical clarification before we are able to suggest a way of 
theoretically differentiating the different subtypes of polar questions.  
2 Rating Studies 
In the following we will report on the results of experiments carried out to decide 
between the different opinions on English polar questions. More precisely, we 
want to find out whether high negation polar questions require the belief of the 
speaker that the positive proposition is true; whether English high negation polar 
questions are indeed ambiguous between questioning the positive and 
questioning the negative proposition; and whether the type of negation (n’t or 
not) does have an effect on the meaning of a y/n-question.  
2.1 Experimental Design and Material 
Native speakers were asked to rate the naturalness of preposed and non-preposed 
negation questions in controlled contexts.  
The four versions of the English questionnaire were built from eight different 
lexical items, six different context types and five different question types and 
included ten filler sequences. For every lexical variant there were 16 conditions. 
Each of the four versions of the questionnaire was seen by a different group of 
the 25 raters. For the purposes of this paper, we consider the following 
conditions:  
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• Questions with preposed negation/non-preposed negation and too2 in 
contexts with or without the positive speaker´s belief 
• Questions with preposed negation/non-preposed negation and either in 
contexts with and without a positive speaker`s belief 
 
The contexts differed regarding two parameters. Firstly, the contexts included 
either the speaker’s belief that p is true; or it indicated that the speaker did not 
have any belief in terms of the proposition p.  
The other factor refers to the contextual requirements of either and too. Note that 
the question Is Jane not coming either? presupposes that somebody else beside 
Jane is not coming; the question Is Jane coming too? presupposes that somebody 
else beside Jane is coming. Either the statement immediately preceding the 
question at issue fulfilled the presupposition of a question with too or it satisfied 
the presupposition of a question with either.  
The appearance of the questions also varied in terms of two parameters. 
Questions contained either n’t or not and either either or too. Too and either had 
their focus consistently on the subject of the question.  
A context was combined with a question if they agreed in the usage of a certain 
item: A question with either was only seen in a context which was in accord with 
the presupposition of either; a question with too was only seen in a context which 
was in accord with the presupposition of too.  
2.2 Results 
Considering the results for either-questions in contexts with and without a 
positive speaker´s belief, the ANOVA yields a statistical main effect for 
NEGATION TYPE (F1 (1,24)=9.120; p=0.006; F2 (1,7)=16.741; p=0.005). 
Preposed negation questions with either receive significantly lower ratings than 
non-preposed negation questions. Since there is no effect of the speaker’s belief, 
there is no evidence that negated questions with either presuppose a speaker’s 
belief. Turning to the questions with too, questions within contexts with a 
speaker’s belief demonstrate higher ratings than questions within contexts 
without a speaker’s belief. There is a statistical main effect of SPEAKER´S 
BELIEF (F1 (1,24)=7.941; p=0.010; F2 (1,7)=5.914; p=0.045). Furthermore, 
questions with preposed negation receive higher values than questions with non-
preposed negation. The statistical main effect of NEGATION TYPE is highly 
significant (F1 (2,48)=12.732; p< 0.001; F2 (2,14)=17.748; p<0.001).   
2.3 Discussion 
The missing effect of SPEAKER´S BELIEF on the ratings of preposed negation 
questions with either implies that these questions with either do not presuppose 
                                                        
2 According to R&H, polar questions containing too clearly question the positive 
proposition while questions containing either unambiguously question the negative 
proposition. 
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the presence of a positive speaker’s belief. The main effect of NEGATION 
TYPE along with the low ratings suggest that preposed negation questions with 
either are evaluated as being less natural than their non-preposed negation 
counterparts. A possible explanation of the missing effect of the speaker’s belief 
on preposed negation questions is that preposed negation questions with either 
are inherently marked so that the speaker’s belief in the context might not be able 
to improve their status.  
The effect of NEGATION TYPE might to be due to either demanding a non-
preposed negation. We may thus attribute the low ratings of preposed negation 
questions to that either makes a difference between preposed negations and low 
negations and prefers to appear in questions with low negation. There is actually 
no other reason for this pattern, since the conditions of preposed negation 
questions with either and low negation questions with either were identical 
except for the position of the negation. In addition, the preposed negation 
questions with too received significantly higher ratings than preposed negation 
questions with either, so that the low ratings of preposed negation questions with 
either cannot be due to a general rejection of preposed negation questions in 
written language.  
Turning to the results of the too-questions, the ratings of preposed negation 
questions containing too are in significant excess of the ratings of their low 
negation counterparts. Hence, there is evidence that low negation questions are 
marked if containing too and that preposed negation questions are marked if 
containing either. Considering this pattern, we would like to suggest the 
following explanation: Preposed negations are so high within the syntactic 
structure that either has to adjoin to a positive proposition and the question is 
thus marked. Questions with the negation above too within the syntactic tree are 
unmarked because too can take a positive proposition as preferred. 7) illustrates 
this3. 
 
7) Isn’t John coming too/*either? 8) Is John not coming either/*too? 
 
 
CP
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t k coming
*too
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If the negation is low, questions comprising too are marked because too had to 
attach to a negative proposition. This might be the causal factor for the 
                                                        
3 The negation might have originated in NegP but it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to discuss the syntactic position of the negation. 
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ungrammaticality of the question in 8) if containing too. If containing either, the 
question in 8) is unmarked because either can take a negative proposition as 
required.  
The pattern which too and either demonstrate suggests that English comprises 
two different kinds of negation in polar questions. The two types of negation are 
disambiguated by their syntactic position plus morphology as well as by the 
behavior of too and either. The low negation type is used in order to ask about 
not-p no matter whether the speaker has a certain belief about p.  
Since too is known to adjoin to positive propositions while either is said to 
require a negated proposition, we want to argue that preposed negation questions 
differ from positive questions only in that they convey a positive belief of the 
speaker. Therefore, it is necessary to specify a special meaning for preposed 
negations while low negations are treated as taking a positive proposition and 
yielding its complement as usual. N´t – as it occurs in questions - is a 
presuppositional operator, which we will call n'tPrO (PrO = presuppositional 
operator). Simply put, n'tPrO contributes the presupposition that the speaker 
believes that the complement of n’t, that is p, is true. The meaning of n'tPrO is 
given in 9). We further assume that n'tPrO requires being in the scope of the 
question operator Q since it can only occur in questions (10). Considering the 
application of Q to the proposition in the scope of n'tPrO, it turns out that Q skips 
n’tPrO and applies to the proposition without even noticing n’tPrO. The question 
operator is a hole to the presupposition projection (Karttunen, 1973). 
Consequently, we assume the whole meaning of a question containing n'tPrO to 
consist of two parts evaluated on different levels. On the presuppositional level 
(PL) - 13), we add that the speaker believes in p. On a strictly semantic level - 
12), the question operator is applied to the proposition just as in any other 
question and yields {that p, that not p}.  
 
  9)  [[n’tPrO]]g,  =  λp: ∀w’ [w’ ∈  Dox (g(s), w) Æ p(w’)] . p w
10) Licenser of n’tPrO: n’tPrO requires being in the scope of Q 
11) Isn’t John coming? 
12) Denotation: Q [[John is coming]] = {John is coming, John is not coming} 
13) Presupposition: s believes that John is coming 
    
In sum, the findings suggest that polar questions with preposed negation usually 
ask about the positive proposition while low negation questions usually question 
the negative proposition. This in turn challenges the claim that preposed negation 
questions in English are ambiguous. If either preferably adjoins to the 
proposition of questions containing a low negation and too preferably adjoins to 
the proposition contained in preposed negation questions, then there is evidence 
for that high negation questions are not ambiguous. Rather, it seems as if they are 
merely used to express a positive question, which conveys a positive belief of the 
speaker.  
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3 Conclusion 
The results of the experiment on English negated questions indicate that there are 
two different kinds of negation in polar questions.  
In order to account for the differences between different types of polar questions, 
vR&S suggested to maintain the semantic denotation as supplied before and 
allow for differences on another level. We would like to pursue this direction and 
assume that a high negation question receives the entry that this question 
presupposes the speaker’s belief that the positive proposition is true at the 
presuppositional level. Furthermore, a low negation question might presuppose 
that there is a reason for the negation. Finally, positive questions do not receive 
an entry on the presuppositional level because they can be regarded as the default 
type of polar questions according to vR&S. In this way, the semantic denotation 
does not need to be changed. By assuming that different types of polar questions 
give rise to different entries on the presuppositional level and are thus 
distinguished from each other, the denotation may remain as supplied before.  
Concluding, B&G’s typology of polar questions is best conformable with the 
findings from the experiments. There are two different kinds of negated polar 
questions. The low negation questions the negative proposition. High negation 
questions ask about the positive proposition and clearly presuppose that the 
speaker believes in the truth of the positive proposition. The experimental results 
do not support R&H’s typology, which assumes three types of negated polar 
questions.  
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Abstract
We argue that the internal semantics of NPIs does not fully explain Ladu-
saw’s puzzle, the question of why NPIs are licensed in downward entailing
contexts. Instead, we propose that though it is no accident that NPIs have the
semantics they have, ultimately, it is the presence of a syntactic feature that
determines whether a semantically predisposed expression is an NPI or not.
We spell out the implications of this analysis for the licensing of NPIs and
their historical development.
1 Introduction
Negative polarity items (NPIs) are generally held to be licensed in downward en-
tailing environments (cf. English any in (1)) (Ladusaw (1980); cf., however, Gian-
nakidou (1998) for a different view).
(1) a. Negation: I don’t have any ketchup.
b. Universal restriction: Everyone who talked to anyone at the party had
fun.
c. Without: He came without any friends.
While Ladusaw’s generalization has been extremely successful in describing the
distribution of NPIs, it does not explain, or pretend to explain, why a sentence’s
entailment pattern should have to do anything with grammaticality or why it should
affect the choice between any and some, for instance. Current discussion of solu-
tions to ‘Ladusaw’s puzzle’, as we will refer to the question, is largely inspired by
Lahiri (1998)’s analysis of NPIs in Hindi, by Lee and Horn (1994) and by Krifka
(1995).
We first discuss the analyses that try to solve Ladusaw’s puzzle in terms of the
semantics of the NPIs themselves. We show that these proposals, though they rep-
resent important progress, ultimately do not succeed in completely explaining why
NPIs are only licensed in downward entailing contexts. We consider an alternative
proposal that relies on a syntactic feature. We try to show that this kind of approach
has more advantages than one might initially assume.
2 Challenges for an ‘even’ account of NPIs
On the version of the ‘even’ account proposed in Lahiri (1998) the distribtution of
Hindi NPIs is elegantly reduced to their internal morphological makeup. Lahiri,
following Karttunen and Peters (1975), assumes that ‘even’ carries the presuppo-
sition (implicature) that the element it associates with is the least likely among
†A previous version of this paper was presented at the Swarthmore workshop on negation and
polarity that took place in April 2006 at Swarthmore College. We would like to thank the audience
for their questions, in particular Larry Horn.
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the relevant alternatives. This in combination with low scalar elements denoting
quantity (e.g. one, a bit) predicts that the relevant expressions are only sensible in
contexts where the least quantity counts as the least likely among the alternatives.
And this happens to be the case in downward entailing contexts. For instance, since
whenever two persons came, one did, it is less likely for one person not to come
than it is for two.
Note that on this account the Hindi sentences where an NPI appears in an unli-
censed context should strictly speaking not be ungrammatical, but merely pragmat-
ically bizarre, similar to Even one person came. It is not obvious that this coincides
with speakers’ judgements.
Another general question this analysis has to contend with is the fact that there
are a great many NPIs that do not seem to contain an instance of ‘even’, for in-
stance any and ever. Why are these elements also restricted to downward entailing
contexts? On the account in question one could of course propose a tacit ‘even’ in
the relevant cases. But then there would have to be independent evidence for posit-
ing it. One might attribute the presence of a tacit ‘even’ to the element in question
being a low scalar element, denoting the bottom rung on a Horn scale (cf. also
Fauconnier (1975)). There is, however, no correlation between low scale elements
and NPIs: many low scale elements are not NPIs (e.g. some) and the ‘understating’
NPIs (e.g. much) are not low scale elements, as shown in Israel (1996).
Even when restricted to those cases where ‘even’ is morphologically discernible,
the analysis in questions has a cost, for it requires ‘even’ to take scope over the el-
ement that creates a downward entailing context. This, it turns out, sometimes
requires implausibly high scope for ‘even’. On the other hand, if ‘even’ can take
scope in a local fashion below the negative element, then it itself no longer picks
out the least likely (or most surprising) among the alternatives, but has a meaning
where it picks out the most likely element. Since this kind of reading of ‘even’ is
restricted to downward entailing contexts (Rooth, 1985), this syntactically sound
option results in circularity on Lahiri’s analysis–the distribution of one NPI is re-
duced to the distribution of another.
Another argument for not deriving the distribution of NPIs entirely from their
internal structure has to do with the historical tendency of NPIs to change to nega-
tive elements. This tendency, described as part as part of Jespersen’s Cycle, can be
observed in the history of English nobody, which used to be an NPI but has ceased
to be one (at least in standard English). Interestingly, the change is also visible, we
argue, in cases where the morphology of the NPI suggests the presence of ‘even’,
as is the case in Modern Hebrew af exad ‘anyone’, which is literally ‘even one’.
As we show, many young speakers are starting to use these expressions in subject
position as negative expressions in their own right, but still continue to use them
as NPIs elsewhere. If the NPI distribution depended entirely on the internal struc-
ture of the relevant expressions, then, given that the internal structure presumably
does not change for individual speakers depending on syntactic environment, this
change would be hard to explain.
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3 A syntactic feature account
In light of the issues just stated we think it is reasonable to set aside Lahiri’s elegant
account (and similar ones) and conclude instead that whether an element is an NPI
or not is ultimately a property that is not determined by its semantics. Instead, we
claim that what determines whether an expression has the distribution of an NPI
is a morphological feature, which we simply name [+NPI]. It is this feature alone
that distinguishes two elements that seem semantically synonymous but where only
one is an NPI, e.g. any vs. some and ever vs. sometime.1 Crucially [+NPI] is not
a semantic feature (cf. Israel (1996)’s i-value), but a purely grammatical feature.
This is so because, as we noted above, there is no way to semantically define the
class of NPIs; though a lot of them are low scale elements, not all of them are.
Neither are all low scale elements NPIs. On the present account the difference
between some and any does not reside in their truth-conditional meaning, which
we assume is identical, but merely due to any but not some carrying the [+NPI]
feature. Since the restriction to downward entailing contexts is no longer viewed
as a consequence of the presence of ‘even’, this analysis is not limited to accounting
only for NPIs where the morphology suggests the presence of ‘even’, which is the
vast majority of NPIs. Similarly, the analysis can also account for the existence of
‘understating’ NPIs like much.
The scope problem we noticed earlier also disappears. On the account we are
positing the ‘even’ NPIs in Hindi and Hebrew are restricted to downward entailing
contexts for mechanical reasons, because they bear the [+NPI] feature. No longer
is there a need to posit that ‘even’ takes scope over the element that creates the
downward entailing context.
Though speakers do not seem to parse the Hindi and Hebrew ‘even’ NPIs as
two separate words, as also noted in Lahiri (1998), it seems likely that initially
they were compositionally analyzed, where the ‘even’ component itself was an
NPI, picking out the most likely (or least surprising) among the alternatives, which
helps explain why these elements as a unit acquired the [+NPI] feature.
Regarding the change that NPIs are currently undergoing in Modern Hebruew,
we can hypothesize that af exad is ambiguous in the minds of the relevant speakers
between an expression that bears the [+NPI] feature and one where this feature has
changed from being a purely morphological feature signalling ‘I need a negative
context’ to a semantically contentful ‘I create a negative context’. We believe that
this general mechanism also captures what happens during the Jespersen Cycle in
other instances, where an element that initially functions as an NPI comes to be a
1Contra Kadmon and Landman (1993), we do not think that any differs from a some in that any
induces a widening of the domain of quantification. It seems that the examples in (1a) relate to each
other in the same way as the examples in (1b):
(1) a. I don’t have potatoes./I don’t have any potatoes.
b. I have potatoes./I have some potatoes.
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negative element in its own right.
4 Questions this approach raises
4.1 Why are only certain kinds of expressions NPIs?
If what makes an element an NPI is a particular, uninterpretable feature that it
bears, as we are arguing, then one question that arises is why only lexical items
of a certain type bear this feature. As we noted above, NPIs seem to fall into two
classes. Many of them are low scalar expressions (but many low scalar expressions
are not NPIs) and some are expressions that correspond to a medium high rung on
a Horn scale (understating NPIs like much). First, following Jespersen (1917) and
many others since him, we want to point out that elements that occupy the bottom
part of a scale are functionally useful in negative contexts in that they lead to very
strong statements. Thus, saying that one did not read a single page licenses the
inference that one did not read anything containing a single page, for instance a
chapter or a book. Because of their functional usefulness in downward entailing
contexts some of the low scalar expressions seem to become restricted to these
contexts. In other words, they acquire the [+NPI] feature.
Whereas low scalar elements lead to strong claims in negative contexts, ele-
ments that occupy a place in the upper part of the scale lead to a very weak claim
in negative contexts, cf. I didn’t read many books. Some of these expressions come
to be used in downward entailing contexts because they are useful in these contexts
insofar as they allow one to make an understated claim rather than an emphatic one,
which may be desirable at times. When one says I didn’t like it much, neo-Gricean
reasoning would lead one to infer that the person in question liked it some. This
is so because via Quantity the speaker is assumed to have made the strongest pos-
sible claim, which in turn leads to the implicature that a higher alternative claim,
in this case I didn’t like it to any degree would be false, implicating the speaker
liked it a bit. At the same time, making such a statement can be a way of avoiding
strongly negative claims, which is desirable in certain contexts and speech styles.
In this case, the implicature is not generated. Rather, it is assumed that something
stronger than what was actually said holds, namely that the speaker didn’t like it
to any degree. Again, given their functional usefulness, some of these expressions
come to be restricted to negative contexts.
4.2 How the syntactic licensing works
Even though we are arguing that NPIs bear an uninterpretable feature, which needs
to be checked, we are not arguing for reeinstating a modern day version of Klima
(1964)’s analysis. In particular, we do not want to say that the [+NPI] feature is
checked in any construct that would directly involve the element that creates the
downward entailing context, e.g. a determiner. As shown in Ladusaw (1980) such
an analysis has serious difficulties in capturing the difference between every and
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no, in particular the fact that every only licenses NPIs in its restriction but no does
both in its restriction and its scope.
The failure of a Klima style syntactic account does not mean that there is no
syntactic account at all to be given of NPI licensing. In fact, Ludlow (2002) offers
what seems to be a successful one. His project forms part of a long-standing at-
tempt to explain the syllogism patterns catalogued by medieval logicians in terms
of natural language: rather than just specifying the environments in which syllo-
gisms hold, he aims to predict them from the linguistic structures of the sentences
involved. He first shows that the class of inferences can be reduced to two rules, the
dictum de omni and the dictum de nullo, which correspond to upward entailment
and downward entailment respectively. As a second step, he then argues that if we
assume that the logical forms of sentences are represented in the logic of what he
calls L*, then upward and downward entailment can be read off by the number of
negations in the scope of which a variable occurs. Finally, he shows how all of this
can be done as part of the syntax by assigning elements that create downward en-
tailing contexts particular (pairs of) of negation features which are then checked by
operators that correspond to the connectives of L*. NPIs can therefore be viewed
as having features that are checked by a local negation. We would like to briefly
illustrate how this works by using two simple examples. First, some and all are
defined as follows:
(2) a. Some A is B: ∃ ≥ 1x(A(x) ∧B(x))
b. All As are Bs: ∀ ≥ 1x(¬A(x) ∨B(x))
Taking A to be the restriction and B to be the scope in both sentences, not that
neither is in the scope of a negation in the case of some and only the restriction is in
the case of every. Ludlow then proposes a way of mapping these definitions into the
syntax. First, he proposes two rules of interpretation under which the quantifiers
are eliminated, simplifying the logical forms. The connectives—¬, ∨ and ∧—
are then associated with operators in the syntax. Each connective introduces a
functional projection (PolP or ConjP), and for the derivation not to crash, operators
that can check the uninterpretable features introduced by the determiners—[∧] for
some and [-restric, ∨] for all—must appear in those projections. The resulting trees
are then:
(3) a. [ConjP [NP n(x), A(x)][Conj ′ [Conj ∧] [VP B(x)]]]
b. [ConjP [PolP [Pol ′ [Pol− ¬] [NP n(x), A(x)]]] [Conj ′ [Conj ∨] [VP B(x)]]]
On this analysis, downward entailing contexts can be discerned from the syntactic
tree; any variable in the scope of a local negation is in a downward entailing con-
text. This means that NPIs check their [+NPI] feature against the local negation,
thus providing a syntactic analysis that can account for the differences between
every and no.
Finally, we intend to compare the account argued for here with Chierchia
(2006) proposal, which also reaches the conclusion that NPIs are marked with
uninterpretable features, but for other reasons.
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Polarity and ‘Bipolar’ Constructions:  
Epistemic Biases in Questions 
  
1. Introduction 
The interest of this paper is in questions of knowledge and negation.  We 
will discuss the different representations of epistemic implicatures/biases in polar 
(or yes-no) and bipolar (i.e., A-not-A) constructions by centering around the 
following two kinds of formation of questions:1
A. Epistemic biases are influenced by the use of PPIs and NPIs, such as some and 
any.   
B. Different epistemic biases are contributed by employing pre-posed or 
non-preposed negation (cf. Romero and Han, 2004). 
 
2. Epistemic biases in questions 
2.1 The patterns of epistemic bias 
The patterns of epistemic bias can be briefly illustrated in the following 
examples.  These patterns show that NPIs have the negative-biased force (cf. 
Ladusaw, 1979; Fauconnier, 1980; Lahiri, 1998), and PPIs possess the 
positive-biased force. 
(1) a. Has he left yet?     (Negative bias) 
b. Has he left already?     (Positive bias) 
(2) a. Ni  you tingjian renhe shengyin ma?  
   You have hear  any sound Q 
   ‘Have you heard any sounds?’   (Negative bias) 
 b. Ni  you tingjian yixie  shengyin ma?  
   You have hear  some  sound Q 
   ‘Have you heard some sounds?’   (Positive bias) 
(3) a. Isn’t it raining?      (Positive bias) 
b. Is it not raining? 
c. Is it raining or not?     (Neutral bias) 
(4) a. Ni  bu xihuan zhe-dong fangzi ma? 
  You not like  this-CL house Q 
  ‘Don’t you like this house?’   (Positive bias) 
b. Ni  xi-bu-xihuan zhe-dong  fangzi?   
  You like-not-like this-CL  house 
  ‘Do you like this house or not?’   (Neutral bias) 
(1a) with an NPI yet conveys a negative implicature that the speaker thinks or 
presupposes that the person in question hasn’t left, while (1b) carries a positive 
                                                 
1 In what follows, we attempt to deal with epistemic bias or implicature in nearly 
context-free conditions, if possible, trying to consider the non-compositional 
meaning that a sentence itself presents by involving some kind of lexical items, say, 
polarity items, or due to the different positions of negation.  The epistemic bias or 
implicature that a sentence is claimed to have just means the predominant one that 
we take into consideration.  Any other possibilities are also allowed, but beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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bias triggered by the PPI already.  The same pattern is also exhibited by the 
Mandarin data in (2).  The negative bias may be generated due to the NPI renhe 
involved, while the PPI yixie makes clear the speaker’s bias towards a positive 
proposition.  (3a) with the so-called pre-posed negation is argued to be 
positively biased, and (3c) is obviously neutral.  Whether (3b) is positively 
biased or not is determined by the stress on the non-preposed not (e.g., Han and 
Romero, 2004).  With respect to negation and epistemic bias in certain 
interrogative constructions, Mandarin behaves differently from English.  Unlike 
English, (4a) is positively biased with the negator bu staying in situ.  In (4b), the 
A-not-A constituent is argued to undergo LF-raising to CP (e.g., Hsieh, 2001), 
conveying a neutral bias, but not a positive one.2
 
2.2 Biased questions with polarity items 
More patterns of epistemic bias are exhibited as follows.  When biased 
questions contain a polarity item, the context-changing force of PIs still remains. 
(5) a. Wasn’t I right?   
b. Wasn’t I right about anything else?  (Huddleston and Pullum, 2002) 
(5a) implies a positive bias.  It is changed into a negative one in (5b) when the 
NPI is added.  The domain-widening resulting from any or the compounds 
formed by any creates a stronger or more informative proposition, in which an 
exhaustive set of alternatives is considered doubtful.  The selection of anything 
causes (5b) to have a negative interpretation. 
Different choices corresponding to different discourse considerations 
generate different results.  PPIs like some denote specificity or particularity, 
probably carrying presuppositions, and contain a collective sense.  Therefore, 
the positive bias in (6a) would be reinforced by the selection of PPI something in 
(6b). 
(6) a. Didn’t you know it?   
b. Didn’t you know that something happened last night?  
Like the English data (5) and (6), the Mandarin data—(7a) implies a 
positive bias, which is cancelled by the NPI involved in (7b), but strengthened in 
(7c), due to the addition of PPI yixie. 
(7) a. Zhangsan mei bang  ni mang ma?  
  Zhangsan not do  you favor Q 
  ‘Didn’t John help you?’ 
b. Zhangsan mei bang  ni renhe mang ma?  
  Zhangsan not do  you any favor Q 
  ‘Didn’t John give you any help?’ 
c. Zhangsan mei bang  ni yixie mang ma? 
  Zhangsan not do  you some favor Q 
  ‘Didn’t John give you some help?’ 
The example in (8a) has the negative-bias interpretation that the speaker thinks 
                                                 
2 See Hsiao (2006) for the account of the difference between English and Mandarin 
bipolar constructions, in which a base-generated analysis is argued to apply to 
Mandarin data, as well as ones in English, to account for the different epistemic 
effects contributed by the different positions of negation. 
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the addressee did not hear any sounds, and the NPI underlined in (8b) reinforces 
this interpretation.  This negative interpretation would be cancelled by the PPI 
in (8c). 
(8) a. Ni  zhende you  tingjian shengyin ma?  
  You really  have  hear  sound Q 
  ‘Have you really heard sounds?’ 
b. Ni  zhende you  tingjian renhe shengyin ma? 
  You really  have  hear  any sound Q 
  ‘Have you really heard any sounds?’ 
c. Ni  zhende you  tingjian yixie  shengyin ma? 
  You really  have  hear  some  sound Q 
  ‘Have you really heard some sounds?’ 
 
2.3 Questions with minimizers 
Questions containing minimizers are always biased towards a negative 
answer, since minimizers may be associated with focus encoded by a hidden even 
(e.g., Guerzoni, 2004).  When minimizers are present in the questions where 
positive biases exist, as (9b) illustrates, the questions would sound odd.  (9c) 
shows that minimizers are compatible with the negative contexts.  Therefore, 
we get the exclusive bias condition.  That is, for any minimizer, i.e., a strong 
NPI with emphatic stress denoting a minimal value on a scale, its acceptability in 
questions determines the existing biases the questions convey.  
Negatively-biased questions allow such NPIs, while positively-biased questions 
do not. 
(9) a. Did John (ever) lift a finger to help Mary? 
b. ??Didn’t John lift a finger to help Mary? 
c. Did John really lift a finger to help Mary? 
 
3. The “enriched composition” model 
The “enriched composition” model in the sense of Jackendoff (2002) is 
given to explain how PIs interact with the existing biases, why some PIs can 
reverse the polarity or bias in the questions, and why others are ruled out by the 
exclusive bias condition.  In what follows, we use several representative 
examples to demonstrate the explanatory power of the model. 
(10) a. Doesn’t John like Mary? 
b. LF: [CP Q [NOTF [IP John likes Mary]]] 
= [CP Q [VERUM3-NOT [IP John likes Mary]]] 
c. [Doesn’t John like Mary?] 
  = λA [(∀p)(A(p) ↔ p = ^LIKE(j, m)) ∨ (∀p)(A(p) ↔ p = ^¬LIKE(j, m))] 
  = {{^LIKE(j, m)}, {^¬LIKE(j, m)}} 
  = {{^LIKE(j, m)}}    [after conditionalization4] 
                                                 
3 VERUM, a term borrowed from Romero and Han (2004, p. 624), is an epistemic 
conversational operator, the presence of which can be overtly spelled out with really 
or signaled by stress on a polarity item.  Moreover, its presence triggers an 
epistemic bias of the opposite polarity to the questioned proposition. 
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d. Inf. Str.: Common Ground  Focus 
            (POS-bias)  (not) 
e. John likes Mary, doesn’t he? 
The question in (10a) is represented at LF as (10b), in which negation carrying 
focus can be reformulated as VERUM having scope over negation.  (10c) is the 
semantic realization of this biased question, showing that the positive proposition 
is supposed.  The information structure tier for this question is depicted in (10d), 
where the positive proposition is assumed by the speaker to be a part of the 
Common Ground, and the bias trigger occurs as part of focus, conveying new 
information.  Based on the information in (10d), hence, the transformation of 
(10a) as a tag question like (10e) clearly shows us the speaker’s strong bias in 
favor of a positive answer.  In a similar way, the negatively biased question in 
(11) can be explained. 
(11) a. Does John really like Mary? 
b. LF: [CP Q [VERUM [IP John likes Mary]]] 
c. [Does John really like Mary?] 
  = λA [(∀p)(A(p) ↔ p = ^¬LIKE(j, m))] [after conditionalization] 
  = {{^¬LIKE(j, m)}} 
d. Inf. Str.: Common Ground  Focus 
            (NEG-bias)  (really) 
e. John doesn’t like Mary, does he? 
When the positively biased question further contains a PI, the 
representations in various tiers, which are compacted to construct the sentential 
meaning of the question, are illustrated in the following examples.  In (12b), 
someone (included in the set of persons P) has to be moved before NOTF or 
VERUM-NOT at LF, taking a wide-scope reading.  This can be demonstrated in 
(12d), where the circumscribed part indicates the interaction between these two 
lexical items in “Lexical Inheritance Structure” by applying some lexical 
transformational mechanisms in the four levels of semantic representations 
proposed by Pustejovsky (1995).  Hence, at the lexical level, someone scopes 
over negation, and a positive tendency is yielded at information structure tier 
accordingly.  Due to this, the bias of the opposite polarity triggered by VERUM, 
namely the positive bias in this case, is enhanced by the positive tendency at the 
information structure level. 
(12) a. Doesn’t John like someone? 
b. LF: [CP Q [NOTF [IP John likes someone]]] 
      = [CP Q [VERUM-NOT [IP John likes someone]]] 
                                                                                                                   
4 The notion of “conditionalization” proposed by Higginbotham (1997) is originally 
used for the analysis of the presuppositions of a question.  It can also be used to 
account for the semantics of biased questions.  According to Higginbotham (1997), 
a neutral question induces a bipartition on the set of sets of propositions; when it is 
biased, the proposition that is considered more relevant to the question by the speaker 
is conditionalized into the bipartition, and due to this, one of the two sets is reduced 
to empty propositional content, and would then be left out ultimately.  So, a 
bipartition made by a neutral question would become the mono-partition for a biased 
question.  
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      = [CP Q [someonei [VERUM-NOT [IP John likes ti]]] 
c. [Doesn’t John like someone?] 
  = λA [(∀p)(A(p) ↔ p = ^∃x(P(x) ∧ LIKE(j, x)))] [after conditionalization] 
  = {{^∃x(P(x) ∧ LIKE(j, x))}} 
d. Inf. Str.: Common Ground  First Focus Focus 
            (POS-bias)    (not)  (someone) 
                                                POS
e. John likes someone, doesn’t he? 
Similar to the case in (12), the circumscribed part in (13d) signifies the 
scoping relation between negation and anyone at the lexical level, because of 
which a negative tendency is brought out at the information structure tier.  Such 
a negative tendency affects and indeed to some degree reverses the existing 
positive bias to less positive at the information structure tier.  The 
context-changing force that PIs have is attested. 
(13) a. Doesn’t John like anyone? 
b. LF: [CP Q [NOTF [IP John likes anyone]]]    (1) 
      = [CP Q [VERUM-NOT [IP John likes anyone]]]  (2) 
      = [CP Q [anyonei [VERUM-NOT [IP John likes ti]]]  (3) 
      = [CP Q [NOTj-anyonei [VERUM-tj [IP John likes ti]]] (4) 
c. [Doesn’t John like anyone?] 
  = λA [(∀p)(A(p) ↔ p = ^¬∃x(P(x) ∧ LIKE(j, x)))] 
  = {{^¬∃x(P(x) ∧ LIKE(j, x))}}  [after conditionalization] 
d. Inf. Str.: Common Ground  First Focus  Focus 
            (POS-bias)  (not)   ＞NEG (anyone) 
Minimizers like lift a finger possess an inherent focus, exhibiting a 
negative bias as part of their meaning.  As illustrated in (14d), such a bias will 
be embedded in the Common Ground, working at the information structure tier 
as the speaker’s expectation that the negative answer will be picked up. 
(14) a. Did John lift a finger to help Mary? 
b. LF: [CP Q [(LIFT-A-FINGERi)F [IP John ti to help Mary]]] 
c. [Did John lift a finger to help Mary?] 
  = λA [(∀p)(A(p) ↔ p = ^¬LIFT-A-FINGER(j, H(j, m)))] 
  = {{^¬LIFT-A-FINGER(j, H(j, m))}}  [after conditionalization] 
d. Inf. Str.: Common Ground  Focus 
                 (lift a finger) 
                       (NEG-bias) 
When minimizers are put in a positively-biased question, the sentence becomes 
odd.  In (15), VERUM triggers a positive bias, under which lift a finger occurs.  
The negative bias derived from lift a finger and the positive bias invoked by 
VERUM clash at the information structure tier, as shown in (15c).  Minimizers 
are incompatible in positively-biased questions, just because the negative bias 
leads to a conflict with the positive bias existing in the questions at the same 
plane, namely the information structure tier, while the positive bias originally 
encoded in the questions does not affect any and other NPIs, in that they work on 
different planes, complying with the Non-crossing constraint in a spirit similar to 
that of Autosegmental Phonology (cf. Goldsmith, 1989). 
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(15) a. ??Didn’t John lift a finger to help Mary? 
b. LF: [CP Q [NOTF (LIFT-A-FINGERi)F [IP John ti to help Mary]]] 
      = [CP Q [VERUM-NOT (LIFT-A-FINGERi)F [IP John ti to help Mary]]] 
c. Inf. Str.: Common Ground  First Focus  Focus 
               (POS-bias)   (not)  (lift a finger) 
                                      (NEG-bias) 
 
According to such an analysis, it can be inferred that minimizers are acceptable 
in negatively-biased questions, since the negative bias derived from minimizers 
is consistent with the bias originally existing in the questions.   
(16) a. Did John really lift a finger to help you? 
b. LF: [CP Q [REALLYF (LIFT-A-FINGERi)F [IP John ti to help Mary]]] 
      = [CP Q [VERUM (LIFT-A-FINGERi)F [IP John ti to help Mary]]] 
c. Inf. Str.: Common Ground  First Focus  Focus 
              (NEG-bias)   (really)  (lift a finger) 
         (NEG-bias) 
 
4. Conclusion 
As illustrated in the model, the PIs like any and some interact with negation 
or VERUM at the lexical structure tier, changing the “co-compositional” 
(Pustejovsky, 1995) contexts of questions, while minimizers themselves further 
generate negative implicature, which clashes with the biases originally existing 
in the questions at the information structure tier, so that they are subject to the 
exclusive bias condition.  This analysis also accounts for NPI licensing in 
biased questions, involving as it does the relation between NPIs and their 
licensors at every tier in the conceptual structure.   
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Abstract 
The typological distinction of different polarity types of 
indefinites leads to new insights in the history of 
negation beyond Jespersen's Cycle. It allows one to 
capture a whole range of changes in the marking of 
negation and polarity that have gone virtually unnoticed 
in classical philology, viz. the shifts and extensions in 
polarity type of individual indefinite pronouns and 
adverbs leading to changes in type of entire indefinite 
systems with such drastic syntactic consequences as the 
loss or emergence of NC. This is illustrated in a cross-
linguistic perspective but with special emphasis on the 
developments in German. Furthermore, it is shown that, 
while it is common for indefinites to become 'more 
negative', the opposite change is also attested, i.e. there 
is no unidirectionality. 
1 Background: Basic typologies 
As a background to the discussion of diachrony, a few basic distinctions need to 
be made. On the basis of the features [±affective], where affective is used as a 
cover term for NPI-licensing contexts cf. Klima (1964); Ladusaw (1979);1 
Giannakidou (1998)2 etc., and [±negative], three types of contexts can be 
distinguished with respect to polarity: [- affec, - neg], i.e. positive polar contexts, 
[+ affec, - neg] contexts, also referred to as weak NPI contexts (van der Wouden, 
1997), and [+ affec, + neg] contexts or strong NPI contexts, the scope of 
negation. Among the weak NPI contexts there are questions, conditionals, the 
standard of comparison, clauses dependent on negated matrix clauses ('indirect 
negation') or on adversative matrix predicates such as 'deny', 'forbid', 'fear', 
'refuse' etc., restrictive clauses on universal quantifiers, and the context of lexical 
items meaning 'hardly', 'rarely', 'before' etc. 
This basic tripartition of contexts with respect to polarity is evident in a number 
of languages that accordingly differentiate three polarity types of indefinite 
pronouns and adverbs cf. Dahl (1979); Bernini/Ramat (1996): 'normal' or PPI 
indefinites such as English some, something, somewhere etc., NPI indefinites 
such as any, anything, anywhere, and n-word indefinites such as no, nothing, 
nowhere etc. I will follow current theory in assuming that there is no basic 
semantic difference between NPI indefinites and n-word indefinites (cf. 
Penka/Stechow, 2001) but that the latter indefinites differ from the former in that 
they bear a formal neg-feature, are often morphologically neg-marked, are 
restricted to [+ affec, + neg] contexts in most languages, and - most importantly - 
give rise to a negative interpretation in elliptical contexts for instance in one-
word answers. 
                                                        
1 Ladusaw (1979) proposes to identify 'affective' with 'downward-entailing'. 
2 Giannakidou (1998) proposes to identify 'affective' with 'non-veridical'. 
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Not all languages differentiate three polarity types of indefinites. There is also 
underspecification with respect to [±affective] or [± negative] which gives us a 
whole typology of indefinite systems. 
(1) Typology of indefinite systems 
I II III IV 
[- affec, - neg] [- affec, - neg]] 
[+ affec, - neg] [± affec, - neg]  
[+ affec, + neg] [+ affec, ± neg]] [+ affec, + neg] 
 
[± non-aff, ± neg] 
 
These are instantiated by different languages (cf. Weiß, 2002) but also by 
different indefinites within one language. This typology can be made even more 
fine-grained by further subdividing the weak NPI contexts,3 but also by 
distinguishing between inclusive and exclusive distribution of different polarity 
types. Thus, while there is a certain amount of optionality to chose an NPI or an 
n-word indefinite in the scope of negation in English and to some extent in 
Romance languages, the most specific indefinite possible has to be chosen for 
instance in Slavic languages. In the scope of negation, that is the n-word 
indefinites. The NPI indefinites are thus excluded in one central subset of their 
licensing contexts, which has been referred to as the Bagel problem (Pereltsvaig, 
2004). This is, however, merely an example of the common phenomenon in 
language as also captured in Kiparsky's (1973) Elsewhere-Condition, of the 
existence of a more specific form precluding a less specific form from occurring 
(Jäger, 2006). The same mechanism is presumably also responsible for 'normal' 
or underspecified indefinites turning out as PPIs: if in a language the NPI and n-
word indefinites have to be used wherever possible, the 'normal' indefinites will 
be blocked in all other contexts but [- affec] ones. 
2 Typology of diachronic developments 
Looking at language change against the background of the above distinctions, 
one may observe the shift or extension in distributional type of indefinites. One 
particularly common path of language change in this respect is the development 
of NPI indefinites into n-words. This has for instance occurred in Irish, Italian, 
Spanish, Catalan, and Greek. It is currently taking place in the case of French 
aucun whose Italian cognate alcuno is an NPI, however French aucun can 
already give rise to a negative interpretation in elliptical contexts. 
Tracing this development in Romance further back, we find that there was a 
previous shift from PPI to NPI status from the Classical Latin predecessor 
                                                        
3 One way to do this is to differentiate among the downward-entailing contexts those 
that also satisfy the first half of de Morgan's law (anti-additive contexts) and those 
that in addition also satisfy the second half of de Morgan's law (antimorphic 
contexts) arriving at the following neg-hierarchy: antimorphic c anti-additive c 
downward-entailing c nonveridical. 
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aliquuus. In view of these two types of shifts one might assume a 
unidirectionality in development towards 'more negative'. 
However, the opposite changes are also attested. Thus the Slovene NPIs nekdo, 
nekaj etc. are still morphologically marked for negation by their initial neg-
morpheme. They were replaced as n-words by the new formations nikdo, nic etc. 
In Kroatian, the development went even one step further: while nitko etc. form 
the n-word indefinites, the morphologically negative netko etc. further 
developped from NPIs to 'normal' indefinites (Ranko Matasovic, p. c.). In sum, 
there is evidence for the following changes: 
(2) Types of diachronic shift or extension of distribution 
'normal' or  
PPI indefinite 
    
NPI indefinite 
 
    
n-word indefinite 
 
    
 
These shifts in polarity type can be understood as enrichment with or loss of 
formal features of individual lexical items that are only licensed in certain 
syntactic or semantic contexts, notably in the case of development from or 
towards n-word status, the formal neg-feature. 
A closer look at one particular language shows the kind of effects these 
individual developments may have on the entire system of indefinites and syntax 
of negation of a language. I will illustrate this with the help of German where 
several of the above mentioned changes occurred. 
3 Case study: The development in German 
The standard historical grammars of German (Paul, 1998; Braune, Reiffenstein 
2004) basically only list indefinites according to their semantic restriction, i.e. 
person, entity/thing, time, place etc. Against the background of the typological 
distinctions above, one may however observe that Old High German, unlike 
Modern German, had a mostly intact three-set system of polarity types of 
indefinites (cf. Jäger, 2006) consisting of 'normal' or PPI indefinites notably of 
the ete(s)-series (eteslih 'some', ete(s)waz 'something', ete(s)wer 'somebody', 
ete(s)wenne 'some time', etewar 'somewhere') but also the cognate of some, Old 
High German sum(ilih), NPI-indefinites notably the io-series (iowiht 'anything', 
ioman 'anybody', io 'ever', iowergin/ioner 'anywhere') but also the cognate of 
any, Old High German einig, and dehein(ig) ('any'), and finally the n-word 
indefinites of the ni(o)-series (nihein(ig) 'no', ni(o)wiht 'nothing', ni(o)man 
'nobody', nio 'never', niowergin/nioner 'nowhere'). These occurred in inclusive 
distribution, i.e. n-words as well as NPI indefinites were possible in the scope of 
negation. 
Crucial changes in the indefinite system took place during and at the end of the 
Middle High German period. A number of indefinites underwent a shift or 
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extension in distributional type, others died out or completely changed their 
meaning. Among the determiner indefinites, the NPI einig, that is still 
occasionally used as 'any' even in Early New High German, eventually changed 
its meaning to 'a few'/'several'. The PPI sum(ilih) died out. The same happened in 
the Standard language with the n-word Det nihein, Middle High German 
nehein/enhein, which only survives in some Swiss German dialects as ekei. The 
former n-word indefinite Det was replaced by the former NPI dehein/kein which 
changed into n-word. This shift in polarity type explains the long-standing puzzle 
of German linguistics why kein could have both 'positive' and 'negative' meaning. 
Even in Middle High German, it could still be used in some weak NPI contexts, 
but could already occurr as the only marker of negation in a clause: 
(3) sol    kein   man  radt  darzu  geben, das thust auch du. 
 should any man advice to-that give,  that  do  also you 
 'If any man should give advice on this, so should you' 
 Lanc 88, 521 
(4) roub    unde diepheit daz mac   kein    amt          gesîn. 
robbery and theft     that may  any/no profession  be 
'Robbery and theft cannot be a profession' 
Bert I, 94 
The 'normal' indefinite Det ein remained. Among the indefinites corresponding to 
something, anything and nothing, the n-word niowiht>niht remained (in its 
genitive form nichts). The NPI iowiht>iht showed similar tendencies as 
dehein/kein of turning into an n-word. However, it became extinct in the 
Standard language.4 As the NPI died out, the former PPI ete(s)waz>etwas 
extended in distribution and is now used in all [- neg] contexts including weak 
NPI contexts. 
Among the indefinites with a restriction to person, the n-word nioman>niemand 
remained again. However here, the PPI ete(s)wer died out and the former NPI 
ioman>jemand was extended in distribution and developped into a 'normal' 
indefinite that covers all [- neg] contexts. Interestingly, in some Upper German 
dialects, on the other hand, the development was parallel to that of etwas: The 
former PPI ete(s)wer survived as Bavarian ebba and Swiss German öpper and 
was extended in distribution to all [- neg] contexts, while the NPI ioman died out. 
As far as the indefinites with a restriction to time are concerned, the PPI 
ete(s)wenne died out and was replaced by the new formation irgendwann (from 
the former indfinite place-NPI + wh-adverb 'when') that is licensed in all [- neg] 
contexts. The n-word form nio>nie remained again, but also the NPI io>je 
remained in Modern German. Among the place indefinites, the n-word 
nioner>niender became extinct, but niwergin>nirgends survived. The PPI 
ete(s)wa>etwa changed its meaning to 'approximately'. The NPI ioner>iener died 
out, but iowergin>irgen(d) survived in combination with wh-elements with 
which it formed a new set of 'normal' indefinites licensed in all [- neg] contexts: 
irgendein 'some/any', irgendwas 'some/anything', irgendwer 'some/anybody', 
                                                        
4 In some Upper German dialects, e. g. Swabian, it survived as a neg-marker it/et. 
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irgendwann 'some time/ ever', irgendwo 'some/anywhere', and even an indefinite 
manner adverb for which there is no n-word counterpart in German irgendwie 
'some/anyhow'. The following table summarises the main developments: 
(5) Development of the indefinite system in German 
 Det 'entity' 'person' 
'normal' 
/ PPI 
sum(ilih) 
ein 
eteslih  
 
ete(s)waz
ete(s)wer
NPI einig  
dehein(ig) 
 
 
        ein 
(io)wiht 
 
 
        etwas 
ioman 
 
 
       jemand 
n-word nihein(ig)         kein ni(o)wiht          nichts ni(o)man       niemand 
 
 time  place 
'normal' 
/ PPI 
ete(s)wenne  
  irgendwann 
etewar 
NPI io         je  (io)wergin 
ioner 
 
 
         irgendwo 
n-word nio         nie niowergin 
nioner 
           nirgends 
          nirgendwo 
 
What becomes evident when looking at the indefinite system of the language as a 
whole is that, while the developments of individual indefinites occasionally went 
into opposite directions (towards 'more positive' or towards 'more negative'), 
there is one overarching effect these changes had in German: the system of 
indefinites was basically reduced from a three-set to a two-set system with 
underspecification with respect to [± affective]. In Modern German, there is only 
the opposition between 'normal' indefinites and n-words, apart from the temporal 
adverbs where je remained as an NPI. Otherwise, the category of NPI indefinites 
disappeared from the language system. 
This had far reaching consequences for the syntax of negation in general: as the 
NPI-indefinitess basically disappeared, there ceased to be a choice between NPI 
or n-word in the scope of negation, the main source of optionality of NC in 
OHG. N-words became virtually obligatory in negative contexts so that a 
negative context containing an indefinite was already sufficiently marked by the 
indefinite. In combination with the reduction and loss of the clitic neg-particle, 
this facilitated the loss of the original type of NC in German, of Neg-Doubling 
between the clitic neg-particle and an n-word, which significantly decreased 
already from Old High German to Middle High German and basically died out in 
the course of the latter period. Interestingly, the subsequent rise of a new type of 
NC in some varieties of German can also be linked to the change of indefinites 
with respect to polarity type: The original NPI dehein/kein could of course co-
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occur with negative XPs. As it turned into an n-word in Middle High German, 
the learner encountered instances of an n-word co-occurring with other negative 
XPs. This pattern was presumably generalised to other n-words so that NC of the 
kind found e. g. in Modern Bavarian between several negative XPs emerged. 
4 Conclusion 
In a number of languages, indefinites changed in their polarity type both towards 
'more negative' and towards 'more positive'. As one can observe in German, these 
changes could result in a change in the type of the entire indefinite system (from 
a three-set to a two-set system) and the syntax of negation (loss of original type 
of NC, rise of a new type in some German varieties). 
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Abstract
We show in this paper that Korean NPIs are universal-like in nature, scoping
over negation. Specifically, a Korean NPI takes negation in its immediate
scope, respecting a generalized form of the Immediate Scope Constraint of
Linebarger (1987).
1. Introduction
Korean has different expressions of negation: lexical negation, short-form nega-
tion, or long-form negation. Any of these forms can license a negative polarity
item (NPI) anywhere in the clause, even in subject position. The examples in (1)
show this with the simple NPI amwu-to (‘anyone’):
(1) a. amwu-to cip-ey eps-ess-ta
anyone house-at not.be-PAST-DECL
‘No one was at home.’
(lexical negation)
b. amwu-to ku chayk-ul an ilk-ess-ta
anyone that book-ACC NEG read-PAST-DECL
‘No one read that book.’
(short-form negation)
c. amwu-to ku chayk-ul ilk-ci anh-ass-ta
anyone that book-ACC read-COMP NEG-PAST-DECL
‘No one read that book.’
(long-form negation)
Several researchers have suggested that Korean NPIs are not in the scope of nega-
tion. This is quite prevalent view, in fact (see for example, Chung and Park, 1998;
K.-S. Kim, 1999; H. Lee, 2001; A.-R. Kim, 2002; Han et al., 2005; Sells, 2006).
An example like (2) shows that lexical negation cannot scope over the subject po-
sition, even though an NPI is licensed in the same position in (1a).
(2) manhun salam-tul-i cip-ey eps-ess-ta
many people-PLU-NOM house-at not.be-PAST-DECL
‘Many people were not at home.’ (the only scope order is many > Neg)
Further, the contrast in (3) shows that the scalar NPI han salam-to is licensed in a
position over which negation cannot scope.
(3) a. han salam-i o-ci anh-ass-ta
one person-NOM come-COMP NEG-PAST-DECL
‘One person did not come.’ (the only scope order is one > Neg)
b. han salam-to o-ci anh-ass-ta
one person (NPI) come-COMP NEG-PAST-DECL
‘Not one person came.’
We present several pieces of evidence which show that NPIs in Korean are univer-
sals, taking wide scope over the licensing negation. In fact, they take immediate
wide scope over negation, due to the Immediate Scope Constraint, which we pro-
pose to generalize to these wide scope universal NPI cases. Further, even though
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¬∃ and ∀¬ are logically equivalent, we will show that there are identifiable se-
mantic consequences to the choice of these two semantic structures for NPIs, and
that Korean clearly has the latter. We do not intend the NPI-as-universal analysis
to necessarily mean that NPIs have all the semantic and pragmatic properties of
standard universal quantifiers: for our purposes here, we use ‘universal’ as a label
for the type of NPI which outscopes the negation which licenses it.
In particular, Korean NPIs outside the scope of negation can lack the presup-
position of existence often assumed for a regular universal quantifier such as every
in English. An example such as (4) with amwuto does not require a presupposed
set of individuals (equivalent examples with an n-word in Greek are supposed to
be pragmatically odd (cf. Giannakidou 2000, 505)).
(4) totwuk-un amwu huncek-to namki-ci anh-ass-ta
thief-TOP any trace leave-COMP NEG-PAST-DECL
‘The thief didn’t leave any trace.’
There is no commitment in this example to the existence of traces of the thief; if
the NPI were presuppositional, the example would be pragmatically odd at best.
(5) also shows that a Korean NPI does not have an existential presupposition.
(5) ku-nun Mary-eykey amwu kwansim-to eps-ess-ta
he-TOP Mary-DAT any interest not.be-PAST-DECL
‘He didn’t have any interest in Mary.’
2. The Immediate Scope Constraint
Assuming that English NPIs are existentials in the scope of negation, Linebarger
(1987) showed that a simple scope condition on NPIs is not strong enough: their
relation to the licensing negation is subject to a locality condition. For this, she pro-
posed the Immediate Scope Constraint, according to which an NPI can be licensed
only if it is in the ‘immediate scope’ of a negation.
(6) Immediate Scope Constraint (ISC) (Linebarger, 1987, 338)
A negative polarity item is acceptable in a sentence S if in the LF of S the
subformula representing the NPI is in the immediate scope of the negation
operator. An operator is in the immediate scope of NOT only if (i) it
occurs in a proposition that is the entire scope of NOT, and (ii) within this
proposition there are no logical elements intervening between it and NOT.
The ISC is a kind of minimality requirement on NPI-licensing which ensures that
no other logical operator can intervene between an NPI and its licensing negation,
The ‘logical elements’ in (6) correspond roughly to propositional operators (e.g.,
quantificational NPs and adverbs). The effect of the ISC is seen in the contrast in
examples like those in (7), from Honcoop (1998, 116):
(7) a. Nobody gave John a red cent/anything.
b. *Nobody gave most beggars/every beggar a red cent/anything.
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By the ISC, an NPI must be in the immediate scope of its licensor, so (7b) fails as
every beggar, a scope-bearing element, intervenes between the negation and the
NPI a red cent/anything.
Now, for a language in which an NPI outscopes negation, something like the
ISC would require that an NPI as universal takes immediate wide scope with respect
to negation (see e.g., Horn, 1972, chap. 3; Lasnik, 1972; Kroch, 1974; LeGrand,
1975; Eisner, 1994 – cited in Horn, 2005). We show that Korean NPIs are universal-
like in nature, and take immediate scope over negation, respecting the ISC. The
relevance of the ISC is noted already in Kim (1999), who proposes the same gener-
alizations for Korean NPIs as we argue for here, though with only a limited set of
data. Specifically, we argue for a generalized version of the constraint:
(8) Generalized Immediate Scope Constraint (GISC)
An NPI and negation are in an immediate scope relation with each other.
The universal analysis plus the GISC can explain several interesting facts in Korean
(and, we believe, in other OV languages like Japanese or Turkish). An immediate
question for a universalist analysis of NPIs is whether examples can be found with
the interpretation ∀ > QP > Neg. Although such interpretations have occasionally
been claimed for Japanese, the Korean data is unequivocal: such scope configu-
rations do not exist. However, we argue, this is not a mark against the universal
analysis of Korean NPIs, but, rather, it is evidence that the GISC applies.
3. Korean NPIs are Universals
As we noted above, if Korean NPIs were existentials in the immediate scope of
negation, we would have to show that negation can scope over the subject. It
is especially clear in (non-NPI examples in) Korean that this is not possible with
short-form or lexical negation. These forms of negation never c-command and
scope over the subject, but subject NPIs are nevertheless possible:
(9) a. han salam-i an o-ass-ta
one person-NOM NEG come-PAST-DECL
‘One person didn’t come.’ (one > Neg, *Neg > one)
b. han salam-i cip-ey eps-ess-ta
one person-NOM house-at not.be-PAST-DECL
‘One person wasn’t at home.’ (one > Neg, *Neg > one)
(10) a. mila-man an o-ass-ta
Mira-only NEG come-PAST-DECL
‘Only Mira didn’t come.’ (only > Neg, *Neg > only)
b. mila-man cip-ey eps-ess-ta
Mira-only house-at not.be-PAST-DECL
‘Only Mira wasn’t at home.’ (only > Neg, *Neg > only)
(11) a. amwu-to an o-ass-ta
anyone NEG come-PAST-DECL
‘No one came.’
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b. amwu-to cip-ey eps-ess-ta
anyone house-at not.be-PAST-DECL
‘No one was at home.’
We can directly show that a Korean NPI is not in the scope of negation. In the
‘VP-focus construction’ with nun on the verb, negation must take wide scope.
(12) a. mila-to ca-ci-nun anh-ass-ta
Mira-also sleep-COMP-FOC NEG-PAST-DECL
‘It’s not the case that also Mira slept.’ (Neg > also, *also > Neg)
b. mila-man ca-ci-nun anh-ass-ta
Mira-only sleep-COMP-FOC NEG-PAST-DECL
‘It’s not the case that only Mira slept.’ (Neg > only, *only > Neg)
(Other people slept too.)
In these examples, negation must scope over the expression in the subject position.
However, an NPI in that position leads to unacceptability:
(13) *amwu-to ca-ci-nun anh-ass-ta
anyone sleep-COMP-FOC NEG-PAST-DECL
‘No one slept.’
If amwu-to were an existential in the scope of negation, (13) should be grammatical
with this focus construction. Only the analysis in which amwu-to is a universal
with negation in its immediate scope predicts the unacceptability of (13). (13) is
in fact grammatical when it is the verb sleep that is focused and negation targets
it. In this case (13) means something like ‘Whoever it was, it wasn’t sleeping that
he/she did.’, and in this case the scope relation is anyone > Neg > Focus. (14) also
shows that amwu-to is compatible in principle with this focus construction, as long
as negation can associate with some focalizable element besides the NPI.
(14) amwu-to mila-man manna-ci-nun anh-ass-ta
anyone Mira-only meet-COMP-FOC NEG-PAST-DECL
‘No one met only Mira.’
4. Generalizing the Immediate Scope Constraint
Here we provide evidence that in conjunction with the universal analysis of Korean
NPIs, the Generalized ISC (GISC) makes several correct predictions.
Korean examples with multiple quantification tend to be interpreted with scope
being isomorphic to linear order. On the assumption that the GISC holds, we cor-
rectly predict that (15a) is very unnatural, while (15b) is perfect.
(15) a. ?*amwu-to taypwupwun-uy kyengwu cip-ey eps-ess-ta
anyone most-GEN case house-at not.be-PAST-DECL
(any > most > Neg → *GISC)
b. taypwupwun-uy kyengwu amwu-to cip-ey eps-ess-ta
most-GEN case anyone house-at not.be-PAST-DECL
‘In most cases, there was nobody at home.’
(most > any > Neg)
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The contrasts in (15) also argue against any analysis which treats the true semantic
negation as a high abstract negative operator which takes both NPIs and Neg in its
scope. The only reason to posit such an abstract negation would be to license NPIs
in subject position, but then (15a) should be acceptable, as the effective scope rela-
tions would be Neg > any > most. Similarly, if the NPI anyone were an existential,
(15b) would require that negation scope over the subject; and if that were possible,
it ought to be possible too for (15a), giving the scope order just cited. These are
all incorrect predictions. Now, if logical scope corresponds closely to linear order,
as in (15b), negation has the lowest scope, consistent with the universal analysis of
the NPIs; and the infelicity of (15a) shows that negation cannot scope much higher
than its surface position. Only the universal analysis of NPIs predicts the contrast
in (15), in conjunction with the GISC.
Finally, there is one class of interactions which clearly favor the universal anal-
ysis. Ladusaw (1983, 389) observed that neither the ‘Attraction to Focus’ negation
nor denial negation (if they are distinct) is an acceptable licenser for English NPIs.
The NPI in (16) is acceptable only if the negation is not attracted to focus.
(16) John didn’t meet anyone on SundayF.
a. It was on Sunday that John didn’t meet anyone. (no attraction to
focus)
b. *It wasn’t on Sunday that John met anyone. (attraction to focus;
cannot licence NPI)
In the interpretation(s) of the example (16), negation cannot both license an NPI
and associate with focus; attraction to focus would require a scope structure Neg >
Focus > anyone, which the ISC disallows.
However, significantly, Korean does allow an extra focus in the same clause as
the NPI which can be targeted by the negation (see also (14)).
(17) mila-nun amwu-to ilyoilF-ey manna-ci-nun
Mira-TOP anyone Sunday-DAT meet-COMP-FOC
anh-ass-ta
NEG-PAST-DECL
‘Whoever Mira met, it wasn’t on Sunday that Mira met him.’
This difference between English and Korean can only be traced to the relative scope
properties of negation. In Korean, negation can both license an NPI (intuitively,
‘above’ negation), and target a separate focus (intuitively, ‘below’ negation).
(18) illustrates a similar contrast between the languages. We include here an
example from Turkish, which patterns just like Korean.1
(18) a. kutul-un amwuil-to wanpyekhakeyF ha-ci-nun
they-TOP any work perfectly do-COMP-FOC
anh-ass-ta
NEG-PAST-DECL
‘They didn’t do any work perfectlyF.’ (adverb negated)
1We are grateful to Jaklin Kornfilt for assistance with the Turkish examples.
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b. onlar hic¸bir is¸-i kusur-suz-caF yap-ma-dı-lar
they any work-ACC fault-less-ly do-NEG-PAST-3.PL
‘They didn’t do any work faultlesslyF.’ (adverb negated)
c. *They didn’t do any of the tasks perfectlyF/faultlesslyF.
(adverb negated; cf. Linebarger, 1980)
The interpretations in these languages show that the scope relations must be NPI >
Neg > Focus, so that the NPI outscopes Neg on the one hand, and Neg can negate
another constituent on the other – an account that is only consistent with the uni-
versal analysis of NPIs, respecting the GISC. This interpretation is impossible in
English. The precise basis of the typological difference between Korean and En-
glish, and whether it correlates with OV/VO, remains to be explored. However, the
evidence we have surveyed argues strongly that the GISC holds, allowing languages
to have either the existential or universal type of NPI.
Selected References
Chung, Daeho and Park, Hong-Keun. 1998. NPIs Outside of Negation Scope. In
Ho-Min Sohn and John Haig (eds.), Japanese/Korean Linguistics, volume 6,
pages 415–435, Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Giannakidou, Anastasia. 2000. Negative . . . Concord? Natural Language and Lin-
guistic Theory 18, 457–523.
Han, Chung-hye, Lidz, Jeffrey and Musolino, Julien. 2005. Verb-raising and Gram-
mar Competition in Korean: Evidence from Negation and Quantifier Scope. Lin-
guistic Inquiry, to appear.
Honcoop, Martin. 1998. Dynamic Excursions on Weak Islands. The Hague: Hol-
land Academic Graphics.
Horn, Laurence R. 2005. Airport ’86 Revisited: Toward a Unified Indefinite Any.
In Gregory N. Carlson and F. Jeffry Pelletier (eds.), The Partee Effect, pages
179–205, Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Kim, Kwang-sup. 1999. A Paradox in Korean NPI Licensing. Studies in Generative
Grammar 9, 403–428.
Kim, Ae-Ryung. 2002. Two Positions of Korean Negation. In Noriko Akatsuka and
Susan Strauss (eds.), Japanese/Korean Linguistics, volume 10, pages 587–600,
Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Ladusaw, William A. 1983. Logical form and conditions on grammaticality. Lin-
guistics and Philosophy 6, 373–392.
Lee, Hyunoo. 2001. The Morphology-Based Semantics of “Any” in English and
Korean. Enehak 31, 127–158.
Linebarger, Marcia. 1980. The Grammar of Negative Polarity. Ph. D.thesis, MIT.
Linebarger, Marcia. 1987. Negative Polarity and Grammatical Representation. Lin-
guistics and Philosophy 10, 325–387.
Sells, Peter. 2006. Interactions of Negative Polarity Items in Korean. In S. Kuno
et al. (eds.), Harvard Studies in Korean Linguistics, volume 11, pages 724–737,
Dept. of Linguistics, Harvard University.
KIM & SELLS: Generalizing the Immediate Scope Constraint 105
 
 
Licensing of Negative Polarity Particles 
 
Dmitry Levinson 
 
Stanford University 
 
 
 
 
 
Proceedings 
of the 
Workshop on Negation and Polarity 
 
 
Collaborative Research Center 441 
University of Tübingen 
Germany 
 
 
Hedde Zeijlstra and Jan-Philipp Soehn (Editors) 
 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106
  
Licensing of Negative Polarity Particles in English 
1 Introduction 
In this paper I discuss a class of Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) in English 
that I will call Negative Polarity Particles (NPPs). I observe that these items are 
only licensed by a subset of downward entailing (DE) environments. To 
distinguish the DE environments that can license NPPs I propose an additional 
condition of assertivity. I show that only environments that are both DE and 
assertive can license the NPPs. The combination ‘DE and assertive’, which I call 
semantically negative, is then shown to be helpful in explaining other semantic 
and pragmatic phenomena. 
2 Negative Polarity Particles 
2.1 The items and their properties 
The items I discuss in this paper are the following: negative aspectual 
particles yet, anymore, and the negative additive focus particle either. I call this 
class Negative Polarity Particles (NPPs). All these particles have positive 
counterparts: already, still and too, respectively. The NPPs rarely receive special 
attention in the NPI literature. Notable exceptions are papers on either, Rullmann 
(2003) and works referenced therein, and works on positive anymore. This is 
despite the fact that the class of NPPs has sometimes been identified (Krifka 
1995). 
Typical polarity items, including the frequently discussed any and ever, 
denote either minimum or, less frequently, maximum quantities. This creates an 
effect of emphasis or, less frequently, understatement (Israel 1996). In the most 
common case, the emphasis is achieved in downward entailing (DE) 
environments, and this was the motivation for DE as a licensing condition for the 
NPIs (Ladusaw 1980). This reasoning does not apply to the NPPs, therefore, 
there is no motivation for DE by itself as the licensing condition for the NPPs.  
In this paper I investigate the distribution of the NPPs, propose a licensing 
condition and provide a motivation for the proposed licensing condition. 
2.2 Distribution: a subset of DE environments 
While DE is a necessary condition for the licensing of the NPPs, it is not a 
sufficient condition. The following DE environments license NPPs: Negation, 
doubt, barely, few, rarely; negative implicative verbs like fail and refuse, 
without.  
(1) Few tourists are here yet. 
LEVINSON: Licensing of Negative Polarity Particles 107
  
(2) It didn’t rain yesterday, and I doubt it will rain today, either. 
(3) They barely talk anymore. 
On the other hand, the following DE environments do not license NPPs: 
antecedent of conditionals, restrictor of universals, complements of factives, 
comparatives, superlatives, emotive factives, before. 
(4) If you ever go to Brussels, you should buy me some Belgian chocolates. 
(5) I have never been to Amsterdam.*If I go to Brussels either, I will buy you 
some Belgian chocolates. 
(6) I regret that I ever went to Spain. 
(7) *I regret that I’m in Spain anymore. 
(8) *Everyone who is here anymore will receive a prize. 
A counterexample to the De Morgan hierarchy 
The most widespread classification of DE environments and their licensing 
capabilities is into anti-morphic, anti-additive, and other DE environments 
(Zwarts 1995). In van der Wouden’s (1997) terms, strong NPIs require an anti-
morphic environment, medium strength NPIs require an anti-additive 
environment, and weak NPIs require a DE environment of any kind. 
However, the NPPs cannot  be categorized as belonging to either the weak, 
medium or strong NPI class. On the one hand, the environments created by the 
quantifiers few and rarely are DE, but not anti-additive, and the NPPs are 
licensed by them, suggesting that the NPPs are weak NPIs. On the other hand, 
antecedents of conditionals and restrictors of universals, both anti-additive 
environments, fail to license the NPPs, as if the NPPs were strong NPIs. 
Therefore, the NPPs are a counterexample to this hierarchy as a universal 
classification of the distribution of NPIs. This also refutes the claim (Szabolcsi 
2004) that yet is a medium strength NPI licensed by anti-additive environments. 
3 My proposal: semantic negativity 
3.1 The concept of an ‘assertive’ environment and the licensing of NPPs 
In order to distinguish between those DE environments that license NPPs 
and those that do not I introduce the notion of an assertive environment. The 
environment of a predicate/proposition is assertive if the sentence makes a claim 
regarding the extent of the realization of the predicate/proposition. Examples of 
assertive and non-assertive environments will be given below. 
More definitions: 
(9) An environment is semantically negative iff it is both downward entailing 
and assertive. 
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(10) An environment is semantically positive iff it is both upward entailing 
and assertive. 
I propose the following licensing condition for the Negative Polarity 
Particles: 
(11) The NPPs are licensed by an environment which is semantically negative, 
that is, both downward entailing and assertive.  
This explains why some DE environments license the NPPs and some do 
not: those that license the NPPs are assertive, and those that do not license the 
NPPs are not assertive. 
I will demonstrate the concept ‘assertive’ on DE environments; however, 
this notion applies to environments regardless of their monotonicity properties. 
Compare the following two sentences, both containing the phrase participated in 
the marathon in a DE environment: 
(12) Few people participated in the marathon. [DE and assertive] 
(13) Everyone who participated in the marathon received a certificate. [DE, not 
assertive] 
Example (12) makes a claim regarding the realization of the predicate 
participated in the marathon, namely, that the predicate holds of few people. 
Therefore, the environment in which the predicate appears is assertive. The 
environment is also DE, so it is semantically negative, and the NPPs are licensed 
in such sentences. 
Example (13) refers to the individuals for which the predicates holds, but 
makes no claim regarding the realization of the predicate. Therefore, the 
environment in which the phrase appears is not assertive. Although it is DE, it is 
not semantically negative, and the NPPs are not licensed in such sentences. 
The following two sentences contain the proposition p = it will rain today in 
a DE environment: 
(14) I doubt it will rain today. [DE and assertive] 
(15) If it rains today, the hike will be canceled. [DE, not assertive] 
Example (14) makes an epistemic claim regarding the extent of realization of 
p, so the environment of  p is assertive. The environment is also DE, so it is 
semantically negative, and the NPPs are licensed in such sentences. 
Example (15) makes no claim regarding the extent of realization of p. 
Therefore, the environment in which p occurs is not assertive. Although it is DE, 
it is not semantically negative, and the NPPs are not licensed in such sentences. 
Although I adopt the term assertive from Hooper (1975), my definition and 
extent of application of the term differ significantly. For Hooper (1975), it is a 
property of a predicate receiving a sentential complement; moreover, this was 
applied only to positive predicates. My definition applies to an environment, and 
the assertion can be either positive or negative. 
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What is the reason for (11) as a licensing condition? One possible 
explanation is the argumentative orientation. Positively oriented clauses are used 
to make claims in the opposite direction of the negatively oriented clauses. In the 
negative clauses the main predicate is in a semantically negative environment, 
and the NPPs mark the negative argumentative orientation. This is elaborated in 
the following section. 
3.2 NPPs as markers of negative argumentative orientation 
It has been noticed that, depending on the quantifiers, a sentence can have a 
positive or negative argumentative orientation, and the argumentative orientation 
affects the way a sentence can be used in inferences. Such inferences have been 
used to determine whether the quantifier is positive or negative (Ducrot 1973; 
Horn 2002).  
Let’s consider the case in which we are interested in having as many as 
possible working printers (example adapted from Horn 2002). In this case the 
more printers work, the better the situation. In the examples below we see that 
“good news” can be said when work is in a semantically positive environment, 
“bad news” is the appropriate conclusion when work is in a semantically negative 
environment, and neither can be used when work is in a non-assertive 
environment.  
(16) Good/#Bad news: This printer works.  
(17) Good/#Bad news: Many printers work. 
(18) Bad/#Good news: This printer doesn’t work. 
(19) Bad/#Good news: Few printers work. 
(20) #Bad/#Good news: If this printer doesn’t work, I’ll try to fix it. 
In the sentences with the negative argumentative orientation the main 
predicate is in a semantically negative environment, and these are the sentences 
that license the NPPs. 
Another test for the argumentative orientation is substitution of clauses in 
sentences with discourse connectives. For but, sentences of the kind p but q are 
felicitous if p and q make claims towards opposite conclusions (Winter and 
Rimon 1994; Ducrot 1973). Consider the following sentences, uttered when 
someone went to do shopping and the question addressed is whether he will be 
able to buy something. 
(21) #He went to the store, but the store is open.      
 [positive] 
(22) He went to the store, but I doubt the store is open.   
 [negative] 
(23) He went to the store, #but if the store is open, he’ll buy something. [non-
assertive] 
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What are the sentences that license inferences like syntactically negative 
sentences? The answer can be given using the definitions in this paper: sentences 
in which one of the constituents is in a semantically negative environment. The 
quantifiers that license negative inferences are exactly those that license the 
NPPs. This can explain the licensing condition proposed in this paper: the NPPs 
are markers of argumentative force. The NPP accompanies a clause that can be 
used for negative inference: a semantically negative clause.  
3.3 Semantically negative predicates and tests for negation 
Some of the environments, defined in this paper as DE and assertive, were 
sometimes described in earlier literature as a natural class, without a formal 
definition. Jespersen (1917) described sentences with quantifiers like hardly, 
scarcely, and little/few as “approximate negation”. Klima (1964) classifies some 
NPI-licensing quantifiers as “negatives” by proposing that they contain the neg 
feature; all these create assertive environments, and also license NPPs. Klima 
also proposed a number of syntactic tests for ‘negativity’, but no semantic 
definition of negativity was provided. One of the tests is neither-tags: 
(24) He didn’t read it, and neither did I. 
(25) *He read it, and neither did I. 
After the proposal of DE as a licensing condition for the NPI like any and 
ever (Ladusaw 1980), the distinction between the “negative” DE environments 
and “non-negative” DE environments have been usually unnoticed. Huddleston 
and Pullum (2002), with principally the same tests for negativity as in Klima 
(1964), notice that the “approximate negators” pass these tests (26), and claim 
that it is DE that creates the negation. However, the DE environments that are not 
assertive do not pass these tests (27): 
(26) She hardly goes out these days, and neither does her son. 
(27) *If she goes out these days, we will meet her, and neither does her son. 
The environments that do pass the tests are all semantically negative, that is, 
DE and assertive. The definition of semantic negativity proposed in this paper 
explicates what these tests are sensitive to. 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper I demonstrated that the Negative Polarity Particles require a 
special licensing condition in addition to DE, and proposed assertivity as such a 
licensing condition. This introduces a new hierarchy of the DE environments. DE 
and assertivity together constitute semantic negativity, the combined licensing 
condition for the NPPs. The analysis also explicates the notions of ‘negativity’ 
and negative argumentative orientation in the previous literature. 
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Abstract 
In this paper I present data from two Norwegian 
dialects which each have two different negative 
markers with different distribution. In the dialect of 
Setesdal, as in the dialect of Älvdalen, the verb can 
move across a short form of negation but not the full 
form in non-asserted embedded clauses. In the dialects 
of Trøndelag the short negation may among others 
induce a peculiarity in imperatives. I discuss the 
possible explanation that these facts are related to the 
different syntactic status of the short negations, one 
being both a head and a specifier, the other being a 
specifier marked as a clitic. 
1 Introduction†
In this paper I will show that certain Scandinavian dialects have two different 
negative markers, which exhibit different syntactic patterns. These patterns have 
not been discussed in detail in previous syntactic analyses on negation in 
Mainland Scandinavian (henceforth ‘MSc.’)(such as Christensen 2005; Jensen 
2003; Zeijlstra 2004). In section two I present data from the Norwegian dialects 
of Setesdal and Trøndelag which differ from the ‘standard’ Eastern dialect, and 
in section three an analysis is proposed.  
2 Variation across Mainland Scandinavian varieties 
2.1 The dialect area of Trøndelag 
Weak pronouns in MSc. usually shift across adverbs and negation. In some of the 
varieties of the Trøndelag dialect (Central Norwegian), weak pronouns do not 
shift across the negation marker itj (Haugen 1982) but they do when the negation 
marker ikke is used (Endresen 1988) and also with all other adverbs. The form 
ikke is generally not accepted in the position before weak arguments.  
 
(2) a. I går  såg  itj æ dæ 
    yesterday  saw not I you 
 b. I går   såg æ dæ ikke 
    yesterday  saw I you not 
 c. *I går   såg ikke æ dæ 
 ‘I didn’t see you yesterday’ 
 
                                                        
† I thank Øystein Vangsnes for valuable discussion and comments, my informants 
and the audience at the NORMS Workshop on Verb Placement in Reykjavík 26.-27. 
January, where parts of this paper was presented. 
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The forms itj and ikke also behave different in imperatives. In Norwegian the 
imperative is generally speaking identical to the verbal stem. In the Trøndelag 
dialect area when forming imperatives, one group of verbs show homophony 
between the imperative and the infinitive, while the other group has 
unambiguous infinitival morphology. The presence of itj in imperatives allows 
the infinitival marker å to precede the verb (cf. 3a), but å is not necessary (cf. 
3c). The form ikke cannot combine with å (3b) or the distinct infinitival form 
(3d), i.e. ikke can only combine with the imperative form. The distinct infinitival 
form cannot be followed by negation (cf. 3g), contrary to the claim in Jensen 
(2003) that all MSc. languages can generally have verb initial imperatives. 
Adverbs are preferred in post-verbal position. 
  
(3)  a.  Itj  å  lesa   Donald  no! 
    not  to read.inf  Donald now 
b.  *ikke  å  lesa  Donald no! 
not  to read.inf  Donald now 
c.  Itj   lesa   Donald  no! 
not  read.inf  Donald  now 
d.  ?/??Ikke  lesa  Donald  no! 
    not  read.inf  Donald  now 
e.  Ikke   les   Donald  no! 
not  read.imp  Donald  now 
f.  ??Itj   les   Donald  no! 
    not  read.imp  Donald  now 
g.  ??Lesa   itj/ikke  Donald no! 
     read  not  Donald now 
‘Don’t read Donald Duck now!’ 
2.2 The dialects of Setesdal and Älvdalen 
In the dialects of Setesdal (Southern Norwegian) and Älvdalen (Sweden) there 
exist two different negative markers that affect the syntax of embedded clauses 
(Heggstad 1916; Wiklund 2006). As Bentzen (2005) shows for Northern 
Norwegian, movement of the verb from V-to-T in subordinate clauses cannot 
take place over negation. However, in the Setesdal and Älvdalen dialects the verb 
can move across the short negative marker, but not the longer negative marker. 
Note that these contexts are not contexts which allow in general embedded V2 
across Scandinavian.  
The data from Heggstad is partly confirmed by my own investigations, 
but today verb movement is only possible in non-presupposed clauses. The 
marker itj has the same distribution as inkji in these contexts: 
 
(4) The dialect of Setesdal (Heggstad 1916) 
a. Koss va det laga at du  (inkji) kom (kji) 
 how  was  it  made  that  you  not came     not 
 ’Why didn’t you come?’ 
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b. Dei spure kvi han (inkji) køyre (kji) stokkan 
they asked  why  he  not  drives  not  logs.the  
‘They asked why he doesn’t drive the logs’ 
c.  Her  va  ein  mann  som  (inkji) fann  (kji)  
 here was  a  man  who  not found  not 
 hesten  atte 
horse.the  again 
‘Here is a man who didn’t find his horse’ 
d. Itt  du  (inkji) vi  (kji)  me  de  goe,  so 
 if  you  not will  not  with the  good,  then
 lyt du  me  de  vonde 
 must  you  with the  bad 
‘If you won’t go with the good, then you have to go with the bad’ 
 
(5) The dialect of Älvdalen (Wiklund 2006) 
a.  John aunggrar  at  an  int (*it) ar  tajdh  examen       
           John regrets that he not has taken exam.the 
b.  John aunggrar  at  an  ar  (*int) it tajdh examen 
    John regrets that he has not taken exam.the 
 ‘John regrets that he didn’t take the exam’   
2.3 Summary 
In the dialect of Setesdal (and Älvdalen, see Garbacz 2007) the presence of the 
short form seems to be dependent on verb movement. The presence of the form 
itj in the dialects of Trøndelag does however not seem to be dependent on verb 
movement. In the rest of the paper I will focus on the Norwegian dialects.  
3 Analysis 
The exceptional distributional patterns are related to the forms itj (Trøndelag) 
and kji (Setesdal); ikke and inkji behave as Norwegian negation in general. In the 
following I will mainly consider the two short forms. Historically speaking the 
form itj is the result of phonological reduction and apocope of the unstressed 
final vowel of a previous form *inte/injtje > injtj > itj (Endresen 1988; Haugen 
1982), in other words itj constitutes the stress bearing syllable of the original 
form. The Setetsdal short form kji on the other hand has a different status: it 
constitutes a part of the full form inkji.  
The form inkji is homophonous to neuter of ingen (‘nobody’), i.e. 
meaning ‘nothing’. In the dialect of Oppdal ‘nothing’ is formed by negation itj 
and the existential quantifier nå. I nevertheless assume that these forms have the 
same structure, where itj/kji are heads with -in and -nå generated in their 
complement position. I also assume that kji is lexically marked as a clitic, hence 
kji always needs a host. The form itj on the other hand, does not have this 
feature. Accordingly, I propose the following for the internal structure of kji, 
inkji, itj and itjnå: 
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(6) a. kji: [NegP [Neg° kji]]  
b. inkji:  [NegP in [Neg° kji] [DP in]] 
c. itj:  [NegP [Neg° itj]] or [Neg° itj] 
d. itjnå:  [NegP [Neg° itj] [DP nå]] 
 
I adopt Platzack’s (1998) Visibility Condition on the C-domain stating that each 
projection in the C-domain must have phonological features, and Vangsnes’ 
(1999, 2001) principle of ‘identification’ which requires each functional 
projection to be ‘identified’ by an overt element at some step of the derivation. 
This principle is trigger for movement, as well as for insertion of functional 
elements. I furthermore adopt Westergaard & Vangsnes’ (2005) assumption that 
the C-domain in declaratives contains a TopP and a FinP, where FinP has to be 
identified by the verb and TopP by either the subject or the topicalized 
constituent. I suggest that the bare structure [NegP [Neg° kji]] is licensed when it 
is in the complement position of the verb. When the structure [NegP [Neg° kji]]  
is not licensed, in is generated in the complement position and rolled up in the 
specifier position in order to host kji. The form ikke is regarded as an XP.  
3.1 Imperatives 
Evidence from the diachrony of negative imperatives in the dialect of Oppdal 
(Haugen 1982) supports the historical development of itj. Haugen (1982: 149) 
notes that imperatives with the infinitive of the verb is an innovation, referring to 
’old’ imperatives where the verb has imperative morphology and negation 
following it: Jær itj ta versus Itj jårrå ta (’Don’t do that’). The hypothesis that a 
language that bans true negative imperatives1, exhibits an overt negative marker 
X° (Zeijlstra to appear), supports the view that itj can be a syntactic head, 
because itj occur with the infinitive form in imperatives.  
 It seems to be problematic in general to account for negative imperatives 
in Norwegian, since negation-initial imperatives are perfectly grammatical. This 
led Jensen (2003:159) to propose the following two structures for negative 
imperatives in Norwegian: (i) [TimpP V [vP NegP V]]] and (ii) [PolP2 [TimpP V [vP 
V]]]. For imperatives with infinitive morphology in the dialects of Trøndelag, I 
adopt the second structure where itj is the head of Pol° licensing an (abstract) 
infinitival marker in TIMP, and where the verb remains in situ (or possibly has 
moved to a low position in the IP-domain since the verb can precede adverbs).  
3.2 Verb movement 
Modern Norwegian does generally not allow verb movement in embedded 
clauses, whereas Old Norse and Middle Norwegian did. The data from Setesdal 
may be seen as a relic from that time, and a 100 years ago it seems that there 
                                                        
1 When the verb has imperative morphology. 
2 A negation/emphasis projection (of the split imperative IP) (Jensen 2003: 138) 
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were general verb movement across negation in the dialect, but not across 
emphasized negation. Today the possibility for verb movement is dependent on 
the presuppositional status of the embedded clause.3  
At least three different stages of verb movement can be identified. In the 
first stadium the verb moves in all types of embedded clauses. This seems still to 
be the case in the dialect of Älvdalen. In the second stage verb movement cannot 
apply in presupposed clauses (the dialect of Setesdal), and at the third stage there 
is never verb movement (the dialects of Trøndelag). The crucial question is why 
the verb no longer moves. This loss can be related to the verbs loosing capacity 
to identify the features on Fin° in embedded clauses.   
I assume that the C-domain in embedded clauses for stage two and three 
contain ForceP and FinP. The variation is due to what identifies FinP. In the 
grammar of stage three the subject alone can identify FinP. For the dialect of 
Setesdal I propose that there is a grammar saying that both the head and the 
specifier of Fin° have to be identified, where the difference between presupposed 
and non-presupposed clauses is the assumption that the factive complementizer 
introduces an iota-operator that turn the clause into a definite description (cf. 
Fitzpatrick 2005), by identifying Fin°, while in non-presupposed clauses the verb 
is still able to identify Fin°: 
 
Presupposed: [ForceP compFACT [FinP Subject [Fin° ι [NegP inkji [....Subject verb]]]]] 
Non-presupposed: [ForceP comp [FinP Subject [Fin° verb [NegP kji [...Subject verb]]]]] 
4 Concluding remarks 
I have shown that the differences between the two short negative markers itj and 
kji can be regarded as a consequence of their syntactic status and ultimately of 
their etymology. I assumed itj to be both an X° and an XP, while kji is an XP and 
lexically marked as a clitic. This explains the different behaviour in imperatives. 
Being a clitic, kji always needs a host – either the finite verb or a negative 
pronoun, the latter yielding the form inkji. Hence, the word order patterns 
identified with kji and inkji in embedded clauses are a result of verb movement or 
not.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 I am not considering asserted embedded clauses, which quite generally allow V-to-
C-movement and topicalization in the Scandinavian languages 
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Abstract
I argue that the class of interveners for NPI-Licensing matches exactly
with the class of operators that are treated as establishing a dynamic relation
between two Discourse Representation Structures within Discourse Repre-
sentation Theory (Kamp and Reyle, 1993).
1 Data
Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) such as English ever, any, give a damn in (1) must
occur in the scope of a licenser — negation or another appropriate items (Klima,
1964). NPIs are underlined in this paper.
(1) Kim didn’t give a damn about this issue.
If a universal quantifier takes scope between the negation and the NPI, the licensing
is blocked, as in (2-b). This has led Linebarger (1980) to postulate that the NPI
must be in the immediate scope of the licenser. Consequently, a universal quantifier
an intervener (for NPI licensing), i.e. the quantifier shows an intervention effect.
(2) a. Kim didn’t give any apple to every teacher.
b. *Kim didn’t give every teacher any apple.
Other quantified NPs (such as most N) and adverbial clauses (because-clauses)
also constitute interveners. In this paper, I focus on the difference in intervention
between and and or: While or does not block NPI licensing, and is an intervener.
(3) a. I doubt that Kim did her homework or went to any classes this week.
b. *I doubt that Kim did her homework and went to any classes this week.
According to Postal (2005), the difference between conjunction and disjunction
in intervention in NPI-licensing was first mentioned in Ross (1967). The data,
however, did not receive much attention in NPI research until recently, for example
Chierchia (2004). Postal (2005) shows that and blocks NPI licensing in all of its
conjuncts, whereas or is transparent for NPI licensing in either disjunct.
(4) a. I did not investigate any verbs or/ *and any nouns.
b. I did not investigate that verb or/ *and any nouns.
c. I did not investigate any verbs or/ *and that noun.
I will argue that the few existing accounts for the contrast in (3) are not satisfactory.
Taking a DRT perspective, however, the quantificational interveners and and group
together in a natural way: they can all be captured as a dynamic connection of two
DRSs; i.e. the first DRS can change the information state with respect to which
the second DRS is evaluated. In contrast to this, the non-intervening elements,
including disjunction, do not establish such an internally dynamic relation.
†I thank Garrett Hubing for help with English.
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2 Previous Approaches
Linebarger (1980) heavily relies on intervention effects in her theory of NPI li-
censing. An NPI must be in the immediate scope of a negation at the Logical Form
of the sentence in which it occurs, or at the Logical Form of an implicated sen-
tence (the so-called negative implicatum, NI). This theory predicts the disjunction-
conjunction asymmetry, since the or-sentence in (3) has (5) as its NI.
(5) I think that Kim did not do her homework and that Kim did not go to any
classes this week.
Here, the NPI any is in the immediate scope of a negation. For the conjunction in
(3) we cannot find a similar NI. While this is a very simple account of the facts,
there are general problems with Linebarger’s theory. To account for NPI licensing
by few N in (6-a), Linebarger derives an NI of the form in (6-b).
(6) a. Few students ever enjoyed syntax classes.
b. Many students didn’t ever enjoy syntax classes.
Note that (6-b) is only an implicature on the strong reading of few, i.e. the reading
where there is a presupposed set of students. The NPI licensing in (6-a), however,
also works with the weak reading of few. I conclude that while the NI approach
could account for the data in (3), it has independent, fundamental problems.
Chierchia (2004) presents the class of interveners for NPI licensing as a natu-
ral class: they are maximal elements on a contextually relevant scale. Thus, and is
the maximal element on the scale 〈or, and〉, whereas or is not. Similarly every is
maximal, whereas some is the minimal element on the same scale. This character-
ization accounts for the asymmetry in (3).
Chierchia shows with example (7) that while universal quantifiers are interven-
ers for NPI licensing, if -clauses are not. This is a potential problem for a theory
which treats implication as a universal quantification over situations and relates
intervention effects to universal quantifiers. Instead, Chierchia argues, the data
follow from the fact that if is not a maximal element on a scale.
(7) I doubt that if John gets drunk, anyone will be surprised.
Chierchia neglects the fact that there are two readings of if -clauses which do form
a scale and that, contrary to Chierchia’s expectation, the maximal element on this
scale can be found in the complement clause of doubt. (8) repeats the standard
examples for the two readings of if -clauses. In (8-a) every donkey that is owned
is taken care of, whereas in (8-b) only some dime needs to be put into the parking
meter. This puts the two readings of if -clauses on a scale. Chierchia would predict
that under negation only the weak reading, (8-b), is possible.
(8) a. If John owns a donkey, he cares for it.
b. If John has a dime, he puts it into the parking meter.
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(9) I doubt that if Jane gets an invitation to a Halloween party, she will miss it.
However, (9) is true in a situation in which Kim gets two invitations but only
goes to one party. This corresponds to a strong reading in the scope of negation.
This shows that Chierchia’s explanation for (7) is not compatible with his own
system. We will show in Section 5 that there is a much simpler explanation for the
non-intervention of if -clauses.
Postal (2005) provides many data on the conjunction-disjunction asymmetry.
He assumes that the disjunction cases are derived from an underlying coordination,
where a negation is present in each conjunct. This negation is extracted “across the
board”, and as a consequence the and is realized as or. Even though the nature
of the assumed lexical substitution of and with or is unclear, the NPI licensing in
disjunction is correctly accounted for. However, it remains questionable whether
Postal also accounts for the ungrammaticality of the and examples. For instance,
how and why is across the board extraction of negation from disjunction banned?
3 Discourse Representation Theory
I assume that the semantic representation of a sentence is a Discourse Represen-
tation Structure (DRS, Kamp and Reyle (1993); von Genabith et al. (2004)). A
DRS is a pair consisting of a universe of discourse referents (U ) and a set of con-
ditions (C). Conditions are either atomic (x1 = x2, or R(x1, . . . , xn)) or of the
form ¬K , K1orK2, K1⇒K2. In addition I use the sequencing/merge operator
“;” from Muskens (1996), which combines two DRSs into a new DRS. The se-
quencing operator is the representational reflex of syntactic co-ordination. The
interpretation of a DRS is formulated in terms of its context change potential.
In other words, a DRS maps an input information state g into some output in-
formation state h, where an information state is conceived of as a partial func-
tion from the set of discourse referents to the individuals in the model. Follow-
ing Muskens (1996), a DRS denotes a set of pairs of information states, where
[〈x1 . . . xn|C1 . . . Cm〉] = {〈g, h〉| g[x1 . . . xn]h & h ∈ [C1] ∩ . . . ∩ [Cm]} and
[K1;K2] = {〈g, h〉|∃i(〈g, i〉 ∈ [K1]&〈i, h〉 ∈ [K2])}. A condition denotes a set
of information states, where [x1 = x2] = {g|g(x1) = g(x2)}, [R(x1 . . . xn)] =
{g| 〈g(x1), . . . g(xn)〉 ∈ [R]}, [¬K] = {g| ¬∃h〈g, h〉 ∈ [K]}, [K1orK2] =
{g| ∃h(〈g, h〉 ∈ [K1] or 〈g, h〉 ∈ [K2])}, and [K1⇒K2] = {g| ∀h(〈g, h〉 ∈
[K1]→∃i〈h, i〉 ∈ [K2])}
When two DRSs,K1 and K2, are combined into a condition or a DRS, the sec-
ond DRS, K2, can either be interpreted with respect to the information state of the
combination or with respect to the output state of the first DRS, K1. In the latter
case, I speak of an internally dynamic DRS-combination. It follows from the in-
dicated semantics of DRSs and conditions that K1⇒K2 and K1;K2 are internally
dynamic, whereas K1orK2 is not.
The basic DRT language is enriched by conditions of the form QuantxK1K2,
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* I don’t think that every student read any book. * John didn’t drink wine and any coffee.
. . .
. . .
¬
. . .
. . .
K1⇒
. . .
. . .
npi
. . .
. . .
¬

K1;
. . .
. . .
npi


Figure 1: Potential DRSs with interveners.
where Quant is some determiner, x is the variable bound by this determiner, K1
is the restrictor and K2 is the nuclear scope. The interpretation of such conditions
depends on the choice of the quantifier, but in each case the condition is internally
dynamic (von Genabith et al., 2004).
4 Analysis
Leaving aside details of NPI licensing, I assume that an NPI must occur in the
scope of an appropriate operator. In (10) the licensing operators are characterized
as negation and the antecedent of an implication. This allows for NPIs in if -clauses
and in the restrictor of universal quantifiers.
(10) NPI Licensing: An NPI is licensed if it occurs within a DRS K which
occurs in a negation (¬K) or as the antecedent of a conditional (K⇒K ′).
The semantics of DRSs gives us a natural characterization of the interveners
from Section 1: They all introduce internally dynamic operators.
(11) Intervention: An internally dynamic operator may not intervene between
the semantic representation of an NPI and its licensing operator.
This constraint accounts for the intervention effect found with universal quantifiers
and co-ordination, since it excludes the potential DRSs in Fig. 1. It is important for
our approach that the sequencing operator “;” occurs as an explicit representation of
the co-ordination particle and instead of merging the DRSs of the two conjunctions.
With this representation, the parallelism between universal quantification and co-
ordination is captured in the presence of the internally dynamic operators (“⇒”
and “;”). If there is a disjunction, as in Fig. 2, the constraint in (11) does not lead
to a blocking of the licensing relation, since or is not internally dynamic.
The definition of the intervening operator correctly excludes NPIs in both con-
juncts and allows them in both disjuncts. It also excludes them in the nuclear scope
of a universal quantifier, but allows them in its restrictor, since principle (10) li-
censes NPIs in this position.
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John didn’t drink wine or any coffee.
. . .
. . .
¬
. . .
. . .
K1or
. . .
. . .
npi
Figure 2: DRS for a sentence with disjunction
5 Extensions
This account also extends to generalized quantifiers. As mentioned in Section 3,
generalized quantifiers are internally dynamic. Thus, they are correctly predicted to
show intervention effects. The same is true for numerals. It has been observed that
numerals show intervention effects if they have a quantificational interpretation.
Under such an interpretation, the numerals will be treated a generalized quantifier
rather than as an indefinite, and the intervention effect follows directly.1
Chierchia’s observation that if -clauses are not interveners can also be accounted
for. Consider the example in (12-a), whose paraphrase is given in (12-b), showing
that the negation is interpreted in the consequent of the conditional. If the nega-
tion had wide scope over the entire complement clause, we would get a reading
¬(φ→ ψ), which is equivalent to φ∧¬ψ. This reading is not available for (12-a),
as shown by the inadequacy of (12-c) as a paraphrase for (12-a).
(12) a. I doubt that if Mary goes to the party, she will wear a red dress.
b. = I think that if M. goes to the party, she will not wear a red dress.
c. 6= I think that M. goes to the party and she will not wear a red dress.
Following common practice in DRT, I assume a lexical decomposition of verbs
that incorporate a negation. Thus, I treat doubt as think that not, which gives us the
operators needed to represent (12-a) as in (12-b). The resulting DRS condition for
the complement clause is K⇒ ¬K ′. It follows from the NPI licensing condition in
(10) that an NPI is licensed if it occurs within K ′.
Since the if -clause is not in the scope of the negation, Chierchia’s argument
against the analogy of conditionals and universal quantifiers vanishes.
1An NPI which is embedded inside a definite NP is also not licensed (I would not kill a/*the man
who has ever helped me., Hoeksema (2000)). This follows immediately in a DRT-based perspective,
since the definite description is not constructed in the scope of a licensing operator such as negation
but rather enters the DRS via presupposition accommodation. Thus, the blocking of NPI-licensing
inside definite NPs is an issue independent of the intervention effects discussed in this paper.
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6 Conclusion
Using a DRT perspective, the operators that show intervention effects for NPI li-
censing can be characterized in terms of their inherent dynamic properties. This
immediately explains the asymmetry in intervention between disjunction and con-
junction and derives the similarity between conjunction and universals and gener-
alized quantifiers without further stipulation.
The question arises, of course, why the inherent dynamics of an operator should
block an NPI licensing relation. Nonetheless, it could be shown that the dynamic
perspective can shed new light on intervention effects.
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                                     Abstract 
Data from the FRED and the BNC-SpS corpora show 
that most varieties of non-standard British English 
allow n-words to co-exist with polarity items (PIs) in 
NC constructions. Two separate licensing mechanisms 
operate in such cases. Never is argued to bear [iNeg] 
features in some occasions, and [uNeg] features in some 
others. By means of real data, the assumption that, 
unlike Standard English, Non-Standard English has n-
words instead of negative quantifiers is strengthened. 
1 Introduction 
Negative Concord (NC) is a defining feature of non-standard varieties of English 
(Anderwald, 2002; Labov, 1972; Ladusaw, 1992; among many others). NC 
constructions contain more than one apparently negative element, but double 
negation does not arise. Consider the example in (1). 
 
(1) You couldn’t do no papers nor nothing.  (FRED, NTT_014) 
 
While it is often the case that only n-words (Laka, 1990) occur in NC 
constructions, the data from the FRED (Freiburg English Dialects) and the BNC-
SpS (the spoken sub-part of the British National Corpus) corpora reveal that n-
words and polarity items (PIs) of the any-set co-occur in a remarkable number of 
examples. For Non-Standard English, n-words are indefinites of the no-series 
like nobody, nothing, etc. which show a double-sided behaviour in being 
interpreted as quantifiers in certain occasions but as negative polarity items 
(NPIs) in some others. The purpose of the present piece of research is to present 
and analyse a number of observations that stem from real NC data in Non-
Standard British English.  
2 Data 
For the present study, 1,470 examples from the FRED corpus, and 274 from the 
BNC-SpS have been considered. While in the two sources there is a very high 
percentage of examples of NC between a negative element with [iNeg] features 
and one or more n-words, in both corpora there are also a number of examples 
where NC seems to ‘skip’ some elements that could have possibly been affected 
by NC. Some of these examples have been grouped under (2). 
 
(2) a. They doesn’t do no cultivating for any other. (FRED, HEB_030) 
b. But we dinnae have any nowhere.  (FRED, SEL_002) 
 
c. Can’t get lights or nothing on.   (BNC. KCN 5406) 
d. There wasn’t no violence or anything like that.  (FRED, SOM_003) 
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In (2a) the PI any occurs instead of its n-word counterpart no, which is what 
would be expected if NC were a pure ‘spreading’ phenomenon. In (2b), any 
occurs instead of none, and it can be observed that an n-word is also present. 
Finally, (2c) and (2d) illustrate two different cases related to the conjunction or. 
In neither of the two cases does or occur as nor, as is indeed observed in a 
number of examples from FRED, including (1). In (2d), in addition, or is 
followed by the PI anything.  
Similar examples are reported in the literature of other non-standard varieties 
of English such as Afro-American Vernacular English (AAVE). The examples 
below are from Labov (1972: 148). 
 
(3) a. We don’t ever see none of them guys. 
b. From then on, I didn’t have any trouble at school no more. 
 
That n-words and PIs co-occur in the same sentence in AAVE and most of 
the non-standard British English varieties represented in the FRED corpus (and 
in the BNC-SpS to a lesser extent) makes them comparable to NC languages. NC 
languages (all but Polish1) allow the simultaneous presence of n-words and PIs 
in negative contexts.  
3 Analysis 
3.1 Conventional NC data 
Adopting Chomsky’s (2005) Phase Theory, it is possible to account for those 
examples which contain a sentential negative marker and one (or more) n-words 
as cases of (Multiple) Agree (Zeijlstra, 2004). In other words, a negative element 
with an [iNeg] feature in NegP Agrees with one or various indefinites with 
matching uninterpretable features within the v*P phase. This is shown in (4). 
 
(4) a. I have [NegP [Neg0 n’t[iNeg]] [vP had none [uNeg] for weeks]] 
(BNC, KBE 5015) 
b. So you could [NegP [Neg0 n’t[iNeg]] [vP get nothing [uNeg] out of nothing [uNeg]]] 
     (FRED, SFK_010) 
 
For those varieties that allow Strict NC2, the analysis is also valid if the Verb 
Phrase Internal Subject Hypothesis is assumed to be correct. According to the 
VPISH, the subject is base-generated within vP and later moves out from it to 
end up in Spec, TP, where it can have its uninterpretable case features valued. 
                                                        
1 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this observation. 
2 Strict NC is observed in some of the speakers of the following dialectal areas and 
counties in the FRED corpus: the Hebrides (South Uist), Midlands (Shropshire), the 
Southeast (Kent and Suffolk), the Southwest (Wiltshire, Cornwall, Somerset and 
Oxfordshire) and Wales (Glamorgan).  
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Zeijlstra’s (2004) analysis for Strict NC languages is based on the assumption 
that the sentential negative marker bears a [uNeg] feature, as it is semantically 
non-negative. Thus, an Op¬ with [iNeg] features is merged in Spec, NegP. The 
checking of the [uNeg] features takes place before extracting the n-word to Spec, 
Neg, the edge of the v*P phase (Weiss, 2002), so that it can participate in the 
next phase. 
 
(5) Nobody did [NegP Op¬ [Neg0 n’t [uNeg]] [v*P (nobody) [uNeg] notice it]] 
(FRED, SAL_023) 
3.2 Unconventional NC data: a distributional restriction 
Two main observations can be made after inspecting the data. First, the licensing 
of n-words takes place within the v*P phase and, second, in those examples 
where n-words and PIs co-occur, only one n-word tends to participate in NC3. 
This is illustrated in the examples in (6) and (7). 
 
(6) a. None of them wouldn’t do anything.  (FRED, HEB_018) 
b. None of them would [NegP Op¬ [Neg0 n’t [uNeg]] [v*P (none of them) [uNeg] 
do anything]] 
 
(7) There wun’t nobody with any herring.  (FRED, SFK_006) 
 
The second observation is further supported by the figures from FRED and 
the BNC-SpS. These are displayed in Table 1 and show that no occurrences of 
Multiple Agree involving n-words are attested in sentences also containing PIs. 
Multiple Agree, however, is regularly found in both corpora with n-words only. 
Further research should determine to what extent the observed tendency follows 
from the interaction of the two different syntactic mechanisms that are at play in 
such cases and which I address in the remainder of the section. 
 
Table 1. Co-occurrence of n-words and NPIs in FRED and the BNC-SpS 
FRED corpus 
(dialectal areas) 
Total of examples of 
NC 
Negator + n-word(s) One n-word + PI(s) Various n-
words + PI 
Hebrides 25 23 2 0 
Isle of Man 7 7 0 0 
Midlands 130 127 3 0 
North 93 92 1 0 
Southwest 441 431 10 0 
Southeast 722 708 14 0 
Wales 31 28 3 0 
Scotland High 2 2 0 0 
Scotland Low 19 16 3 0 
BNC-SpS 275 273 2 0 
Moscati (2006) argues that apart from the semantic requirement of occurring 
in non-veridical contexts, PIs also need to have a widening feature they bear 
                                                        
3 Labov (1972: 148) reports the following example: Ain’t nobody ever thought about 
pickin’ up nothin’.  
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checked by a universal operator, which is inserted in the derivation after merging 
an element with valued [Neg] features. This is represented in (8) for Standard 
English. 
 
(8) a. John didn’t see anyone. 
b. [NegP∀[iW:  ] [Neg0 n’t [iNeg]]] [vP John [v see anyone [uW: val]]]  
 
The syntax of n-words is thus different from the syntax of PIs in non-
standard varieties of English. However, both elements coincide in that their 
licensor must bear [Neg] features. In the case of n-words the interpretability of 
these features is crucial, as n-words are assumed to carry a [uNeg] feature that 
has to be deleted via Agree with a negator with [iNeg] features. For PIs, on the 
other hand, valuation is at work4: PIs carry an uninterpretable valued widening 
feature, [uW:val] which is probed by the interpretable but unvalued widening 
feature of a universal operator. Such an operator is triggered by the presence of 
the valued negative features of the negator. The two licensing mechanisms are 
represented in (9) for the example in (2a). 
 
(9) Theyi does [NegP∀[iW:  ] [Neg0 n’t [iNeg]]] [vP ti [do no[uNeg,] cultivating for 
any[uW:val] other.  
3.2 N-word + n-word combinations 
Examples of n-word + n-word combinations, which are also observed in our data, 
can be divided into two types: (i) sentences with never + other n-words and (ii) 
true cases of n-word + n-word. In the former case, the analysis that has been 
assumed for the example in (4) could be maintained if never were a negator 
(Cheshire, 1998). I argue that this is the case in those examples where never is 
not clearly an n-word (i.e. when co-occurring with an n-word in the absence of 
the sentential negative marker). As a negator, it would be a bearer of [iNeg] 
features in those varieties of non-standard English that implement Non-Strict 
NC. In Strict NC varieties, on the other hand, never bears [uNeg] features, as 
sentential negative markers in languages like Czech. This would mirror the 
situation of sentential negative markers in Strict and Non-Strict NC languages 
(Zeijlstra, 2004). 
 
(10) a.  We never got nothing.   (FRED, DUR_003)  
b.  We [NegP [Neg0 never [iNeg]] [v*P got nothing [uNeg] ]] 
 
(11) a. Nobody never went away in them days. (FRED, NTT_009) 
b. Nobody [NegP Op¬ [Neg0 never [uNeg]] [v*P (nobody) [uNeg] went away in 
them days ]] 
                                                        
4 Torrego and Pesetsky (2001) assume that valuation and interpretability of features 
are independent concepts. 
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N-word + n-word combinations would be analysed as in (5), (6) and (11). 
That is, an Op¬ is merged to the structure to check the [uNeg] features of the n-
word(s) in the sentence. Op¬ is triggered so that no uninterpretable features 
remain unchecked and the sentence receives a negative interpretation (Zeijlstra, 
2004). 
As for nor, it is not the n-word counterpart of the conjunction or, so cases 
like (2d) are actually what is expected if only one n-word engages in an NC 
relationship with a negative element with [iNeg] features (cf. section 3.2). 
Likewise, cases of or nothing would in fact be instances of Multiple Agree 
between a negator with [iNeg] features and various n-words with [uNeg] 
features. 
It is also observed in the data that hardly and hardly ever are best analysed as 
NPIs (rather than negative quantifiers or n-words) in some of the varieties that 
constitute the FRED corpus. Examples such as the ones in (12) show that hardly 
and hardly ever are always licensed by a negator and do not express negation 
themselves. 
 
(12) a. You never hardly ever read.   (FRED, SOM_016) 
b. He never changed his crew, not hardly ever. (FRED, SFK_017) 
c. You never hardly see a woman in a pub in them days.     
(FRED, KEN_001) 
4 Conclusion 
After close inspection of the data obtained from the FRED and the BNC-SpS 
corpora, it was concluded that most varieties of non-standard British English 
allow, like other NC languages, the possibility of having n-words and PIs co-
occurring in negative environments. This is possible because NC is not a 
spreading phenomenon. That is, the occurrence of PIs instead of n-words is not a 
consequence of NC ‘skipping’ an element that can potentially belong to the no-
set. Rather, two independent syntactic mechanisms are available to license n-
words and PIs in negative contexts. 
The data that have been considered, however, show that whenever n-words 
and PIs co-occur in the same sentence, the number of n-words is often limited to 
one. Such an observation could be established as a restriction on the application 
of Multiple Agree under certain conditions in negative contexts, but further 
research should determine what exactly these conditions are. 
By means of real (i.e. non-idealised or invented) data further support has 
been given to the claim that, unlike Standard English, Non-Standard English 
does not have a set of true negative quantifiers, but a set of n-words that can act 
like NPIs in some occasions and like quantifiers in some others. This does not 
exclude the possibility that any-PIs occur in negative contexts yielding the same 
meaning as n-words, or that they co-occur with the latter.  
It has also been argued in the paper that never is to be analysed as a negator 
in some occasions. Unlike other n-words, never occurs extremely often with 
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other n-words in the absence of the negative marker. I have argued that it is 
underspecified for the interpretability of its negative features. This makes it 
possible to analyse it as an n-word with [uNeg] features when it co-occurs with 
the sentential negative marker. Such an analysis is also consistent with Zeijlstra’s 
(2004) semantic characterisation of sentential negative markers in Strict and 
Non-Strict NC languages. 
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Abstract 
We made a really important discovery; Shika-NPI 
construction in Tokyo Japanese, like Wh-questions, 
exhibits not only the prosodic, but also the interpretive 
property which is closely related to the former. This 
result provides further support for the necessity of an 
interdisciplinary approach to the theory of grammar, 
which seriously take prosody into consideration to the 
syntactic analyses. 
1 Introduction 
A number of recent works have shown that prosody plays a pivotal role in 
accounting for the nature of Wh-questions in (Tokyo) Japanese (Deguchi and 
Kitagawa 2002, Ishihara 2002, 2003, 2004, Kitagawa 2005, Kitagawa and Deguchi 
2002, Kitagawa and Fodor 2003, 2006, Kuroda 2005, among others). It is argued 
that the licensing and interpretation of Wh-phrases are closely tied to the Focus 
Intonation Prosody (FIP) that Wh-questions exhibit, and there is a close correlation 
between FIP and the interpretation/scope of Wh-phrases, which is referred to here 
as the Prosody-Scope Correspondence (PSC). This paper argues that the same is 
true with the licensing and interpretation of shika-NPIs in Tokyo Japanese, 1  
which require not only syntactic but also prosodic conditioning (i.e., FIP; Ishihara 
2005), and demonstrate the PSC.2 Our conclusions provide further credence to 
the interdisciplinary approach to the theory of grammar, in particular along the 
                                                        
† I would like to thank Jun Abe, Hiroshi Aoyagi, Shinichiro Ishihara, Yasuhiko Kato, 
Shin-Sook Kim, James Mesbur, Asako Uchibori, Akira Watanabe, Keiko Yoshimura, 
two anonymous Japanese/Korean Linguistics 16 abstract reviewers, two anonymous 
Workshop on Negation and Polarity 2007 abstract reviewers, and audiences at J/K 16 
(Kyoto University, Oct. 7–9), WECOL 2006 (California State University, Fresno, 
Oct. 27–29), and International Conference on East Asian Linguistics (University of 
Toronto, Nov. 10–12) for rewarding discussions, comments, and clarifications. All 
remaining errors are, of course, solely my own. This paper is an abridged version of 
Yamashita 2007c (see also Yamashita 2007b for more detailed discussions on shika-
NPIs). 
1  Throughout the paper, I only deal with Tokyo Japanese (in a broad sense, which 
includes the surrounding areas of Tokyo). 
2  Since the main purpose of this paper is to show that prosody plays a role in 
understanding shika-NPI constructions, I will not spend much time on the syntactic 
licensing conditions of shika-NPIs (see Yamashita 2007b). The shika-NPI examples 
used in this paper satisfy all syntactic conditions, e.g., the shika-NPI must be c-
commanded by a clause-mate negation. Also, I won’t make any commitment 
regarding the distinction between ‘Negative Polarity Item’ and ‘Negative Concord 
Item’ (see Watanabe 2004). For the semantics of shika-NPIs, see e.g., Yoshimura 
2007, and references cited therein. 
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line of Kitagawa’s (2005) research guidelines (1), casting doubt on “syntax-only” 
approach(es) (such as Hasegawa’s 1994 syntax-only analysis of shika-NPIs).  
 
 (1) Kitagawa’s 2005 Research Guidelines  (Kitagawa 2005: p.303)  
“the study of formal aspects of grammar should be conducted with much 
more careful attention to a larger context of language such as prosody, 
processing, and pragmatics than usually done”3  
2 Prosody and the Syntax of Shika-NPI Constructions in 
Tokyo Japanese 
I argue that what has been noted for Wh-questions in Tokyo Japanese is also 
observed with the shika-NPI constructions in Tokyo Japanese, which provides 
additional evidence for the interdisciplinary approach to the theory of grammar, 
along the line of Kitagawa’s research guidelines in (1).4
2.1 The Syntax of Shika-NPI Constructions (without Prosody) 
Hasegawa (1994) observes that otherwise ambiguous (2) becomes unambiguous 
when shika-NPI is scrambled to the vicinity of matrix Neg as in (3) (allowing 
only the matrix scope interpretation), akin to Takahashi’s (1993) observation 
regarding the Wh-movement effect of long-distance scrambling of Wh-phrase 
(Takahashi 1993: (4b)), and argues that A’-movement of an NPI to NegP-Spec 
fixes scope (Hasegawa 1994: (18)).5, 6 (N.B. CC = control complement) 
                                                        
3  For concreteness, I will concentrate on the “syntax-prosody” interface, but other 
factors such as processing and pragmatics should also be taken into consideration 
(which I will leave for future investigation). In fact, Kitagawa (2005) argues that not 
only prosody, but also other factors (such as pragmatics and processing) must be taken 
into considerations in investigating Wh-questions in Japanese. See also the series of 
works he is involved with, some of which are listed in the references of this paper. 
4  Due to space limitations, I won’t be able to discuss the prosody and syntax of Wh-
questions in Tokyo Japanese. See Yamashita 2007c: Sec.2, for a brief summary of 
this issue, and references/works cited therein.  
5  All the Japanese examples are transcribed in the modified Hepburn(“Hebon”)-
style Romanization (e.g., -shika, not -sika, which is with Kunrei-style Romanization). 
Most of the examples cited in this paper are modified, but in a way that does not 
distort the intention of the original data. I use the mark ‘~’ when the cited data are 
not exactly the same (even if it is a slight modification). The translations are provided 
to illustrate the rough structures of the examples and are not meant to be “correct” 
English translations. 
6  I assume here that shika-NPI in (2) stays in-situ inside the embedded clause. ‘In-
situ’ is used here in a broad sense in that shika-NPIs are not scrambled out of the 
clause it is base-generated in. Note that it may be possible to scramble string-
vacuously out of the embedded clause to some position in the matrix clause below 
the matrix indirect object. Such an option may plausibly be blocked by placing an 
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(2)   Naoya-wa  Mari-ni  [CC PRO  sono ramu-shika  nomiya-de   
  N.-TOP   M.-DAT      that rum-SHIKA  bar-LOC    
  noma-na-i-yooni]   iwa-nakat-ta.     
  drink-NEG-TNS-C  tell-NEG-TNS    
a.  ‘Naoya did not tell Mari [that she should ([Neg]) drink [NPI only  that rum]  
  at the bar].’                    (Embedded Scope)   
b.  ‘It ([Neg]) was [NPI only that rum] [that Naoya told Mari [not to drink   
  at the bar]].’                   (Matrix Scope)   
  (~Hasegawa 1994: (4c/16a), with her judgment)  
 
(3)   Sono ramu-shikai  Naoya-wa  Mari-ni  [CC PRO  ti  nomiya-de   
  that rum-SHIKA  N.-TOP   M.-DAT       bar-LOC    
  noma-na-i-yooni]   iwa-nakat-ta.     
  drink-NEG-TNS-C  tell-NEG-TNS    
a. * (Embedded Scope)  = (2)a  
b.  (Matrix Scope)    = (2)b  
  (~Hasegawa 1994: (16b), with her judgment)  
 
The judgment in (2) and (3), especially the crucial contrast regarding the 
unavailability of the embedded scope reading in (3), however, may not be as 
clear as Hasegawa observes, especially once FIP is taken into consideration. 
2.2 Focus Intonation Prosody and Prosody-Scope Correspondence in  
Shika-NPI Constructions 
Ishihara (2005) has shown, by conducting an experimental study, that essentially 
the same FIP found in Wh-questions is also found in shika-NPI constructions, as 
stated in (4).7, 8, 9
 
(4) Focus Intonation Prosody in shika-NPI constructions (FIPshika):   
Shika-NPI constructions require   
(i)  F0-boosting of XP -shika attaches to (F0 = fundamental frequency),  
                                                                                                                                   
appropriate adverb that modifies only the embedded verb. I won’t place any such 
adverb, so as not to make the sentence complex, but I note here that placing such 
adverb does not interfere with the interpretation of shika-NPIs in any significant way. 
7  I will use the following notations in indicating the prosody. Bold for F0-boosting, 
underline for F0-compression. I will also italicize and shade the relevant licensing 
head (e.g., -na- ‘Neg’).  
8  Due to space limitations, I cannot provide any pitch tracks. See Yamashita 2007b.  
9  Although shika-NPI constructions and Wh-questions in Tokyo Japanese exhibit 
essentially the same FIP, it does not necessarily mean that this holds for other 
dialects as well. As Tomoyuki Kubo (p.c., Oct., 2006) pointed out to me, shika-NPI 
constructions in Fukuoka Japanese does not exhibit the same FIP observed for Wh-
questions. I also note here that FIP of Wh-questions in Fukuoka Japanese is 
something different from that of Tokyo Japanese. See Kubo 1989 and his subsequent 
works on the FIP of Wh-questions in Fukuoka Japanese.  
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(ii)  followed by F0-compression until its licensing Neg, and   
(iii) F0-reset on the material after the licensing Neg, if there is one.   
(~Ishihara 2005: (2), “NPI-FI Hypothesis”)  
 
In this construction, an XP marked with -shika gets F0-boosted and the following 
sequence up until the licensing negation is F0-compressed, as indicated in (5). 
 
(5)   Mari-ga   ramu-shika   nomiya-de  noma-nakat-ta.    
  M.-NOM   rum-SHIKA  bar-LOC   drink-NEG-TNS   
  ‘Mari ([Neg]) drank [NPI only rum] at the bar.’   
  (~Ishihara 2005: (5B))  
 
 I argue that, once FIPshika is taken into consideration, (3) is in fact 
ambiguous and is prosodically disambiguated and such ambiguity shows that 
PSC is at work for shika-NPI construction as well, as stated in (6), making 
Hasegawa’s original observation that (3) lacks the embedded scope reading and 
“syntax-only” analysis (that depends on it) quite dubious. Thus, it is not the type 
of movement (and/or movement to a particular landing site, e.g., NegP-Spec) but 
the prosody that determines and indicates the scope of shika-NPI. 
 
(6) Prosody-Scope Correspondence in shika-NPI constructions (PSCshika):   
The scope of shika-NPIs is determined and indicated by the (post-focus) F0-
compression between shika-NPIs and the sentential negation morpheme 
(that (once) c-commanded shika-NPIs).  
 
(7) and (8) indicate how the FIPshika disambiguates the embedded and matrix 
scope reading associated with (2), where shika-NPI stays in-situ. 
 
(7) = (2)a; Embedded Scope; F0-compression until the embedded Neg.   
  Naoya-wa  Mari-ni  [CC PRO  sono ramu-shika  nomiya-de   
  N.-TOP   M.-DAT      that rum-SHIKA  bar-LOC    
  noma-na-i-yooni]   iwa-nakat-ta.     
  drink-NEG-TNS-C  tell-NEG-TNS    
 
(8) = (2)b; Matrix Scope; F0-compression until the matrix Neg.  
  Naoya-wa  Mari-ni  [CC PRO  sono ramu-shika  nomiya-de   
  N.-TOP   M.-DAT      that rum-SHIKA  bar-LOC    
  noma-na-i-yooni]   iwa-nakat-ta.     
  drink-NEG-TNS-C  tell-NEG-TNS    
 
Crucially, the disambiguation strategy by FIPshika is at work for the scrambling 
example in (3) as well, as shown in (9) and (10). 
 
(9) = (3)a; Embedded Scope; F0-compression until the embedded Neg.   
  Sono ramu-shikai  Naoya-wa  Mari-ni  [CC PRO  ti  nomiya-de   
  that rum-SHIKA  N.-TOP   M.-DAT       bar-LOC    
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  noma-na-i-yooni]   iwa-nakat-ta.     
  drink-NEG-TNS-C  tell-NEG-TNS    
 
(10) = (3)b; Matrix Scope; F0-compression until the matrix Neg.   
  Sono ramu-shikai  Naoya-wa  Mari-ni  [CC PRO  ti  nomiya-de   
  that rum-SHIKA  N.-TOP   M.-DAT       bar-LOC    
  noma-na-i-yooni]   iwa-nakat-ta.     
  drink-NEG-TNS-C  tell-NEG-TNS    
 
What is crucial in the present discussion is that, the availability of embedded 
scope in (3)a, as indicated by the FIPshika in (9), shows that Hasegawa’s (1994) 
analysis, which is based on the absence of such a reading, cannot be maintained. 
The scope possibilities of shika-NPI constructions thus exemplify that the 
prosodic factors (FIP and PSC) are necessary and indispensable for the proper 
understanding of shika-NPIs, on a par with Wh-questions in Japanese.  
3 Concluding Remarks 
A number of recent works (such as Deguchi and Kitagawa 2002 and Ishihara 
2002) which paid attention to the prosodic properties of Wh-questions revealed 
that certain apparently syntactic effects observed for this construction are 
actually prosodic in nature. I have shown in this paper that virtually the same 
holds for the shika-NPI constructions in Tokyo Japanese in that it exhibits Focus 
Intonation Prosody (FIP) and Prosody-Scope Correspondence (PSC), akin to 
what is found in Wh-questions in Tokyo Japanese. I hope to have shown that the 
prosodic factors (FIP and PSC) are necessary and indispensable for the proper 
understanding of not only Wh-questions but also shika-NPIs construction, calling 
for the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to the theory of grammar, 
which is couched under Kitagawa’s research guidelines in (1). As I see it, we 
must pay serious attention to the prosodic properties when conducting the syntactic 
analyses, especially of those constructions which obligatorily exhibit FIP.10  
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